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Erie is by no means simply a case.

—John Hart Ely1

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins2 was the most important federalism decision of the twentieth century. Justice Brandeis’s opinion for the Court
stated unequivocally that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law
of the state. . . . There is no federal general common law.”3 Although law
schools generally teach Erie in Civil Procedure—not Constitutional Law—
and American lawyers most often think of it as simply governing the law
applied by federal courts in their diversity jurisdiction, Erie’s core holding
states a fundamental truth about the allocation of lawmaking power in our
contemporary federal system. Federal law must be grounded in the Constitution or in statutes enacted by Congress; when neither source of law (nor
any federal treaty) applies, state law governs.
As we celebrate its 75th anniversary, however, Erie finds itself under
siege. The most obvious threat comes from a rising chorus of academic
criticism. Michael Greve sees Erie as not only “bereft of serious intellectual or constitutional support” but also as a cornerstone of a “cartel” federalism that suppresses beneficial competition among the states.4 Craig Green
has described Erie’s rationale as a “myth” that must be “repressed,”5 and
Suzanna Sherry has even gone so far as to brand Erie “the worst decision of
all time.”6 Outside the ivory tower, Erie’s restrictive vision of federal law1

John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 695 (1974). Although
Professor Ely’s landmark article generally defended the Erie decision, the statement quoted above was
part of the “myth” that he was criticizing. See id. at 697–98 (complaining that “the indiscriminate
admixture of all questions respecting choices between federal and state law in diversity cases, under the
single rubric of ‘the Erie doctrine’ or ‘the Erie problem,’ has served to make a major mystery out of
what are really three distinct and rather ordinary problems of statutory and constitutional interpretation”). As will be evident, I am considerably more sympathetic to this mythology, as I think Erie does
represent a fundamental point about the nature of our federal system.
2 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3 Id. at 78.
4 MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 373, 378–79 (2012). Professor
Greve’s market-oriented critique resonates with criticism of Erie by representatives of the defense bar.
See, e.g., Robert R. Gasaway & Ashley C. Parrish, In Praise of Erie—And Its Eventual Demise, 10 J. L.,
ECON. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2013).
5 Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 596 (2008) [hereinafter Green,
Repressing].
6 Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time,
39 PEPP. L. REV. 129, 130 (2011) [hereinafter Sherry, Wrong]. Somewhat surprisingly, Professor Sherry is not the first to engage in this particular hyperbole. See Arthur John Keefe, In Praise of Joseph
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making has been extensively circumvented by unfettered executive lawmaking7 and expansive theories of federal common law.8
Although Ed Purcell noted over a decade ago that the Erie literature
had reached “staggering proportions,”9 Erie is worth revisiting. Concluding
that Erie reached the wrong result—or even the right result for the wrong
reasons—would upset many foundational premises of modern American
law. By holding that state law ordinarily governs any question not touched
by positive federal enactments, Erie articulated a view of federal law as
fundamentally interstitial in its nature; where Congress has not acted, the
laws of the several states remain “the great and immensely valuable reservoirs of underlying law in the United States, available for the resolution of
controversies for which otherwise there would be no law.”10 This view has
shifted the focus of federalism doctrine from what Congress can do to what
it has done, paving the way for an extensive jurisprudence limiting national
power not by way of constitutional prohibition but through “clear statement
rules” and other canons of statutory construction.11
Story, Swift v. Tyson and “The” True National Common Law, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 316, 316 (1969) (“I
regard [Erie] as the worst [decision] by the Supreme Court in this Century, ranking with Dred Scott in
the last.”); 2 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 916 (1953) (insisting that Erie “stands revealed . . . as one of the most grossly unconstitutional governmental acts in the nation’s entire history”). African-Americans subjected to Jim Crow
laws under Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and the Japanese-Americans interned during
World War II under Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), might be surprised by these
assessments. For a more measured critique of Erie, see generally Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921 (2013) [hereinafter Nelson, Erie].
7 See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (stating that
“[f]ederal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes”); see generally Ernest A.
Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869 (2008) (discussing preemption of state regulatory authority by federal executive agencies).
8 See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 (1988) (fashioning a federal common law “military contractor’s defense” to block state tort suits against defense contractors); see generally Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639 (2008)
(describing the creation and application of federal common law) [hereinafter Young, Federal Common
Law].
9 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 2
(2000).
10 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 492
(1954).
11 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (holding that Congress must speak
clearly before altering the ordinary balance between the nation and the states); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229–36 (1947) (adopting a presumption against preemption of state law); see
generally Ernest A. Young, The Story of Gregory v. Ashcroft: Clear Statement Rules and the Statutory
Constitution of American Federalism, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 197, 206–24 (William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, & Elizabeth Garrett, eds., 2010); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 593 (1992).
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Not only does Erie provide much of the structural underpinning for
contemporary federalism doctrine, it also addresses—perhaps more than
any other decision in the federal courts canon—foundational questions
about the nature of law and the judicial function.12 Rejecting notions of a
“transcendental body of law,” Justice Brandeis purported to adopt contemporary theories of legal positivism; “law in the sense in which courts speak
of it today,” he insisted, “does not exist without some definite authority
behind it.”13 Although the extent to which Erie necessarily implicated issues of positivism and legal realism remains disputed,14 there is no doubt
that those issues have, in fact, played out on Erie’s terrain. Defending Erie
will require an exploration of what exactly we think courts do when they
decide legal questions.
This article seeks primarily to rescue Erie from its academic critics.
More ambitiously, I hope that by shoring up Erie’s intellectual foundations
this essay may lend support to the vision of limited federal lawmaking that
Erie embodied—that is, one in which the federal separation of powers reinforces federalism by limiting the occasions on which federal lawmaking
may displace state law.15 That vision is of more than theoretical import. Its
implications may govern practical controversies ranging from the domestic
force of customary international law to the preemptive effect of federal
regulatory policies on state tort law.16 Likewise, in an era of resurgent dynamism at the state level,17 Erie’s respect for the preservation of state pre12 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Federalism Revised, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 201 (1982) (book
review) (“Few pairs of decisions expose, manipulate, or challenge a wider range of American values
than do Swift and Erie.”).
13 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
14 See Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L.
REV. 673 (1998).
15 See generally Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79
TEXAS L. REV. 1321 (2001).
16 On customary international law, see, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726–28
(2004) (looking to Erie to constrain the scope of implied rights of action to enforce customary international law); Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing
Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007). On preemption of state tort law, see, e.g., Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 586–87 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that preemptive
effect should be limited to products of the Article I lawmaking process); see also Brief of Public Law
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 29, Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct.
2466
(2013)
(No.
12-142),
2013
WL
749936,
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v2/120142_resp_amcupls.authcheckdam.pdf (invoking Erie to govern federal courts’ construction of state law
for purposes of preemption analysis).
17 See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, State Governments Viewed
Favorably as Federal Rating Hits New Low (April 15, 2013), http://www.peoplepress.org/2013/04/15/state-govermnents-viewed-favorably-as-federal-rating-hits-new-low/ (“Even as
public views of the federal government in Washington have fallen to another new low, the public continues to see their state and local governments in a favorable light. . . . 57% express a favorable view of
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rogatives in the absence of a federal legislative consensus takes on renewed
importance.
The literature on Erie long ago passed the point at which anyone could
offer a truly comprehensive assessment. This essay focuses on the structural side of Erie—in particular, on what Erie has to say about federal lawmaking power. It gives relatively short shrift to debates, primarily in civil
procedure circles, about Erie’s day-to-day application.18 And even within
the structural conversation, I have surely overlooked important contributions. Such are the inherent risks of synthesis. Nonetheless, it is worth
pulling together the most prominent strands of criticism and seeing if they
can be answered.
I believe they can. My defense of Erie proceeds in four parts. Part I
offers a refresher on the Erie decision and its rationale, as well as on the
case that Erie overruled—Justice Joseph Story’s landmark decision in Swift
v. Tyson.19 Part II considers Erie’s statutory and pragmatic arguments, rehabilitating Erie’s interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act20 without insisting that Justice Story got that statute wrong at the time Swift was decided. Part III turns to the main event—Erie’s constitutional rationale. That
rationale, I submit, correctly wove together notions of federalism and separation of powers by insisting that Congress, not the federal courts, must act
in order to displace state law. Finally, Part IV situates Erie within the
broader context of contemporary federalism doctrine. Erie is far from an
anachronism, as some critics have suggested; rather, I argue that, federalism-wise, we are living in the Age of Erie.
I.

THE ERIE AND SWIFT DECISIONS

On a “dark night” in Pennsylvania, an Erie Railroad Company freight
train struck Harry Tompkins, a twenty-seven-year-old factory worker who

their state government – a five-point uptick from last year. By contrast, just 28% rate the federal government in Washington favorably. That is down five points from a year ago and the lowest percentage
ever in a Pew Research Center survey.”); Carl E. Van Horn, Power, Politics, and Public Policy in the
States, in THE STATE OF THE STATES 1 (Carl E. Van Horn ed., 4th ed. 2006) (“Today, at the beginning of
the twenty-first century, state governments are at the cutting edge of political and public policy reform. .
. . From health care, education, and homeland security to stem cell research, the right to die, and election reform, states are leading the way.”). By contrast, as this article goes to press, the Federal Government has once again experienced a government shutdown and come close to defaulting on its debt.
18 “Procedural” though they may be, those debates not infrequently turn on deeply-theorized
views about Erie’s structural meaning. See, e.g., Michael Steven Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1865 (2013) [hereinafter Green, Twin Aims]. I hope the present discussion may
be useful to these debates even if it does not engage them fully.
19 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
20 Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).
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was walking on a footpath alongside the train tracks.21 The impact severed
Tompkins’s arm, and when he had recovered he filed a personal injury suit
against the railroad. Because Tompkins was a citizen of Pennsylvania and
the railroad was incorporated in New York, he had access to federal court
on account of diversity of citizenship. Edward Purcell has explained that
Tompkins’s choice of federal rather than state court was in order “to avoid
what appeared to be a settled and highly unfavorable rule of Pennsylvania
common law,” which held that Tompkins was a trespasser on the railroad’s
right-of-way and, as a result, the railroad owed him no duty of care.22 Similarly, Tompkins filed in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York—rather than in a federal district court sitting in Pennsylvania—in order to take advantage of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ tendency to readily apply general common law rather than state law
in diversity cases.23 Tompkins was, in a word, forum-shopping.
The trial court accepted Tompkins’s argument that the general law, not
state law, applied, and the jury awarded him $30,000 in damages. The Second Circuit affirmed, agreeing that “it is well settled that the question of the
responsibility of a railroad for injuries caused by its servants is one of general law.”24 This meant that although the parties disagreed about whether
Pennsylvania law really cut off the railroad’s duties to the plaintiff, the
court “need not go into this matter since the defendant concedes that the
great weight of authority in other states is to the contrary.”25 The court of
appeals thus divined the content of this “general law” from an assortment of
federal decisions from other federal circuits; state court decisions from
Texas, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Missouri; and the American Law
Institute’s Restatement of Torts.26 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
“[b]ecause of the importance of the question whether the federal court was
free to disregard the alleged rule of the Pennsylvania common law.”27
Justice Louis Brandeis’s majority opinion opened by framing the
“question for decision” as “whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson shall now be disapproved.”28 Erie thus cannot be understood apart
from Swift, decided by Justice Story in 1842.29 That case arose out of a
complicated series of credit transactions involving a shady land speculation

21

Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69 (1938); PURCELL, supra note 9, at 95.
PURCELL, supra note 9, at 96.
23 See id. at 96–97. The Third Circuit, by contrast “tended to push the district courts in its circuit
to defer to local common law and apply divergent federal rules only sparingly.” Id. at 96.
24 Tompkins v. Erie R. Co., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d. Cir. 1937). Judge Swan wrote for a unanimous
panel, which included Learned Hand.
25 Id.
26 See id.
27 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938).
28 Id. at 69.
29 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
22
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in Maine and some businessmen in New York City.30 Basically, Norton
owed Swift some money on a previous debt. Norton paid Swift by signing
over to him a bill of exchange that Norton had received from Tyson in
payment for some land.31 When Swift tried to collect the bill from Tyson,
Tyson refused to pay on the ground that Norton defrauded him; it turned
out that Norton didn’t really own the land he had purported to sell to Tyson.
The substantive issue in the case boiled down to whether there was any
consideration when Norton gave Swift the bill. If there were, then Swift
would be a bona fide holder and therefore not subject to any fraud defense
that Tyson might raise.32
Swift sued Tyson on the bill in the federal circuit court for the Southern District of New York. Swift being from Maine and Tyson from New
York, federal jurisdiction rested on diversity of citizenship. The New York
courts had generally held that settlement of a preexisting debt was not valid
consideration, thus raising the question whether a federal court sitting in
diversity was obligated to follow those courts or make its own independent
judgment of the applicable commercial principles.33 Tyson argued that the
federal courts were bound by § 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789—now
known as the Rules of Decision Act—which provided that “[t]he laws of
the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the
United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply.”34 Justice Joseph Story’s opinion for the Court rejected
that argument, concluding that “the true interpretation of the 34th section
limited its application to state laws, strictly local, that is to say, to the positive statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by the local
tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a permanent locality.”35
Justice Story denied that the Rule of Decision Act applied “to questions of a more general nature . . . as, for example, to the construction of
ordinary contracts or other written instruments, and especially to questions

30 Tony Freyer has attempted to untangle the transactions in some detail in his extremely helpful
book, see TONY FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 4–6 (1981). Herbert Hovenkamp has similarly undertaken to explain the significance of
bills of exchange in antebellum commercial law, see Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 216–23. One of the
unpleasant realities confronting constitutional scholars drawn to the subject of Federal Jurisdiction is
that the merits of a disconcerting proportion of the critical cases turn on dizzying questions of commercial law.
31 George W. Tysen actually spelled his last name with an “e”, but the Court’s opinion misspelled
it. See Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 204 n.20. I will stick with the Court’s more familiar spelling here.
32 See Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 15–16.
33 Id. at 16–18.
34 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1652 (2012)).
35 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
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of general commercial law.”36 On these more general questions, the federal
court’s obligation was “to ascertain, upon general reasoning and legal analogie, . . . the just rule furnished by the principles of commercial law.”37
Although “the decisions of the local tribunals upon such subjects are entitled to . . . the most deliberate attention and respect of this court,” the federal courts were not bound to follow them.38 Having determined that the federal court was free “to express [its] own opinion of the true result of the
commercial law,” Justice Story had “no hesitation in saying, that a preexisting debt does constitute a valuable consideration” so that Tyson could
not assert Norton’s fraud as a ground for not paying Swift.39
Nearly a century later, Justice Brandeis read Swift as holding “that
federal courts exercising jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship need not, in matters of general jurisprudence, apply the unwritten law
of the State as declared by its highest court,” and that “they are free to exercise an independent judgment as to what the common law of the State is—
or should be.”40 Brandeis offered three distinct arguments for rejecting
Swift’s conclusion. First, he argued that Swift had misconstrued the Rules
of Decision Act. Although Swift had confined the Act to “state laws strictly
local,”41 Justice Brandeis read it to govern “all matters except those in
which some federal law is controlling.”42 Second, Brandeis said that
“[e]xperience in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, had revealed its
defects, political and social”; these defects included disuniformity of applicable laws between federal and state courts sitting in the same jurisdiction,
the difficulty of drawing a boundary “between the province of general law
and that of local law,” and “grave discrimination by noncitizens against
citizens” of particular states based on asymmetry of their access to federal
court.43 Finally, Brandeis insisted that “the unconstitutionality of the course
pursued [in Swift] has now been made clear”; “in applying the doctrine this
Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which . . . are reserved by
the Constitution to the several States.”44
Each of these sets of arguments has proven controversial. I discuss
Justice Brandeis’s construction of the Rules of Decision Act in Part II,
along with his pragmatic arguments about uniformity and discrimination.
Part III addresses Brandeis’s constitutional argument, which I take to be
grounded in principles of judicial federalism. Let me kill any suspense at
the outset: On each point, I think Justice Brandeis got it basically right.
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938).
Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 72.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 77–78, 80.
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THE STATUTORY AND PRAGMATIC ARGUMENTS

Although Justice Brandeis insisted that the dispositive arguments in
Erie were constitutional in nature, he also made important statements about
the governing statute, the Rules of Decision Act, and the pragmatic consequences of interpreting it to permit federal courts to apply their own “general law” rules of decision in diversity cases. This part canvasses those
arguments.
A.

The Rules of Decision Act

Both friends and foes of Erie tend to discount its statutory argument,
largely because Justice Brandeis relied prominently on a famously weak
argument about Section 34’s drafting history. I do not defend that particular argument, but I do contend that Section 34’s enacted text is best read to
foreclose the “general federal common law” rejected in Erie. That does not
mean that Swift itself was wrong. But as Ed Purcell has noted, “whatever
the First Congress intended with Section 34, it surely did not intend the
large-scale social practice that had evolved under Swift by the end of the
nineteenth century.”45 Erie was thus right on the statutory question, even if
some of Brandeis’s arguments are more persuasive than others.
1.

The Text of Section 34

Section 34 of the 1789 Judiciary Act provided:
The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at
common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply. 46

Justice Story’s opinion in Swift had construed the “laws of the several
States” to include only “state laws strictly local, that is to say, . . . the positive statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by the local
tribunals,” as well as “rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable
45

PURCELL, supra note 9, at 306; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 215–16 (suggesting that
both Swift and Erie were appropriate within the contexts of their respective times).
46 Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). The current version is codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (2012) (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”). The only arguably significant change is the substitution of “civil actions” for the older “trials at common law.”
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and intraterritorial in their nature and character.”47 The distinction was
not—as law students are sometimes taught—between written and unwritten
or judge-made law,48 but rather between “local” and “general” law, with
both classes including bodies of law embodied in judicial decisions and
statues conclusively falling in the former category.49
In Erie, Justice Brandeis’s opinion rejected Story’s reading. He noted
that Swift’s interpretation of Section 34 had been criticized, both for incorrectly interpreting the intent of the First Congress and for “the soundness of
the rule which it introduced.”50 But the dispositive factor, he said, was “the
more recent research of a competent scholar”—Brandeis’s friend and coauthor Charles Warren—“which established that the construction given to
[Section 34] by the Court was erroneous.”51
Professor Warren had unearthed an earlier draft of the Judiciary Act,
as well as a paper—apparently in the handwriting of Oliver Ellsworth—that
contained a draft of the amendment that became Section 34. This draft referred to “the Statute law of the several States in force for the time being
and their unwritten or common law now in use, whether by adoption from
the common law of England, the ancient statutes of the same, or otherwise.”52 Although the provision was amended to employ the somewhat
catchier “laws of the several States” language, Warren surmised that these
changes were purely stylistic and that the later language was supposed to
encompass the more specific categories laid out in Ellsworth’s draft.53
Brandeis concluded from this that “the purpose of the section was merely to
make certain that, in all matters except those in which some federal law is
controlling, the federal courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases would apply as their rules of decision the law of the State, unwritten as well as written.”54
Erie’s critics have, with considerable justification, jumped all over this
argument. The most obvious problem is that when Congress alters the original draft of a measure and adopts somewhat different language, there are
virtually always two possible explanations: (1) Congress meant to keep the
original meaning and the changes are merely stylistic, and (2) Congress
47

Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
See, e.g., Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 132–33 (asserting that Swift “interpreted the Act as
requiring the application of only state statutory law, and not state common law”).
49 See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, General Law in Federal Court, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 655, 664–93 (2013).
50 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938).
51 Id.
52 See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV.
L. REV. 49, 87 (1923).
53 See id. at 86–88.
54 Erie, 304 U.S. at 72–73. Whatever one thinks of this particular argument, one cannot help but
be a little wistful at the extent to which, in the 1930s, doctrinal and historical work was respected in the
academy and actually relied upon by the Court. Styles are different now, in both quarters.
48

File: Young Proofs

2013]

Created on: 1/16/2014 10:21:00 AM

Last Printed: 1/16/2014 10:22:00 AM

A GENERAL DEFENSE OF ERIE RAILROAD CO. V. TOMPKINS

27

meant to change the original meaning. The mere fact that the language
changed generally cannot assist us in choosing between these possibilities.55
Critics like Suzanna Sherry have thus rightly pointed out that “[i]n the absence of any further evidence . . . there is no way to determine whether the
change in . . . language was or was not intended to change the substantive
meaning of the statute.”56 As Judge Friendly observed, “the debate only
demonstrates on what quicksand any attempt to interpret so venerable a
statute on the basis of an unexplained change from an earlier draft must
rest.”57
The question remains, however, whether Justice Brandeis’s reading of
the Rules of Decision Act can stand without the support of Professor Warren’s drafting history. I think that it can. Fascination with Warren’s rummaging through the attic and cellars of the Capitol has distracted both
Erie’s defenders and its critics from the text of the statute Congress actually
adopted. That text requires federal courts to apply the “laws of the several
states” as “rules of decision” except in cases “where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide.”58 The
55 See, e.g., FREYER, supra note 30, at 112–13 (concluding that Warren’s discovery was “inconclusive[]”); Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 134; Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 954–55. Professor Field
has also pointed out that the earlier draft referred only to state statutes and common law rules in force at
the time; hence, “[t]o accept Warren’s conclusion, one would have to believe that the omission of this
language in the final version of the Act was only stylistic . . . with respect to the equation of statutory
and common law, but not with respect to its application only to preexisting law.” Martha A. Field,
Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 904 (1986) [hereinafter
Field, Sources of Law].
56 Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 134; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 207 & n.38 (collecting citations to contemporaneous criticism of Brandeis’s opinion on this point). Professor Sherry is
not quite right to say, with respect to “further evidence,” that “Warren had none.” Sherry, Wrong, supra
note 6, at 134. As Professor Nelson points out, Warren did offer one further argument to support his
conclusion: Ellsworth struck the word “statute” from the original draft, which had referred to the “Statute laws of the several states.” See Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 955 n.100 (discussing this point);
Warren, supra note 52, at 86. That does suggest that the adopted language did not address only statutes,
but it hardly proves that all the other forms of law discussed in the original draft were included in the
adopted text. See Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 955 n.100.
57 Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV.
383, 390 (1964).
58 Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). Louise Weinberg thinks that this
language is irrelevant to the lawmaking powers of the federal courts for two reasons: First, that the
Constitution—in particular, the Supremacy Clause—actually “requires” courts to make and apply federal common law, and second, that Section 34 must be irrelevant to the federal common law issue because
that law is supreme in both federal and state courts, while Section 34 applies only to federal courts. See
Louise Weinberg, The Curious Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme Federal Common
Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 860, 862, 865, & 867 (1989) [hereinafter Weinberg, Rules of Decision Act].
But while the Supremacy Clause renders unconstitutional state laws that contravene federal ones, nothing in the Clause generally empowers courts to fashion federal rules of decision; that Clause does not
speak to federal judicial powers at all. See generally Young, Federal Common Law, supra note 8, at
1655–56. And even if the Supremacy Clause could be said to countenance federal common lawmaking
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text makes no distinction between state statutes and state unwritten law, and
no one disputes that unwritten law was considered “law” in the late eighteenth century.59 Indeed, as I have already noted, Justice Story did not draw
the line here in Swift.60
What Story rejected was the proposition that “the word ‘laws,’ in [Section 34], includes within the scope of its meaning, the decisions of the local
tribunals.”61 He explained:
In the ordinary use of language, it will hardly be contended, that the decisions of courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are not, of themselves, laws. They are often re-examined, reversed and qualified by the courts themselves,
whenever they are found to be either defective, or ill-founded, or otherwise incorrect. The
laws of a state are more usually understood to mean the rules and enactments promulgated by
the legislative authority thereof, or long-established local customs having the force of laws.62

Although this passage is sometimes read to distinguish between written and unwritten law, that cannot be right. Story alludes to “longestablished local customs,” even though those customs were likely to be
unwritten, as laws.63 Moreover, if a state decision is only “evidence of what
in certain instances, those instances are driven by a specific interpretation of underlying federal constitutional or statutory norms. See, e.g., Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (inferring federal common lawmaking powers in foreign affairs cases from particularly strong federal interests and separation of powers principles unique to that context); Young, Federal Common Law, supra
note 8, at 1674–78 (questioning inferences of lawmaking power from mere “interests” but pointing out
that those interests are limited to particular contexts). These instances, to the extent that they are legitimate at all, are exceptions to the Rules of Decision Act’s mandate.
As to the second point, it is fair to say that the Rules of Decision Act mirrors the language of the Supremacy Clause itself—that is, it limits the categories of federal law that can supplant state law. So
viewed, it makes sense that the Act is limited to the federal courts, both because Congress does not share
the same responsibility to provide detailed rules for the operation of state courts that it has for federal
courts, and because the Supremacy Clause itself applies the same principle directly to the state courts.
See U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2 (providing not only that federal law is not only “the supreme law of the
land,” but also that “the judges in every state shall be bound thereby”).
59 Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789); see also FREYER, supra note 30, at
23–26 (explaining that antebellum lawyers accepted non-statutory commercial law principles as “law,”
but noting that the debate concerned “whether commercial practice or judicial precedent was the surest
guide” to that law’s meaning); id. at 35 (finding “little room for doubt that the ‘laws of the several
states’ included statutes, decisions by state courts, and vaguely defined ‘local customs’”).
60 See text accompanying notes 35–36. As Jack Goldsmith and Steven Walt have pointed out,
“[i]t is doubtful that Swift represented a commitment to or belief in the ‘brooding omnipresence’ theory
later attributed to it by Holmes and Erie.” Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 14, at 682. Justice Story was
himself a legal positivist and would have had no doubt that courts deciding common law cases are
making “law.” See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federalism Revised, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 224–25 (1982)
(book review) (“Story himself had a positivistic view of the rule of law.”).
61 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
62 Id.
63 See, e.g., RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH U. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON
LAW 107 (1977) (“[T]here has been much misunderstanding generated by commentators who have
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the laws are” in a case involving contracts or property, for example, it remains the case that the underlying “laws” were generally unwritten. Story
is thus better read as distinguishing between the federal courts’ obligation
to follow state law and their obligation to follow state courts. Caleb Nelson
has observed that when the Judiciary Act of 1789 was drafted, “people did
not automatically treat the phrase ‘unwritten or common law’ as a synonym
for ‘judicial decisions.’”64 Hence, even if Section 34 required federal judges to apply state unwritten law in diversity cases, it would not necessarily
require them to take the interpretation of that law by state courts as conclusive of its meaning.65
And yet this is not actually the line that the Swift Court drew either.
The Court had made clear that it was obligated to follow not only state law,
but also state court constructions of that law, in cases involving state statutes.66 As Justice Story was well-aware, the Court had held fifteen years
prior to Swift that it must also follow the state supreme courts on matters
involving the unwritten law of testamentary disposition.67 Acknowledging
that “many of the cases in which this Court has deemed itself bound to conform to State decisions, have arisen on the construction of statutes,” the
Court had pointed out that “the same rule has been extended to other cases;
and there can be no good reason assigned why it should not be, when it is
applying settled rules of real property.”68 “This Court adopts the State decisions,” the Court had said, “because they settle the law applicable to the
case.”69 Hence, in Swift, Story acknowledged the federal courts’ obligation
to follow the state courts’ construction of the local, as opposed to general,
law—whether those laws were written or unwritten.70
suggested that Swift provided for binding weight to be given by federal courts only to state cases construing state statutes. This, of course, was not true. . . .”); Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 925–26 (noting
that, in Swift, “Justice Story took for granted that not only ‘the positive statutes of the state’ but also
‘local customs having the force of laws’ supplied rules of decision for federal courts”).
64 Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 955.
65 Id. at 955–56.
66 See, e.g., Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 159–60 (1825); Green v. Neal’s Lessee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291 (1832); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER &
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 554,
n.2 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
67 Jackson v. Chew, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 153, 168–69 (1827). Justice Story, who joined the Court
in 1811, would have been part of the Court that decided Jackson.
68 Id. at 167.
69 Id. (emphasis added).
70 See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at
554 (observing that Justice Story “drew a distinction between ‘local’ law (statutes and usages), on the
one hand, and ‘general commercial law’ on the other”); BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 107
(“Justice Story . . . did not simply hold that the Rules of Decision Act bound federal courts to follow
state statutes and the decisions of the state courts construing those statutes. He also pointed out that the
Act was equally obligatory on all other ‘local’ matters, especially in matters affecting title to real property.”); see also Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 925 (explaining that “[t]he ‘local’ law of a particular state
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The critical point is that Justice Story thought this distinction—
between local and general law—captured the meaning of the Rules of Decision Act.71 Where that Act applied, in other words, the federal courts were
obligated not only to follow state law, but also to follow the decisions of
state courts construing that law. And the reason appears to have been
grounded in the different functions being performed by a state court in local
and general cases.
In cases “not at all dependent upon local statutes or local usages of a
fixed and permanent operation” but rather involving “questions of general
commercial law,” Story observed, “the state tribunals are called upon to
perform the like functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon general
reasoning and legal analogies . . . what is the just rule furnished by the principles of commercial law to govern the case.”72 Although Story did not
spell out what he viewed the state courts as doing in local cases, the implication is clear that state courts did not share “the like functions as ourselves” in those cases—that is, that state courts bear a special authoritative
relationship to local law that they do not share with the federal courts.
Much of the confusion about Swift—and therefore about Erie—stems from
misunderstanding the “like function” that state and federal courts exercised
in general law cases.
2.

General and Local Law in the Nineteenth Century

The “general law” applied in Swift raises conceptual difficulties for
contemporary lawyers on two distinct grounds. First, it was often thought
to be customary law, which differs not only from statute law but also from
common law as modern lawyers conceive it.73 Second, it was neither state
nor federal in nature, and thus it raises conceptual difficulties for contemporary lawyers accustomed to thinking that those are the only two choices.74
Both these qualities eroded by the end of the nineteenth century, and that
erosion set the stage for Erie. But so long as they each held true, it is posincluded both its written laws (such as the state constitution and statutes enacted by the state legislature)
and at least a portion of its unwritten law (such as rules grounded in peculiar local customs and rules
about the status of land and other things with a fixed locality in the state)”).
71 See FREYER, supra note 30, at 35–36 (“[Justice Story’s] construction of section 34 rested upon
a distinction between general and local law which was familiar to antebellum lawyers and judges.”).
72 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19.
73 See, e.g., FREYER, supra note 30, at 38 (noting that Justice Story “said that business necessity
and usage were the best guides” to the content of the general commercial law). On customary law, see
generally DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW (2010).
74 See generally Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (2006)
[hereinafter Nelson, General Law] (noting the persistence of law that is neither state nor federal); Bellia
& Clark, supra note 49, at 658 (rejecting the notion that “the Constitution prohibits federal courts from
applying general law under any circumstances”).
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sible to say that Swift was entirely consistent with the Rules of Decision
Act—and with the Constitution as well.75
Customary law is “bottom–up” law—that is, it arises out of the practices of predominantly private actors rather than a “top–down” normative
command of the sovereign.76 It is true that for custom to become binding as
law there must be an “extra ingredient,” such as a demonstration that private actors follow the custom from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris),
the endurance of the custom from “time immemorial,” or a conclusion that
the custom is consistent with right reason.77 But the basic norms emerge
from practice. Hence, although Justice Story relied on a wide range of judicial authorities in Swift, the underlying commercial law principles rested
on the customary practices of merchants.78
Tony Freyer has demonstrated that American jurists disputed the relative importance of reason and practice under the general commercial law.79
The important point for present purposes, however, is that a court enforcing
a customary rule of commercial law is engaged in a quite different enterprise than, say, a court formulating a common law doctrine of products liability. The former inquiry will focus on the practices and legitimate expectations of the parties to the transaction,80 while the latter (if the question is
an open one) will engage more normative policy considerations about optimal deterrence, loss-spreading, and fairness.81
75 See, e.g., Bellia & Clark, supra note 49, at 662 (rejecting “modern suggestions that the Swift
Court misconstrued section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 or usurped state authority under the Constitution”).
76 See, e.g., BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 13 (“[T]he original source of customary law
is the behavior of individuals. It depends for its authority upon regular and continued practice and
acceptance by individuals.”); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J.
INT’L L. 449, 465 (2000) (“Customary law’s authority comes from the internalized normative beliefs of
the political community and not from a defined process or ritual through which law is determined.”).
77 See BEDERMAN, supra note 73, at 3–4; Emily E. Kadens & Ernest A. Young, How Customary
is Customary International Law? 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 885, 907–11 (2013).
78 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Erie-effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive
Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1791 (1997) (“The common law at issue in Swift was the law merchant. The law merchant was customary law. Customary law was constituted by the usual or ordinary
understandings of parties to a commercial transaction.”); Michael Conant, The Commerce Clause, the
Supremacy Clause and the Law Merchant: Swift v. Tyson and the Unity of Commercial Law, 15 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 153, 156 (1984) (“The customary origin of the commercial law . . . . meant that courts
did not . . . create descriptive categories of legal wrongs and remedies. Rather, the merchants created
the patterns of customary behavior that were most efficient . . . and the courts adopted rules to enforce
these customs.”). As one English jurist put it, “[t]he law merchant thus spoken of with reference to bills
of exchange and other negotiable securities . . . is neither more nor less than the usages of merchants and
traders . . . ratified by the decisions of Courts of law.” Goodwin v. Robarts, L.R. 10 Exch. 337, 346
(1875).
79 FREYER, supra note 30, at 23–25.
80 See, e.g., BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 4.
81 See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 403-04 (1959) (asserting, in a
products liability case, that “[p]ublic policy . . . finds expression” not only “in the Constitution” and “the
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One might concede that a court is “making law” in either case. Much
as Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle suggests that an observer cannot
simply observe a phenomenon without altering what is being observed,82 a
court cannot articulate a legal rule reflecting the practices of private actors
without also, to at least some degree, shaping those practices.83 Moreover,
customary law’s binding force must still derive from the decision of the
legitimate legal authorities to apply it; in this sense, customary law is generally traceable to some sovereign’s command.84 Nonetheless, a critical
distinction remains between the two modes of judging: it is the difference
between trying to follow the practices of others and choosing the best practice by one’s own lights.85 That distinction exists even in contemporary
practice prescribed by Erie itself, as federal courts must try to follow state
law in diversity cases while enjoying greater autonomy in enclaves of federal common law.86
statutory law,” but also “in judicial decisions”; “[t]he task of the judiciary” includes weighing policy
considerations in order effectively “to protect the ordinary man against the loss of important rights”).
82 “According to Heisenberg, the more accurately you measure where a particle is, the less accurately you are able to measure where it's going.” Laurence Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional
Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1989) (citing
WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY: THE REVOLUTION IN MODERN SCIENCE 47–48
(1958)). This principle “relies generally on two premises: first, that any observation necessarily requires
intervention into the system being studied; and second, that we can never be certain that the intervention
did not itself change the system in some unknown way.” Id. at 18.
83 See id. at 20–23 (“[C]ourts must take account of how the very process of legal ‘observation’
(i.e., judging) shapes both the judges themselves and the materials being judged.”).
84 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA.
J. INT’L L. 365, 491-92 (2002) [hereinafter Young, CIL] (arguing that the Swift regime was consistent in
theory with legal positivism); Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 14, at 695 (pointing out that many of
Swift’s defenders justified the application of general law as authorized by Article III); BRIDWELL &
WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 95–97, 110–11 (reading the Rules of Decision Act as a choice of law principle mandating application of general law in commercial cases).
85 See, e.g., BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 115 (arguing that, under Swift, “federal
judges . . . ‘searched for’ the legal rules they enforced in the parties’ own conduct, rather than creating
and imposing them from on high out of ‘competing social policies’”).
86 For a typical statement of a federal court’s obligation to follow—not construct—state law under
Erie, see McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 661 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that a federal court
deciding an issue of state law under Erie must follow any interpretation of state law articulated by the
state supreme court and, if no such interpretation exists, “predict[] . . . how the state’s highest court
would decide were it confronted with the problem”). Commentators have disagreed as to the precise
nature of this obligation. Compare, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Law of the Several States:
Positivism and Judicial Federalism after Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459 (1997) (arguing that Erie forecloses federal courts from trying to predict how the state supreme court would resolve unsettled questions of state law), with Benjamin C. Glassman, Making State Law in Federal Court, 41 GONZ. L. REV.
237 (2006) (arguing federal courts should make their own judgment based on all available state law
sources as to the content of state law). But no one argues that federal courts in this situation exercise the
same sort of lawmaking function that they might within an established enclave of federal common
lawmaking authority. See, e.g., Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282,
285 (1952) (“To some extent courts exercising jurisdiction in maritime affairs have felt freer than com-
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Courts applying the general commercial law decided cases according
to the custom of merchants in order to protect party expectations. As Professors Bridwell and Whitten explain, “[t]he primary function of a customary system [is] to preserve a context in which autonomous party behavior
has its maximum possible range without defeating the widespread, legitimate expectations of others.”87 As part of this regime, “a wide range of
customary rules were designed to clarify or settle the intent of private contracting parties when they had made no unequivocal, express agreement.”88
Hence, “the critical feature of the Swift common law system was a decisional process or function that was designed to vindicate the legitimate and
discernable expectations of the parties to any given dispute.”89
A strong scholarly consensus agrees that the general commercial law
was not considered to be federal in nature,90 and that conclusion finds further support in the Founding Generation’s refusal to incorporate the common law into the Constitution.91 In Wheaton v. Peters, the Marshall Court
announced that “[i]t is clear, there can be no common law of the United
States.”92 As Justice McClean explained,

mon-law courts in fashioning rules . . . .”); Preble Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea,
51 CAL. L. REV. 661, 718 (1963) (“From the beginning admiralty judges have retained the inventiveness
and initiative characteristic of common law courts in private law areas.”).
87 BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 58; see also Conant, supra note 78, at 153–54; Andrew P. Morriss, Hayek and Cowboys: Customary Law in the American West, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY
35, 39 (2005) (describing Friedrich Hayek’s theory of customary law and observing that “[t]he key
characteristic of a Hayekian legal institution’s generation of rules . . . rests on a connection between a
rule and individual expectations regarding the outcome of an interaction.”).
88 BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 58.
89 Id. at 4. They explain that under this approach, “the federal courts were able to avoid ‘making’
law in the only sense in which the term ‘making’ is important to the parties in a lawsuit—that is, the
application, ex post facto, of a rule or principle not within the legitimate anticipations of the parties to
the transaction or event in question.” Id. at 5.
90 See, e.g., William Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1521–25 (1984); FREYER, supra note
30, at 137–43; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 554–56, 655; Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1292-93 (2007) [hereinafter Clark, Erie’s Source]; Stewart Jay,
The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 832–33 (1989); see
also Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 740 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (“General common law was not federal law under the Supremacy Clause.”). Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s opinion, and although the majority opinion did not
address this point directly, it did not appear to disagree.
91 See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (rejecting the notion
of federal common law crimes); see generally Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 131–42 (1996)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (chronicling the Framers’ reluctance to federalize the common law); HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 610–12; Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 1003, 1069-72 (1985) [hereinafter Jay, Part One]; Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common
Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1254–57 (1985) [hereinafter Jay, Part Two].
92 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834).
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[t]here is no principle which pervades the union and has the authority of law, that is not embodied in the constitution or laws of the Union. The common law could be made a part of
our federal system, only by legislative adoption. When, therefore, a common law right is asserted, we must look to the state in which the controversy originated.93

It was not necessary to apply state law, however, where “the states
themselves purported to adhere to an extraterritorial body of customary
principle.”94 As Justice Story noted in Swift, state judges in commercial
cases were “called upon to perform the like functions as ourselves”—that
is, to apply general law.95 General law was thus “shared law” among the
federal and state courts.96 As Judge Fletcher has demonstrated, all American courts tried to interpret commercial custom in such a way as to maintain uniformity across jurisdictions, but no court exercised supreme interpretive authority and courts did, from time to time, simply disagree about
the content of general law.97 In the first half of the nineteenth century, this
arrangement managed to maintain an impressive degree of uniformity in the
commercial law despite the absence of “one court to rule them all” as it
were.98
The distinctively “national” aspect of the Swift regime derived not
from any notion of federal supremacy, but rather from the federal courts’
ability to provide a neutral forum for litigation among citizens of different
states. As Professors Bridwell and Whitten explain, “[i]n a customary law
system in which the purpose of a grant of subject matter jurisdiction is to
protect nonresidents from local bias, the intentions and expectations of the
parties to every dispute had to be determined by a tribunal independent of
the apprehended local prejudice.”99 In addition to interpreting the meaning
of the general law where it applied, the federal courts also provided an independent determination of whether that law had been superseded by local
rules and, in some cases, whether local law was sufficiently settled to bind
other courts.100
93

Id.
BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 99.
95 41 U. S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842).
96 See, e.g., FREYER, supra note 30, at 39–40 (noting that state judges shared independent authority to develop commercial law with the federal courts); Fletcher, supra note 90, at 1515 (“In marine
insurance cases, deviations by individual state courts from the general law were sufficiently rare that
these courts, even when they disagreed, considered themselves engaged in the joint endeavor of deciding cases under a general common law.”).
97 See id., at 1539–42; see also FREYER, supra note 30, at 40.
98 See Fletcher, supra note 90, at 1562–63.
99 BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 67; see also id. at 67–68 (pointing out that, because
the purpose of the diversity grant was simply to provide a neutral forum, there was no need for federal
court interpretations of the general law to preempt divergent interpretations of that law in the state
courts).
100 See Green v. Lessee of Neal, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291, 298 (1832); BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra
note 63, at 70–73.
94
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As the last point suggests, however, states retained the power to “localize” the general law by promulgating distinctive rules of their own, even
in the commercial area.101 And when the states did so, the federal courts
respected that decision. As Alfred Hill has explained, “even under Swift v.
Tyson the federal courts recognized their duty to follow state law which was
recognizable as such.”102 The result was that “once the state made it clear
that its law in the particular matter was something other than the ‘general
law,’ as when a statute was enacted, this manifestation of a new and distinctively local law was followed by the federal courts without question, even
when Congress did not direct them to do so.”103 States generally chose not
to localize commercial rules, because “it would have constituted commercial suicide for them to do so beyond certain boundaries.”104 But this pragmatic judgment did not depend on any notion that the general commercial
law was “supreme” in an Article VI sense. Participation in the Swift regime
was ultimately up to the state.105
All of this history ought to shed some light on Section 34’s limitation
of the obligation to follow state laws (and state court interpretations of
those laws) to “cases where they apply.” Some commentators have read
this language as basically draining Section 34 of any determinate meaning.106 But the phrase need not be tautological; instead, it may fairly be read
101

See id. at 70; see also Fletcher, supra note 90, at 1527–28 (“[S]tate courts and legislatures
could, at least in theory, establish local law that federal courts would be obliged to follow in any area of
law. In practice, however, federal courts usually felt obliged to comply with state law only in subject
areas of peculiarly local concern . . . . Although federal courts sometimes found local law to be dispositive in matters of more national concern, such as commercial law, such cases were relatively rare.”).
102 Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 427, 443 (1958).
103 Id.
104 BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 91.
105 Herbert Hovenkamp has suggested a more mandatory view of Swift. He argues that
[t]he theory that Justice Story developed . . . contained an implicit constitutional limitation
on the state’s power to impose its law on a transaction that exceeded the geographic boundaries of the state. Such a limit was essential to the creation of a unified American economy
out of balkanized and self-interested sovereigns.
Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 223. Professor Hovenkamp admits that this constitutional limit was at
best “implicit,” and his suggestion is inconsistent with the evidence just canvassed concerning the
states’ power to localize the general law. See also Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 378
(1893) (acknowledging, with respect to a point of general law, that “[t]here is no question as to the
power of the states to legislate and change the rules of the common law in this respect as in others”). In
any event, Hovenkamp’s view does not ground Swift in any notion that general norms were themselves
federal in character, but rather in a sharp limit on state law’s extraterritorial effect. As he acknowledges,
those limits did not survive far into the twentieth century. See Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 223; see
also Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 483 (1997) (describing the loosening of dormant Commerce Clause constraints on state law after
1937). Despite occasional decisions suggesting limits on extraterritorial state regulation, see, e.g.,
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572–73 (1996), no one thinks that the states simply lack
power to regulate commercial transactions that cross state lines.
106 See, e.g., Field, Sources of Law, supra note 55, at 903 (observing that “the last clause, ‘in cases
where they apply,’ without any specification of what those cases might be, leaves the provision open to
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as referring to the two boundaries of the general law. In many areas, such
as real property, the law had always been “localized”; in others a state
might choose to abrogate its prior commitment to the general customary
rules. In either scenario, however, the question of state law’s scope was
itself a question of state law. Recall that Justice Story begins the critical
passage in Swift not simply by noting the commercial nature of the question
presented, but by observing the stance taken by the state’s courts: “[T]he
courts of New York do not found their decisions upon . . . any local statute,
or positive, fixed or ancient local usage; but they deduce the doctrine from
the general principles of commercial law.”107 In other words, Story did not
derive the general law’s applicability in Swift from some categorical federal
choice of law principle, but rather from the decision of the New York state
courts to follow the general law in cases like Swift. It is, on this view, always a matter of local law whether general law applies.108 Hence Section
34’s language referred to state law rules about the choice between local and
general law.109
Professors Bridwell and Whitten offer a slightly different reading of
Section 34 that nonetheless ends up in the same place. They argue that
the ‘in cases where they apply’ language of the Act was effectively treated as limiting the
operation of state laws, both statutory and common law, to intraterritorial situations. State
laws would thus be treated as ‘rules of decision’ . . . only when traditional conflict of laws
principles would permit them to control. 110

Under this reading, “[g]eneral commercial law disputes were treated
independently by the federal courts because they were cases in which the
states themselves purported to adhere to an extraterritorial body of customary principle.”111 The only difference between the Bridwell/Whitten view
and the one I advanced in the previous paragraph is that they view Section
34 as “a statute to be applied in strict accord with private international conflict of laws principles—that is, state law applied under the statute when
very flexible interpretation”); Weinberg, Rules of Decision Act, supra note 58, at 867 (pointing out that
“[n]othing in this neatly tautological legislation tells us state laws must be applied where they do not
apply”).
107 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
108 See, e.g., Bellia & Clark, supra note 49, at 658 (“[W]hen federal courts applied general commercial law, they did not displace state law, but rather acted in accord with a state’s choice to apply
general commercial law.”); Hill, supra note 102, at 443 (“In equity no less than at common law the
federal courts tended to apply state law which was cognizable as such, resorting to independent applications of the ‘general law’ insofar as the ‘general law’ was understood to be the law of the state.”).
109 That langague also presumably incorporated the Supremacy Clause’s principle that state law
cannot apply where it has been displaced by a validly-enacted federal rule. But as already explained, no
such rules were present in cases like Swift or Erie.
110 BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 99.
111 Id.
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such conflict principles dictated that it apply, but not otherwise.”112 In other
words, Section 34 referred not to state choice of law rules to determine
when general law would apply, but rather incorporated general international
conflicts rules for that purpose. But this distinction makes little practical
difference, because—as Bridwell and Whitten acknowledge—the general
conflicts rules themselves permitted individual states to “localize” their law
on particular points by departing from the general commercial law.113 At
the end of the day, then, Section 34 required courts to look to state law to
determine whether general law applied.
This reading of Section 34 operates in tandem with Professors Bridwell and Whitten’s interpretation of the Diversity Clause in Article III.
They point out that the general willingness of states to apply the general
commercial law “led citizens of other states to develop expectations that
could only be protected by an independent federal determination of what
the extraterritorial custom was.”114 States would not be permitted to localize their law retroactively to the detriment of out-of-staters.115 But on this
view, the issue was protection of private expectations against retroactive
change, not a categorical limit on state departures from general law.
The federal courts would gradually depart from Swift’s nuanced approach in the late nineteenth century, substituting general law for state law
even in cases where the state courts would have applied the latter.116 In
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Baugh, for example, the Court upheld a
fellow-servant defense to tort liability in a diversity case, even though the
state courts had expressed a different view of the law.117 The problem with
such an extension is that whereas commercial law seeks to protect the expectations of private parties to a consensual transaction, tort law imposes
normative rules of conduct grounded in sovereign authority.118 As Larry
Lessig has explained,
112 Id. at 81. Professors Bridwell and Whitten base this reading on Justice Story’s opinion on
circuit in Van Reimsdyk v. Kane, 28 F. Cas. 1062 (C.C. D.R.I. 1812) (No. 16,871), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. Clark v. Van Reimsdyk, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 153 (1815). See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN,
supra note 63, at 79–82.
113 See id. at 86 (“The commercial conflict rules thus protected the general expectations of the
commercial community, while permitting ‘localization’ of commercial law by both the sovereign and
private parties.”).
114 Id. at 99.
115 See id. at 129.
116 See generally FREYER, supra note 30, at 51–75; see also GREVE, supra note 4, at 145;
BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 115–22.
117 149 U.S. 368 (1893). The Court had ventured to apply Swift to a tort case as early as 1862. See
Chicago v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 418 (1862).
118 See, e.g., PAGE KEETON, ROBERT E. KEETON, LEWIS D. SARGENTICH & HENRY J. STEINER,
TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (2d ed. 1989) (“Tort . . . is a body of legal principles aiming to control or regulate harmful behavior; to assign responsibility for injuries that arise in
social interaction; and to provide recompense for victims with meritorious claims.”); BRIDWELL &
WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 121 (“[T]ort law was vastly different in kind from the general customs of
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[t]his change in scope in turn changed the nature of the common law practice: federal general
common law was less the practice of gap-filling for parties to a commercial transaction, and
more a practice of norm-enforcement, covering a substantial scope of sovereign authority.
The common law was no longer reflective, or mirroring of private understandings; it had become directive, or normative over those private understandings.119

Baugh made clear that the Court’s criteria for which issues were governed by general law had expanded considerably:
[T]he question is essentially one of general law. It does not depend upon any statute; it does
not spring from any local usage or custom; there is in it no rule of property, but it rests upon
those considerations of right and justice which have been gathered into the great body of the
rules and principles known as the “common law.” There is no question as to the power of
the States to legislate and change the rules of the common law in this respect as in others; but
in the absence of such legislation the question is one determinable only by the general principles of that law. Further than that, it is a question in which the nation as a whole is interested. It enters into the commerce of the country.120

Other cases went still further, applying general law to trump state statutes and constitutional provisions,121 as well as state judicial decisions construing quintessentially local property rights.122 The expansion of the general law regime to areas in which the states had not accepted its applicability raised serious questions under both the Rules of Decision Act and the
Constitution itself. But nothing in Swift itself is inconsistent with a reading
of Section 34 that looks to state law to regulate the reach of general commercial principles.
3.

Does the Rules of Decision Act Mandate Federal Common Law?

Some revisionist scholars have argued that Swift was simply wrong
about the meaning of Section 34—not because it construed the federal
court’s powers of independent judgment too broadly, as Justice Brandeis
thought, but because Swift failed to read Section 34 as a broad mandate “for
federal courts sitting in diversity . . . to apply federal common law.”123 This
argument, which relies on the work of the late Wilfred Ritz,124 focuses not
on the word “laws” but on the meaning of “the several states.” Professor
the commercial world, and . . . it should have been treated as a local matter to be controlled by state law
as defined in state decisions.”).
119 Lessig, supra note 78, at 1792.
120 149 U.S. at 378.
121 See, e.g., Town of Venice v. Murdock, 92 U.S. 494 (1875); Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863).
122 See, e.g., Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497 (1870).
123 Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 135.
124 See WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING
MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE (Wyth Holt & H. H. LaRue eds., 1990).
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Ritz pointed to usage by eighteenth century legal draftsman that frequently
employed “the several states” to mean “the states as a group” rather than
each state individually.125 That suggested that Section 34 should be read to
require federal courts to apply “American law generally” rather than “the
law of a particular state.”126 Adopting Ritz’s reading, Professor Sherry concludes that “the instruction in Section 34 to apply ‘the laws of the several
states’ directed courts not to the law of any individual state, but rather to the
law of all states—in other words, to federally–developed common law. The
purpose was to ensure that American law, not British law, would apply in
the federal courts.”127 Sherry’s view seems to be that this law was plainly
federal—not “general”—in nature.128
A wide range of Erie’s critics—and even some of its supporters—have
endorsed Professor Ritz’s reasoning.129 It is therefore worth taking the time
to consider both his argument and his evidence. Putting it mildly, Ritz’s
view has all kinds of problems. Ritz claimed that the founding generation
used “the phrase ‘the several states’ when referring to the states as a group
and the phase ‘the respective states’ when referring to them individually.”130
His evidence, however, is quite thin: As evidence of general usage, for ex125

See id. at 83; see also Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 956–57 (summarizing Ritz’s argument).
RITZ, supra note 124, at 140–41.
127 Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 134.
128 It seems unlikely that Professor Ritz himself meant to go this far. He states in his introduction
that “Section 34 was not meant to be a major and fundamental section,” and that “thus downgraded, the
section’s reference to ‘the laws of the several states’ probably was meant to say nothing more remarkable than that the national courts should use American law, and not British law.” RITZ, supra note 124,
at 11. If Section 34 were a delegation of broad authority to make federal common law, supreme within
the meaning of the Supremacy Clause, that would make the Rules of Decision Act “a major and fundamental section” indeed. Although Ritz is hardly clear on this point, it seems more likely that “American
law” meant a form of general law that was simply distinct from British law.
129 In addition to Professor Sherry, see, e.g., GREVE, supra note 4, at 226 (relying on Ritz and
William Crosskey to support the assertion that “Charles Warren’s purported evidence has been proven
wrong to the point of certainty”); PURCELL, supra note 9, at 306 (citing Ritz as having “made a strong
case that the framers could not have intended the section to have the meaning Brandeis attributed to it”);
Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave
New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 81 (1993) (stating that “the validity of the historical orthodoxy has been exploded by the recent writings of Professor Wilfred Ritz and others”); George
Rutherglen, Reconstructing Erie: A Comment on the Perils of Legal Positivism, 10 CONST. COMMENT.
285, 286 (1993) (endorsing Ritz’s reasoning); Jay Tidmarsh, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100
NW. U. L. REV. 585, 615–16, 615 n.193, 616 n.194 (2006) (relying on Ritz’s conclusions); see also
PETER W. LOW, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF
FEDERAL–STATE RELATIONS 9–11 (7th ed, 2011) (offering an extended and uncritical summary of
Ritz’s evidence and argument); Green, Twin Aims, supra note 18, at 1889 (also endorsing Ritz’s reading, but concluding that it simply makes the Rules of Decision Act irrelevant to “the division of common lawmaking power between federal and state courts”).
130 RITZ, supra note 124, at 83. Significantly, Professor Ritz admitted that “there is no hard-andfast rule requiring” this distinction and that even within the Judiciary Act itself, “[i]n some contexts
either word may be appropriate and one may disagree as to which is the most felicitous.” Id. at 83, 87.
126
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ample, he cites a handful of isolated early state laws, as well as a couple of
statements and actions by federal officials, but none establishes the sort of
collective meaning that Ritz’s argument attributes to “several.” Consider
this order issued by the Continental Congress in 1777:
Ordered, That the resolution of Congress of 10th of September last . . . be without delay
transmitted to the executive powers of the several states, with a request, that they will order
the same to be published in their respective gazettes for six months, successively.131

What does this prove? Certainly “respective” is used, as Ritz suggests,
to refer to individual states. But although “several” indicates all the states
are to receive Congress’s order, it hardly refers to them in some undifferentiated collective capacity. There was not then, and is not now, any such
thing as a collective “executive power” of the states for Congress to send
messages to.132 The statement can only mean each state.
Professor Ritz’s other evidence is similar. He cites the federal Constitution’s statement that “[t]he President shall be commander in chief . . . of
the militia of the several states,”133 but this plainly means the militia of each
state—there was no combined national militia. He also relies upon the
Commerce Clause’s reference to “commerce . . . among the several
states,”134 but this must likewise convey a sense of the states as distinct entities. Ritz goes out of his way to reject William Crosskey’s famous view
that this provision empowered Congress to regulate both intrastate and interstate commerce, reasoning that this would “read ‘the several states’ as
though it were ‘the United States.’”135 But Professor Crosskey’s mistake is
precisely the approach that Ritz prescribes for the Rules of Decision Act:
both approaches read “several” not just to be collective, but also combined
and undifferentiated. At least in the present context, this is a simple category mistake. In common usage today, lawyers frequently use a phrase like
“state law” collectively to refer to all state law, but no one thinks that
phrase refers to some merged and undifferentiated “American” law distinct
from the laws of each state.136
131 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 777–78 (Worthington Chauncey
Ford ed. 1907) (quoted in RITZ, supra note 124, at 83) (Ritz’s italics).
132 The closest thing today would be the National Association of Attorneys General, but it is not an
official body and in any event was not founded until 1907. See About NAAG, NAT’L ASS’N OF
ATTORNEYS GEN., http://www.naag.org/about_naag.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
133 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (cited in RITZ, supra note 124, at 84) (Ritz’s italics).
134 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (cited in RITZ, supra note 124, at 85) (Ritz’s italics).
135 RITZ, supra note 124, at 85 (discussing 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 50–53 (1953)).
136 Again, the closest thing to this idea would be the work product of the various unofficial organizations working to coordinate and harmonize state laws, such as the American Law Institution’s “restatement” projects or the model statutes promulgated by the Commission on Uniform State Laws.
Caleb Nelson has demonstrated that these efforts may comprise part of a “general” law that is available
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This usage is hardly unique to the present era. As Caleb Nelson has
demonstrated, dictionaries from the founding era use “several” to “convey[]
a sense of ‘separation or partition.’”137 Professor Nelson has likewise
shown that eighteenth century draftsmen frequently used “the several
states” in its more differentiated connotation, both in statutes and in the
Constitution itself.138 The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
for example, provides that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”139 Nelson
concludes that
[n]ot only is that reading [that “the adjective ‘several’ can be used to refer serially to each
discrete unit in a composite group”] consistent with the drafting habits of the late eighteenth
century, but I am not aware of any persuasive evidence that Ritz’s contrary reading of § 34
even occurred to a single lawyer or judge in the early Republic.140

In any event, Professor Ritz’s claims about eighteenth century usage—
even if true—do not support the inferences he draws from them. Ritz says
that in the Judiciary Act, “‘several’ is used to refer to a fungible group, or
for incorporation by courts in various contexts. See generally Nelson, General Law, supra note 74, at
505–25. But Professor Nelson never equates this sort of thing with “the laws of the several states” in the
Rules of Decision Act. See Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 958–59 (refuting Ritz’s argument).
137 Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 958 (citing 2 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF
THE AMERICAN UNION 504–05 (2d ed. 1843)) (“The first good American law dictionary, originally
published in 1839.”); see also 15 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 97 (2d ed. 1991) (providing
examples from the fifteenth through the nineteenth centuries to the effect that “several” can mean
“[i]ndividually separate” when it qualifies a plural noun). Even the title of Bouvier’s dictionary demonstrates that lawyers in the early Republic did not invariably use “several” as Ritz insists.
138 See Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 958–59. Professor Nelson cites a resolution of the First
Congress that the Secretary of State should “procure from time to time such of the statutes of the several
states as may not be in his office,” Res. of Sept. 23, 1789, 1st Cong., 1 Stat. 97, as well as an appropriation of money “[f]or paying salaries to the late loan officers of the several states,” Act of Mar. 26, 1790,
ch. 4, § 5, 1 Stat. 104, 105. See also U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States”). If Professor Ritz were right, this provision would require each Member of the House to be
elected at large in a national election.
139 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. Professor Ritz did read this language to mean “the privileges
and immunities . . . that are common . . . to all the states.” RITZ, supra note 124, at 85. That reading
would come close to collapsing the broad category of rights generally thought to be protected against
state governmental discrimination under Article IV into the much narrower category of privileges and
immunities of national citizenship recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). In any event, privileges and immunities claims brought under
Article IV do not depend on showing that the privilege invoked is common to all the states. See generally 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-37, at 1255–70 (3d ed. 2000). And
even if they did, the basic protection for those rights would still stem from the laws of individual states,
not some collective “American” law.
140 Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 959.
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as a collective reference, for example, ‘the courts of the several states.’”141
That seems right so far as it goes: In Ritz’s example, the courts are fungible
in the sense that no particular court is distinguished, and they are collective
in that they are all included. But that is not nearly enough to support his
claim that “Section 34 is a direction to the national courts to apply American law, as distinguished from English law,”142 much less Professor Sherry’s more aggressive assertion that Section 34 is a delegation of broad federal common lawmaking power,143 As a matter of semantics, a collective
and fungible usage may nonetheless refer to a grouping of distinctive entities. Moreover, for Ritz’s and Sherry’s claims to be true, there would have
to be some sort of general American common law, distinct from the common law of England or other jurisdictions, and for Sherry at least that law
would have to be federal within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause.
Both those propositions are demonstrably false.
The common law that the several states received and adopted by positive acts or judicial decisions was avowedly English, and although it became American upon reception it did so as the law of each particular
state.144 The noncommercial common law varied considerably from state to
state, which suggests there was no unified body of “American” common
law principles available for federal courts to apply under Section 34.145
Moreover, as Stewart Jay has recounted, the delegates at Philadelphia debated whether to include in the Constitution a general reception similar to
those adopted by the states, but decided not to do so.146 When the federal
courts—and state courts, too—did apply legal principles not tied to the law
of particular states, that general law was not distinctively American at all.147
141

RITZ, supra note 124, at 87.
Id. at 148.
143 See Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 135.
144 See, e.g., James Madison, Report on Resolutions, House of Delegates, Session of 1799–1800,
Concerning Alien and Sedition Laws, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 373 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1906) (“The common law was not the same in any two of the Colonies," and that "in some the modifications were materially and extensively different.”). And at least one state opted out of the common law
altogether. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. I (2013) (“[T]he sources of law . . . are legislation and custom.”).
145 See, e.g., William B. Stoebuck, Reception of English Common Law in the American Colonies,
10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393, 401 (1968) (“The assumption that colonial law was essentially the same
in all colonies is wholly without foundation.”).
146 See generally Jay, Part Two, supra note 91, at 1254–62 (discussing the Convention’s debates
and concluding that “[i]t would have been untenable to maintain that the body of British common law
had been adopted by the Constitution, or that the federal judiciary possessed a jurisdiction equivalent to
that of the central courts in England”).
147 See, e.g., FREYER, supra note 30, at 38 (“In determining commercial principles, federal courts
were not to confine themselves to precedents of any local jurisdiction, but should scan the entire landscape of American, English, and civil law.”); Fletcher, supra note 90, at 1517 (observing that “[t]he law
merchant . . . was the general law governing transactions among merchants in most of the trading nations in the world”). It was, indeed, one of the most prominent forms of customary international law.
142
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As Justice Story observed in Swift, “[t]he law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared in the language of Cicero, adopted by Lord
Mansfield . . . to be in a great measure, not the law of a single country only,
but of the commercial world.”148 This cosmopolitan character was critical,
as the use of general law was meant to integrate American courts into the
broader commercial world.149 Professor Ritz provides no explanation whatsoever as to why the Framers of the Judiciary Act would have wanted to
thwart that development.150
It is equally clear that the Rules of Decision Act was not understood to
authorize a general federal common law. As I have already noted, the Marshall Court plainly rejected that notion in Wheaton v. Peters, stating unequivocally that “there can be no common law of the United States.”151 The
overwhelming majority of scholars have concluded that the general law
applied under Swift was not federal in character;152 state court decisions
applying it were not appealable to the U.S. Supreme Court, and it generally
did not preempt state decisions to “localize” the law on particular points.153
Moreover, the Adams Administration’s effort to establish a federal common
law of crimes led to a political crisis that emphatically rejected any such
notion.154 The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries simply did not
See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1245, 1280–83 (1996) [hereinafter Clark, Federal Common Law] (stating that the general commercial
law was part of customary international law).
148 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842); see also BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 61 (“Commercial law was also originally customary law, which was received by all nations, and whose principles
were uniformly enforced throughout the civilized world.”). The revisionists thus find themselves in the
unenviable position of accusing Joseph Story of being insufficiently nationalist.
149 See, e.g., FREYER, supra note 30, at 33–43; Paul B. Stephan, What Story Got Wrong—
Federalism, Localist Opportunism and International Law, 73 MO. L. REV. 1041, 1041–42 (2008).
150 Professor Ritz insisted, moreover, that for various reasons—the lack of American judicial
decisions in print, the non-hierarchical organization of the state courts, and the role of the jury in finding
the law as well as the facts—state common aw was “nonexistent” and even state statute law was “virtually inaccessible.” RITZ, supra note 124, at 10. If that is right, however, then there could have been no
distinctively “American” law to apply under Section 34 either, because that law would have had to be
distilled from the aggregate corpus of the several states. It seems more sensible to assume that the drafters of the Judiciary Act anticipated a future in which “the laws of the several states” would be more
readily available.
151 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834); see supra text accompanying notes 92–93.
152 See sources cited in supra note 90.
153 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 90, at 1560–61; BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 7.
154 Professor Ritz argues that the most likely interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act is that it
pertained only to criminal cases. See RITZ, supra note 124, at 11. On this view, Section 34 was “a temporary measure to provide an applicable American law for national criminal prosecutions . . . pending
the time that Congress would provide by statute for the definitiona and punishment of national crimes.”
Id. at 148. As he points out, “[t]his interpretation seems to raise only one problem with Section 34. It
did not use the word ‘criminal’ in referring to its application.” Id. at 147. That strikes me as a rather
large problem, as is his inability to cite any contemporary describing Section 34 as a purely criminal
measure. Moreover, Ritz insists that once the First Congress enacted the Crimes Act in 1790, 1 Stat.
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furnish a hospitable climate for broad notions of federal common lawmaking authority.155
In view of all this, it is frankly surprising how many scholars seem to
rely on Professor Ritz without considering the obvious weaknesses of his
position.156 Once we set aside the revisionist Ritz/Sherry view, I suggest
that the most plausible reading of the Rules of Decision Act is that it requires federal courts to follow state law, including state choice-of-law rules
that mandate application of general law, as in Swift, but also state rules
mandating a departure from general law in favor of local policy, as in
Erie.157 This argument will not persuade those who, like my friend Louise
Weinberg, believe that “the [Rules of Decision] Act comes down to us as a
relic of a prepositivist, prerealist time, with scant relevance for us today.”158

112, Section 34’s “purpose had been served” and it “should have been repealed”; after 1790, “Section
34 was a statute without any apparent reason or purpose.” RITZ, supra note 124, at 149. Frankly, it
seems a little late in the day to simply read Section 34 out of the Judiciary Act.
It is worth emphasizing, however, that this criminal-only interpretation represents Professor Ritz’s
preferred reading of Section 34. He proffers the reading upon which Professor Sherry relies—“that the
section was intended as a direction to the national courts to apply American law in all judicial proceedings at common law, both civil and criminal”—only as a “less likely” “alternative possibility.” Id. at
148. As such, Ritz’s broader reading is an exceptionally weak reed to bear the weight of Sherry’s
claims.
155 See, e.g., Jay, Part Two, supra note 91, at 1233 (observing that “the common-law authority of
federal courts was seen by the Republicans as a vital component in their quarrel with Federalists over
the national union”; moreover, “the nature of jurisdictional theory at this time was unreceptive to the
development of an understanding of ‘federal common law’ in the modern sense of the term”).
156 See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 129, at 98 n.142, 105–06 (praising Ritz’s “brilliant new book”
and repeating his conclusions about the meaning of “several” without any critical probing of the underlying evidence or reasoning); see also sources cited in note 129, supra. None of these scholars appears
to have taken even a peek under the hood of Professor Ritz’s argument. Would they agree, for instance,
with Ritz’s contention that Section 34’s reference to “trials at common law” means only “that part of a
judicial proceeding that was held in open court and when witnesses were examined and their testimony
taken”? RITZ, supra note 124, at 143. How exactly would that work? Would federal courts apply a
different law at summary judgment or on appeal? At the end of the day, Ritz’s close textual analysis
simply unravels the statute into an unworkable mess. But those scholars who have adopted part of his
reasoning need to provide some rationale for why they leave other implications aside. Otherwise, it is in
for a penny, in for a pound.
157 Additional textual arguments exist against Justice Brandeis’s reading, but they need not detain
us long. Professor Sherry argues that because “Section 34 was placed . . . among other sections dealing
with all suits in any federal courts, and [it] was most likely a general direction about how federal courts
should go about their adjudicatory business rather than a specific direction about the law applicable to
state claims in diversity cases.” Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 134. But it has long been accepted that
Erie applies, at least presumptively, to all issues arising in federal court that are not governed by positive federal law, regardless of the basis for the federal court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Maternally Yours
v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 540–41 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956) (Friendly, J.) (“[T]he Erie doctrine
applies, whatever the ground for federal jurisdiction, to any issue or claim which has its source in state
law.”); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 563.
158 Weinberg, Rules of Decision Act, supra note 58, at 866.
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But unless we are to engage in some sort of neo-Calabresian “sunsetting” of
obsolescent statutes,159 we must find a way to make sense of the Act.
B.

Uniformity and Discrimination

Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Erie also emphasized that “[e]xperience
in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson had revealed its defects, political
and social.”160 These difficulties had to do with the lack of legal uniformity
that Swift engendered, as well as the discriminatory impact of that situation
on parties with asymmetrical access to federal court. Erie’s modern critics,
by contrast, complain that Erie swapped one form of disuniformity for another, more damaging one—in particular, one with a particularly vexatious
tendency to discriminate against out-of-state businesses.161 It is certainly
true that Erie did not put an end to concerns about uniformity. However,
my conclusion here is that any more effective cure for those concerns
would be worse than the disease.
Erie aimed to promote what we have come to call vertical uniformity—that is, to ensure that the same law would apply to similar suits brought
within a particular state, whether those suits were brought in state or federal
court.162 In so doing, Justice Brandeis hoped to minimize forum-shopping
by out-of-state parties for the most advantageous substantive law.163 As
Professor Sherry points out, however, “Erie simply replaced the vertical
forum-shopping of Swift with horizontal forum-shopping.”164 She explains
that “[i]nstead of choosing between state and federal courts in order to obtain the benefit of state or federal law, litigants now choose among courts
(state and federal) located in different states in order to obtain the benefit of
a particular state’s law.”165
To some extent, horizontal disuniformity is inevitable in a federal system—indeed, it is the essence of a federal system.166 Different states get to
159

See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 59–65 (1982).
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).
161 See GREVE, supra note 4, at 234–35; Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 138.
162 See 304 U.S. at 74–75 (complaining that Swift “made rights enjoyed under the unwritten ‘general law’ vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court” and that
this doctrine “rendered impossible equal protection of the law”).
163 Out-of-staters had an advantage in forum-shopping because the federal removal statute barred a
defendant sued in its home state’s courts from removing the case to federal court. See, e.g., Ely, supra
note 1, at 712 n.111 (providing a particularly lucid account of the discrimination argument).
164 Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 138.
165 Id. at 138–39. But see Ely, supra note 1, at 715 n.125 (suggesting reasons why vertical forumshopping may be more likely than the horizontal kind).
166 The Court acknowledged as much in holding that federal courts must apply the choice of law
rules of the state in which they sit:
Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal courts in different states is attributable to our federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the
160
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have different laws, and these disuniformities are generally thought to be a
feature, not a bug, in the system.167 The question is how much federalism
we want. If we think that these disuniformities are undesirable in the context of diversity litigation, there are at least two possible ways to minimize
them. But neither option, in my view, is likely to solve the problem.
The first alternative emphasizes the importance of uniform choice of
law rules that, in principle, would guarantee that the same law would govern a case regardless of which state it was brought in. The editors of the
Hart & Wechsler casebook, for example, laid blame for the horizontal disuniformity problem not at Erie’s door, but rather at the door of Klaxon Co.
v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,168 which the Court decided three
years later.169 Klaxon held that a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits. 170 The argument is
that Klaxon facilitates horizontal forum-shopping because litigants can get
different choice of law rules by suing in federal courts sitting in different
states, and those different choice of law rules will presumably yield different substantive law.171 The critics contend that, if federal courts applied a
uniform set of federal choice of law principles, then any federal court
would end up applying the same state’s substantive law to a dispute, regardless of the federal court’s location.172 The disuniformities resulting from
Klaxon, moreover, are often not party-neutral: as Michael Greve has explained, “Erie guaranteed plaintiffs their choice of a state law, to the exclusion of federal general common law. Klaxon effectively guaranteed them
the state law of their chosen forum” and thus “reinforces Erie’s proplaintiff
orientation.”173
Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors. It is not
for the federal courts to thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent ‘general law’
of conflict of laws.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
167 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1484 (1987) (exploring policy benefits of state-by-state legal diversity); Richard A. Epstein, Exit
Rights Under Federalism, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1992) (explaining the benefit of state policy
diversity making exit rights possible); Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity, Distinctiveness, and Political Culture in the American Federal System (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) (exploring the extent to which states in fact adopt divergent legal regimes as a measure of
the health of our federal system).
168 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
169 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 566–67.
170 313 U.S. at 496–97.
171 See, e.g., LOW, JEFFRIES, & BRADLEY, supra note 129, at 12–13.
172 See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 129, at 121; Hart, supra note 10, at 513–15. As Professor Ely
points out, Professor Hart’s proposal would cause vertical disuniformity problems of its own. See Ely,
supra note 1, at 714–15 n.125; see also Donald F. Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and
the Federal Courts, 28 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 732 (1963) (defending Klaxon).
173 GREVE, supra note 4, at 233. There is, as Professor Greve points out, another important piece
of the puzzle—that is, expansive rules of personal jurisdiction that allow plaintiffs to choose among a
wide variety of states in which to bring suit against defendants operating in interstate commerce. See,
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An important premise of the anti-Klaxon argument is that, although
federal courts generally lack constitutional power to make substantive law,
they do not lack such power to formulate federal choice of law rules.174
That seems right. If there is any constitutionally acceptable scope for federal common law, it would include the unavoidable task of reconciling the
claims of different jurisdictions’ substantive law within a federal system. 175
And there may be certain benefits to allowing the federal courts to do so.176
But there is no guarantee that federal choice of law rules would solve the
horizontal disuniformity problem. Much would depend on the content of
the choice of law rules that the federal courts adopted. Under current doctrine, the Constitution would have relatively little to say about what precise
sorts of conflicts rules the federal courts could adopt.177 But if the federal
courts followed the general tendency of the state jurisprudence, as they often do, then it is likely that they would adopt some form of interest analysis.
And under interest analysis, courts are more likely than not to apply forum
law.178
e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that the Due Process Clause
requires only that a defendant have “minimum contacts” with a particular jurisdiction). Greve argues
that “[t]he rules of Klaxon and International Shoe, operating in tandem, expose parties in interstate
commerce to suit virtually anywhere, in a forum and under a state law of the plaintiff’s choosing.”
GREVE, supra note 4, at 234. Of course, Greve’s point also raises the possibility that the deleterious
impact on interstate business that he laments could be redressed by rethinking International Shoe rather
than Erie or Klaxon.
174 See Hart, supra note 10, at 517–25.
175 See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 282 (1992); but see GREVE, supra note 4, at
235 (noting that “the justices who decided Klaxon . . . viewed it as a natural extension” of Erie, and
offering arguments that “on balance, that is the better view”); Ely, supra note 1, at 715 n.125 (arguing
that Klaxon was compelled by the Rules of Decision Act); William H. Danne, Jr., Comment, A Resurgence of the Klaxon Controversy—Contemporary Legal Trends Revitalize an Old Principle, 12 VILL. L.
REV. 603, 610 (1967) (arguing that, under contemporary approaches to choice of law, “a forum state's
choice of law rule is but a delimitation of the policy underlying the pertinent local law and a determination of the extent to which that policy is to be given extraterritorial application,” and that “[o]nce a
choice of law rule is considered as part and parcel of a substantive law, the assumed gap between the
Erie principle and the Klaxon rule appears to vanish, and the latter tends to become as constitutionally
compelled as the former”). Although Mr. Danne’s point strikes me as a neglected and important one, I
am less pessimistic about courts’ ability to distinguish between choice of law rules and the substantive
law, especially because I am also inclined to favor territorial choice of law rules that merge less fully
with the underlying substantive norms.
176 See Hart, supra note 10, at 513–15 (arguing that the federal courts are uniquely suited for this
task).
177 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818–23 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302, 307–09 (1981); Laycock, supra note 175, at 257–58.
178 There are three primary options in contemporary choice of law: interest analysis, the Restatement (Second) approach, and a more old-fashioned reliance on territorial rules. See Laycock, supra note
175, at 252–59. Interest analysis seeks to balance the claims of each potentially-interested state in
applying its own law to the dispute in question. In practice, however, this approach heavily favors
allowing the forum to apply its own law. See, e.g., John B. Corr, The Frailty of Interest Analysis, 11
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If that is right, then abandoning Klaxon will not solve the horizontal
uniformity problem. If the federal courts apply interest analysis—along
with its preference for forum law—then the state in which the plaintiff’s
chosen federal court sits will still be a critical factor in determining which
state’s law applies to a given dispute. Consider the facts of Klaxon itself.
Stentor, a New York corporation, transferred its business to Klaxon, a Delaware corporation, with the latter promising to use its best efforts to promote the sale of Stentor’s device and to give Stentor a share of the profits.
Ten years later, Stentor sued in a federal district court sitting in Delaware,
alleging breach of that agreement. Jurisdiction rested on diversity of citizenship. After Stentor won a jury verdict, it moved for addition of prejudgment interest under New York law—a right that it would not have under Delaware law. The court of appeals had concluded that, under its independent view of the applicable conflicts principles, New York’s statute
would apply; the parties disagreed about whether, under Delaware choice of
law rules, the Delaware courts would refuse to apply the New York prejudgment interest statute.179
My point is simply that a federal set of choice of law rules might be
uniform in their content but nonuniform in the outcomes that they generate.
If the federal courts in Klaxon had adopted some form of interest analysis,
then each of the various federal district courts in which Stentor could have
filed would have applied forum law. The federal district court in Delaware
would most likely have applied Delaware law to the prejudgment interest
question, while if Stentor had filed in federal district court in New York,
that federal court would most likely have applied New York law. The
plaintiff’s forum choice would remain critical even under a uniform federal
choice of law rule.
This fact does tend to mitigate the vertical disuniformity that the Klaxon Court feared from applying different choice of law rules in federal and

GEO. MASON L. REV. 299, 301 (2002) (noting that, despite scholarly criticism, “the strong bias in favor
of forum law remains a fact of life in courts applying the various forms of interest analysis”); Aaron D.
Twerski, Neumeier v. Kuehner: Where are the Emperor's Clothes?, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 104, 121 (1973)
(concluding that interest analysis generally results in the application of forum law). The Restatement
has been criticized for attempting to be all things to all people, and it tried to pair a general incorporation
of interest analysis with more specific territory-based presumptions for particular kinds of cases. See
Laycock, supra note 175, at 253. Much of the time, analysis under the Restatement collapses back into
interest analysis. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Vicissitudes of Choice of Law: The Restatement (First,
Second) and Interest Analysis, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 362 (1997) (noting that, “in reading opinions
purporting to follow the second Restatement, one cannot help but be struck by how often the courts shift
into undiluted interest analysis”); see generally Corr, supra, at 299 (“[I]n the area of conflict of laws,
interest analysis is now the predominant approach.”). Hence, a new federal choice of law regime would
lack a strong preference for forum law only if it followed the minority of states that have clung to a
territory-based regime.
179 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 495–96, 497 (1941).
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state courts within the same jurisdiction.180 After all, in my example, the
federal and state courts in each state would most likely end up choosing the
same law most of the time. Except, that is, in those brave states that have
held on or returned to a more territorial set of choice of law rules. No one
desiring rationality in conflicts jurisprudence ought to want to discourage
that development.181 But the bottom line is that, without reforming the
choice of law rules that courts actually apply, postulating one set of federal
common law choice of law principles will not solve the horizontal uniformity problem.182 And as long as plaintiffs can alter the applicable law by
filing in one federal court rather than another, the “proplaintiff” discrimination that Professor Greve laments will persist.
The second, and more effective, way to deal with horizontal disuniformities engendered by Erie would be to federalize the law applied in diversity cases. That seems to be the upshot of Professor Sherry’s reading of
the Rules of Decision Act, which views that statute as a broad mandate to
apply federal—not general—common law in cases in federal court.183 And
it is at least the implication of Professor Greve’s position, which argues that
interstate commercial enterprises should be able to count on one law applicable to their far-flung operations, no matter in what state they end up being
sued.184 After all, those enterprises can always be sued, without right of
removal, in state court in their own home jurisdictions. The only way to
truly provide one uniform rule of decision—one law to rule them all—
would be to federalize the rule.
One can see what this might look like by turning to maritime law,
where the Supreme Court confronted an issue similar to Erie’s two decades
earlier and came out the opposite way. It is settled that “early Americans
understood admiralty and maritime law to be of the same genus of ‘general
180

See id. at 496 (worrying that, if federal courts applied their own choice of law rules, “the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate
state and federal courts sitting side by side”).
181 See Laycock, supra note 175, at 337 (arguing for a return to territorial rules).
182 Donald Cavers made a somewhat similar point in his report on Klaxon to the American Law
Institute. He noted that, if Klaxon were rejected based on the need to achieve horizontal uniformity
among federal courts sitting in different states, that would create pressure for those courts to return to
the sort of territorial choice of law rules in the first Restatement. Donald F. Cavers, Memorandum on
Change in Choice-of-Law Thinking and Its Bearing on the Klaxon Problem, in ALI STUDY ON THE
DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 154, 186–88 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1963). Because Professor Cavers viewed interest analysis as preferable to territorial rules, he saw this as
a reason to stick with Klaxon. See id. My concern, by contrast, is that federal courts in a post-Klaxon
world would not return to a territorial view of choice of law, leaving us with basically the same horizontal uniformity problem that currently inspires Klaxon’s critics.
183 See Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 135; see also supra Section II.A.3 (criticizing this argument).
184 See GREVE, supra note 4, at 134–36; see also Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey,
Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1368–69 (2006) (arguing for a similar result through
federal preemption of state law).
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law’ as the ‘law merchant’ applied in diversity” in Swift.185 In Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen, the Court considered whether state law, applied in
state court, could modify the principles of the general maritime law.186 Jensen was a longshoreman killed while loading a vessel in port, and his next
of kin sought to recover under a state workers’ compensation statute. The
Supreme Court said that he could not. Despite acknowledging that “the
general maritime law may be changed, modified, or affected by state legislation . . . to some extent,” Justice McReynolds’s majority opinion held that
“no such legislation is valid if it . . . works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper
harmony and uniformity of that law in its international or interstate relations.”187 The upshot was that “in the absence of some controlling statute
the general maritime law as accepted by the federal courts constitutes part
of our national law applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction.”188 This holding elicited Justice Holmes’s famous comment
that “[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky” 189—one
of the better one-liners in American jurisprudence—but Holmes remains in
dissent to this day as far as admiralty law is concerned.
Jensen and Erie both illustrate the difficulty in maintaining a viable
category of “general” law—neither state nor federal in nature—at the dawn
of the twentieth century. The two cases reached diametrically opposed solutions, however: Jensen federalized the general maritime law, rendering
that law supreme not only in cases in federal court but also in state court as
well. Erie, on the other hand, assimilated the general common law to state
law, holding that it could not supplant state law even in cases in federal
court.190 If Professors Sherry and Greve had their way, the nonwatery world
would look much like Jensen.
Although Jensen’s solution may seem attractive to Erie’s critics, there
are several reasons to treat it as a cautionary tale.191 First, the Jensen rule
has never been clean, and “courts have faced vexing questions in trying to
define what matters are governed by uniform federal admiralty law and in

185

HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 655; see also Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note
147, at 1280–81; Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 318–22 (1999).
186 244 U.S. 205, 207 (1917).
187 Id. at 216.
188 Id. at 215; see also Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 383–84 (1918) (holding, in
a case in diversity jurisdiction, that federal maritime law preempted state tort remedies).
189 Jensen, 244 U.S. at 222 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
190 See generally Hart, supra note 10, at 531 (arguing that Jensen embodied “[t]he same logic of
federalism which underlay Erie”).
191 I set aside until Part III the small difficulty that Jensen’s solution is unconstitutional, for the
same reasons that Erie is constitutionally required. See generally Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note
185.
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what areas state law remains free to operate”192—a dilemma that David Currie aptly described as the “Devil’s Own Mess.”193 Extending Jensen’s rule
to the much broader class of cases implicated in Erie would exacerbate
these problems beyond all measure; indeed, it is difficult even to define the
class of cases that would have to be federalized. The category could not be
confined to the commercial law cases contemplated by Swift, because the
general law overflowed those banks by the end of the nineteenth century;
similarly, it could not be limited to common law cases, because a truly federal general common law would trump state statutes as well.194 Federal
maritime law works, to the extent that it does, because the jurisdictional
scope of maritime law is narrow and comparatively well-defined, the instances of conflict with state policy are relatively few, and the critical issues
of admiralty law tend now to be governed by federal statutes.195 None of
those things are true in the broader world of Erie itself.
In any event, federalizing the law applied in diversity cases would cut
the general common law loose from its historical moorings, which have
always treated that law as non-federal in nature.196 One may doubt, moreover, whether horizontal uniformity would be fully achieved even under such
a draconian solution. After all, how uniform is federal law, really? We
have thirteen circuits with open and notorious differences in the law that
each applies, and it seems doubtful that the Supreme Court would expand
its docket sufficiently to unify federal law on the vastly broader set of federal questions that Jensen-izing Erie would entail.197 Moreover, one signifi192

HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 656; see also Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443,
452 (1994) (“It would be idle to pretend that the line separating permissible from impermissible state
regulation is readily discernible in our admiralty jurisprudence, or indeed is even entirely consistent
within our admiralty jurisprudence.”); Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish Co., 32 F.3d 623, 628
(1st Cir. 1994) (Boudin, J.) (“[T]he Supreme Court's past decisions yield no single, comprehensive test
as to where harmony is required and when uniformity must be maintained. Rather, the decisions however couched reflect a balancing of the state and federal interests in any given case.”).
193 David Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: “The Devil’s Own Mess”, 1960 SUP. CT. REV.
158. The definitive treatment, surveying the evolution of the Jensen test and identifying the troubles
with each formulation, is David R. Robertson, Displacement of State Law by Federal Maritime Law, 26
J. MAR. L. & COM 325 (1995). In recent years, the Court has repeatedly questioned or distinguished
Jensen. See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 206 (1996); Miller, 510 U.S.
at 450–52; see also id. at 458 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (“In my view, Jensen
is just as untrustworthy a guide in an admiralty case today as Lochner v. New York . . . would be in a
case under the Due Process Clause.”).
194 Indeed, in Jensen itself, the maritime law trumped a state statute. See Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216–
18.
195 See, e.g., Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990) (noting that “maritime tort law is
now dominated by federal statute”); Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 185, at 350–51.
196 See generally Fletcher, supra note 90; see also GREVE, supra note 4, at 144.
197 See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1572 (2008) (concluding that
“standardizing federal law is no longer possible as a practical matter”); John Harrison, Federal Appellate Jurisdiction over Questions of State Law in State Courts, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 353, 357 (2004) (“Fed-
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cant unifying force in federal statutory interpretation—construction of those
statutes by federal agencies—would not exist for this new class of federal
questions. For all these reasons, I suspect that the horizontal uniformity
envisioned by contemporary advocates of a general federal common law is
largely a mirage.
The real reason not to federalize the law in diversity cases, of course,
is that it would be unconstitutional.198 But before I take up Erie’s constitutional arguments, I want to consider a possible reconceptualization of Erie.
C.

Erie, Chevron, and Deference to State Judges on State Law Questions

So far I have characterized the commercial law applied under Swift as
“general” law—neither state nor federal in character. But as several scholars have pointed out, another conceptualization is possible.199 Federal
courts operating under Swift occasionally described the general commercial
law as a species of state law, but one on which they owed no deference to
the interpretations issued by the state courts.200 In Chicago, Milwaukee &
St. Paul Railway. Co. v. Solan,201 for instance, the Supreme Court said that
[t]he question [in this case] . . . is . . . one of those questions not of merely local law, but of
commercial law or general jurisprudence, upon which this court, in the absence of express
statute regulating the subject, will exercise its own judgment, uncontrolled by the decisions
of the courts of the State in which the cause of action arises. But the law to be applied is
none the less the law of the State . . . .202

eral law is notoriously non-uniform among the different circuits, and the Supreme Court is apparently
sufficiently indifferent to this fact that it leaves many inter-circuit conflicts unresolved.”).
198 See Robert H. Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A. J. 609, 614 (1938)
(“The need for uniformity has never been allowed to operate as a basis of power in Congress, which was
not granted in the Constitution, and it is hard to see why it should supply power, otherwise not granted,
to the Federal judiciary.”).
199 See Michael G. Collins, Justice Iredell, Choice of Law, and the Constitution—A Neglected
Encounter, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 163, 175 (2006); John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over the
Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 526 (2000) [hereinafter Harrison, Power of Congress]; Nelson,
Erie, supra note 6, at 927–29.
200 Even prior to Erie, some observers were skeptical of such claims. See, e.g., Comment, What is
“General Law” within the Doctrine of Swift v. Tyson?, 38 YALE L.J. 88, 91 (1928) (“Though the courts
in making such independent judgments assert that there is no federal common law, and claim instead
that they are expressing the state’s own common law, it seems clear that they are in fact looking to some
‘transcendental body of law’ when they apply the Swift v. Tyson rule.”).
201 169 U.S. 133 (1898).
202 Id. at 136; see also PURCELL, supra note 9, at 185 (“According to long-established doctrine,
Swift authorized the federal courts only to make an ‘independent judgment’ on common law principles
as to what was properly ‘state’ law.”).
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It is not completely clear in Solan and similar cases what the Court
meant by “the law of the State.” The Court’s language seems perfectly
consistent with saying that the general law had become “the law of the
state” by virtue of a state choice of law rule.203 For example, when Professor Hill observed that “in theory the federal courts deemed themselves to be
applying state law during the era of Swift v. Tyson,”204 he seems to have
meant that the State had made a decision to adopt the general law on the
relevant points—not that the law applied in such cases was a body of state
law other than the general law.205 Professor Purcell’s discussion is also
consistent with this notion; when he says that the common law under Swift
“was properly ‘state’ law,” he means that it was “not ‘the creation of the
federal [lawmaking] power,’” that it did not preempt state law under the
Supremacy Clause, and that it “did not give rise to ‘federal questions’ for
purposes of either original jurisdiction or Supreme Court review.”206 The
“general” law described by Judge Fletcher and others shared all these characteristics.207 As the remainder of this section explains, I do not think it
ultimately makes any difference which way we phrase the matter. The important point, common to both perspectives, is simply that the general law
never applied of its own force, but always because of a state’s decision to
follow it.
If we take the common law under Swift to be state law, then the distinction between Swift and Erie lies in the degree of deference that federal
courts owe to state courts on the proper construction of state law.208 Erie
rejected the notion that there is any category of cases in which federal
courts may exercise independent judgment as to state law (although later
cases restricted Erie’s mandate of deference to decisions of the state’s highest court).209 This notion turns out to lie at the heart of Erie’s constitutional
argument, and I will thus return to it in Part III. The present section asks
whether there is anything to be said for the no-deference rule from a pragmatic standpoint.
The problem is that, if the concession that state law is being applied is
to mean anything, then the boundary between local and general law must
itself be a question of state law—and a question, moreover, of the local
203

See supra text accompanying notes 101–104 (arguing that this is the right way to think about

it).
204

Hill, supra note 102, at 444.
See also id. at 443 (observing that in cases under Swift “the law of the state on a particular
matter was the common law in what was considered to be its more general aspect” and that this was
why “a federal court deemed itself as competent as a state court to ‘find’ and ‘declare’ the legal principle applicable to the case”).
206 See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 185.
207 See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
208 See Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 941–42, 950.
209 See, e.g., King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153, 158-59 (1948); HART
& WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 570 (collecting authorities).
205
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kind. It might be possible—although doubtful—to interpret the statutory
grant of diversity jurisdiction to imply a mandate to apply the general
commercial law, much as the admiralty grant was long interpreted as a
mandate to apply the general maritime law.210 But if the law involved is
really state law, then it is surely up to the state to determine its content and
scope of application.
The only way to make sense of the notion of a “general” law that is
nonetheless state law is to say that, on matters of a general character, state
law aims to mirror a broader set of norms applied in multiple jurisdictions.
In practical effect, this would be much like a state choice-of-law rule to
apply general law in a certain set of cases.211 But either way, it would be up
to the state to determine how broadly this mirroring was to take place—for
example, whether it would be confined to commercial cases or extended to
the law of torts.212 And the recurring, difficult question would be whether,
in cases where state court decisions seemed to depart from the tendency in
other jurisdictions, that discrepancy should be treated simply as an error,
undeserving of deference from the federal courts, or a deliberate limitation
imposed by the state on the scope of its general law.213
One can imagine situations in which federal courts could plausibly answer this question without deference to state courts. If, for example, the
legislature adopted the general law by statute in certain areas, such as transactions involving commercial paper, then federal courts could conceivably
make an independent judgment about the text of the statute. But even under
Swift, the federal courts deferred to state constructions of state statutes,214
and in any event, state legislatures generally do not legislate such rules so
explicitly. The question then is, whether federal courts should defer to state
courts in the murkier setting in which the issue actually arises.
I submit that they should, for reasons similar to those that undergird
the federal rule mandating judicial deference to administrative agencies’
constructions of the federal statutes they administer. In Chevron U.S.A.,
210

See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 653. The trouble, of course, is that the diversity grant says no such thing (nor does the admiralty grant). It says nothing about the law to be applied in
diversity cases, and it certainly contains nothing suggesting a distinction between general and local law.
211 See supra note 107–113 and accompanying text.
212 See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 91 (discussing the states’ power to “localize”
questions of general law under Swift).
213 As Professors Bridwell and Whitten discuss, the Supreme Court did exercise some degree of
independent judgment in determining whether state courts had taken a consistent position on whether a
question had been localized. See id. at 88. That function is analogous to the Court’s occasional (and
generally quite deferential) review of state courts’ decision of state law questions that are antecedent to a
question of federal law. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 462–63; Stacey L. Dogan
& Ernest A. Young, Judicial Takings and Collateral Attack on State Court Property Decisions, 6 DUKE
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 120–25 (2011) (discussing this form of review).
214 See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938); supra notes 47, 66 and accompanying
text.
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Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,215 the Court held that federal courts must defer to federal administrative agency interpretations of the
statutes they administer, so long as the statute in question is ambiguous and
the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. The Court has developed three
distinct justifications for this rule: that the agency has relatively more expertise and experience with a statute that it administers than does a reviewing court;216 that the agency is more democratically accountable than a
court;217 and that an ambiguous statute may be viewed as a congressional
delegation of authority to the agency to fill in the gaps in the statute’s
meaning.218 Each of these justifications finds a persuasive analogy in the
Erie context. The third—that agencies have been delegated interpretive
authority by the legislature—speaks to Erie’s constitutional underpinnings,
and I accordingly address it in Part III. But the other two—expertise and
accountability—provide pragmatic justifications for Erie’s rule of deference.
First, state courts have superior experience and expertise concerning
state law, much as federal agencies have expertise with respect to the statutes they administer. To be sure, our federal system does not draw any
essential link between the source of law and the court that interprets; in
other words, state courts are presumptively appropriate fora for interpreting
federal law,219 and federal courts similarly may, and frequently do, interpret
state law. But state courts surely have a comparative advantage in construing state law, based on the frequency with which it is litigated in state
court.220 This advantage may be particularly pronounced on the sort of state
law questions I have been considering, which require a court to assess the
overall shape of state law in an area and assess the degree to which the state
as decided to go its own way and depart from the “general” jurisprudence.
215

467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027,
2135 (2002) (noting this as "the leading alternative theory for Chevron" but ultimately finding it unsatisfactory).
217 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (1984) (insisting that “federal judges–who have no constituency–
have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do”); see generally Cynthia R.
Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 452, 466–67 (1989) (discussing the delegation and democratic accountability justifications for
Chevron).
218 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44; Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187,
197–98 (2006) (arguing that the delegation rationale has won out).
219 See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459–60 (1990) (holding that state courts presumptively have jurisdiction to hear federal law claims unless Congress clearly states its intention to exclude
them).
220 See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499–500 (1941) (acknowledging the superior expertise and authority of the state courts to construe state law). This is likely to be true
even on issues where a state had, by hypothesis, chosen to follow the drift of “general” jurisprudence.
Chances are that the states will see more of those cases than the federal courts and therefore develop
greater expertise.
216
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Second, state courts are plainly more accountable than federal judges
to the state electorate. This is true on both the front and the back end. State
judges are much more likely to be appointed or elected with an eye to their
views and expertise concerning state law than federal judges, whose nomination and confirmation will tend to focus on federal issues and concerns.
And of course many state judges, unlike all federal judges, are elected and
can be voted out of office if they make a mess of state law. Certainly state
judges compare favorably to the rather attenuated form of democratic accountability motivating deference to unelected federal agency officials under Chevron.221
Finally, it seems unlikely that a regime limiting deference to state
judges on general questions of state law would achieve significant practical
advantages over Erie’s regime. One factor that put pressure on the Swift
regime in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the federal
expansion of Swift’s general law beyond the commercial context to cover
matters such as tort and noncommercial contracts, as well as the concomitant decision by many states to depart from the general law, particularly in
these collateral areas.222 If general law is really state law, at bottom, then it
will surely be relatively narrow in scope—most likely confined to Swift’s
original commercial law bounds. But that is not really the area giving rise
to horizontal uniformity concerns today; after all, the modern analog to
Swift is the Uniform Commercial Code, under which states have been able
to achieve a significant measure of uniformity.223 What interstate businesses worry about are questions of tort, consumer protection law, and the like,
and the only way to return these questions to a general law basis is likely to
be through the main force of federal preemption.224
Even if we could somehow fiat the states’ adoption of a system of
general law in these areas, the Supreme Court would lack the appellate jurisdiction (or the inclination) to unify conflicts among the state supreme
courts and the federal circuits on these matters.225 It seems likely we would
be trading one patchwork for another. As Swift’s most prominent contemporary defender acknowledges, “[t]he fact remains that the Swift regime

221

See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of Elective
Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 224 (1993).
222 See FREYER, supra note 30, at 43–75; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 556–58.
223 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1952); see also Stephan, supra note 149, at 1049 (noting that
the UCC represents “a cooperative strategy of legal harmonization” by the states).
224 See, e.g., Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 184, at 1431–32.
225 See Fletcher, supra note 90, at 1561–62 (noting the Supreme Court’s lack of appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions on matters of general law). The sharp decline in Supreme Court review
of state court decisions on questions of federal law since Congress expanded the Court’s certiorari
discretion in 1988, see Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the TwentyFirst Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335 (2002), suggests that the Court would probably not review many
state court decisions on general law matters even if it had jurisdiction to do so.
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proved unstable even in the nineteenth century and is unlikely to fare any
better under modern circumstances.”226
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
Justice Brandeis concluded his discussion of the statutory and pragmatic issues in Erie by stating that “[i]f only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine
so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality
of the course pursued has now been made clear and compels us to do so.”227
For Erie’s many critics, however, “the unconstitutionality of the course
pursued” in Swift has been anything but clear.228 Part of the problem is that
both critics and defenders of Erie disagree about the nature of Erie’s constitutional rationale.229 In my view, Erie cannot be fairly read to rest on the
proposition that the rule at issue fell outside Congress’s power; rather, it
rested—and rightly so—on the proposition that the Constitution vests no
general lawmaking powers in the federal courts. Although recent students
of Erie have identified important and instructive difficulties with this rationale, I conclude that it remains eminently defensible.
Before turning to that rationale, however, I begin by clarifying the role
played by Justice Brandeis’s discussion of some basic issues in jurisprudence.
A.

Erie and Positivism

Much of Justice Brandeis’s constitutional discussion in Erie suggests
that the case turns on a basic disagreement, not just about the Constitution,
226

GREVE, supra note 4, at 373.
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 77–78 (1938).
228 See, e.g., Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 602 (arguing that “none of [Brandeis’s constitutional arguments] provides adequate constitutional support for Erie's result”); Hill, supra note 102, at
427, n.3 (citing numerous articles suggesting that “the constitutional basis of Erie has been widely
regarded as dictum, and rather dubious dictum at best”).
229 See, e.g., LOUISE WEINBERG, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND COMMENTS ON JUDICIAL
FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL POWER 10–15 (1994) (collecting scholarly arguments about Erie’s constitutional basis, ranging from equal protection to federalism to separation of powers to due process). There
is even disagreement as to whether the Court really relied on the Constitutional ground, Clark, Erie’s
Source, supra note 90, at 1298 n.66 (noting Chief Justice Stone’s opinion that Erie’s constitutional
ground is dicta), although it is hard to take that particular disagreement all that seriously. See, e.g., 19
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4505 (2d ed. 1996) (noting the opinion’s explicit reliance on the Constitution); Hill, supra
note 102, at 439 (“[I]t is difficult to view as dictum the Court’s statement of a legal proposition without
which, we are assured in the opinion, and have no reason to doubt, the case would have been decided the
other way.”).
227
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but rather about the nature of law and judicial decision making. “The fallacy underlying the rule declared in Swift v. Tyson,” he said,
is made clear by Mr. Justice Holmes. The doctrine rests upon the assumption that there is “a
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and
until changed by statute,” that federal courts have the power to use their judgment as to what
the rules of common law are; and that in the federal courts “the parties are entitled to an independent judgment on matters of general law.”230

This was wrong, Holmes had written, because
law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common
law or not, is not the common law generally but the law of that State existing by the authority
of that State without regard to what it may have been in England or anywhere else. 231

It followed that “the authority and only authority is the State, and if
that be so, the voice adopted by the State as its own [whether it be of its
Legislature or of its Supreme Court] should utter the last word.”232 Brandeis thus concluded, again quoting Holmes, that “the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is ‘an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United
States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make
us hesitate to correct.’”233
Many subsequent courts and commentators accepted the description of
Swift by Justices Holmes and Brandeis. Justice Frankfurter, for example,
230 Erie, 304 U.S. at 77 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); see also FREYER, supra
note 30, at 131–53 (documenting the influence of the positivist critique of Swift on Justice Brandeis’s
opinion in Erie). Justice Holmes was hardly the only positivist critic of Swift. See, e.g., William R.
Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional Revolutions, 62 TUL. L. REV. 907, 908
(1988) (“In the late nineteenth century, the Field brothers, David and Stephen, launched devastating
positivist attacks on Swift, and their self-evident criticism was vigorously reiterated by Professor [John
Chipman] Gray, Justice Holmes, and others.”); see also id. at 922–24 (outlining these attacks).
231 Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533–34.
232 Id. at 535.
233 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533). Professor Purcell
argues that Justice Brandeis’s embrace of positivism in Erie was a limited one: “In Erie Brandeis incorporated the narrowly positivist elements of Holmes’s jurisprudence that equated judicial decisions with
‘law’ and law with the power of an identified sovereign.” PURCELL, supra note 9, at 181. He did not,
however, “adopt any broader skeptical, positivist, or ‘realist’ legal philosophy,” such as “the proposition
that law means only what the courts would enforce or that any rule the courts enforced was immune
from meaningful philosophical and moral critique.” Id. at 182. According to Purcell,
Erie’s narrow positivism was grounded ultimately not in any distinctively Holmesian or realist jurisprudence, or any other general legal philosophy, but in Brandeis’s practical understanding of the structural and operational requirements of American constitutional federalism
in an age of burgeoning multistate activities.
Id.; see also id. at 185.
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portrayed the Swift regime as one in which “[l]aw was conceived as a
‘brooding omnipresence’ of Reason, of which decisions were merely evidence and not themselves the controlling formulations. Accordingly, federal courts deemed themselves free to ascertain what Reason, and therefore
Law, required wholly independent of authoritatively declared State law.”234
Similarly, William Casto has written that “[u]nder Swift . . . judges were
considered the living oracles of a preexisting natural law.”235 This model
“pictured common-law judges as oracles who discovered preexisting metaphysical legal principles and declared the principles’ applicability in particular cases. Under this view, the metaphysical principles were the law, and
judicial precedents were merely evidence of the law.”236
When Swift is seen in this light, “Erie is often regarded as a victory of
legal positivism over natural law.”237 As Professor Casto put it, “The general acceptance of positivism in this century virtually dictated the overruling of Swift v. Tyson and the creation of the Erie doctrine in 1938.”238 This
positivist reading has become highly controversial in recent years, however.
The debate has to do both with the logic of Justice Brandeis’s argument and
the accuracy of his portrayal of Swift.239 With respect to the former, Craig
Green points out that “[e]ven if Holmes’s argument were true, Swift’s alleged ‘fallacy’ did not violate the Constitution. Positivism was popular in
the early twentieth century and remains so today. Yet the Constitution re-

234

Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102 (1945) (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); see also Jackson, supra note 198, at 612 (“Swift v. Tyson rests
on the philosophic premise that a court . . . does not make the law but merely finds or declares the law,
and so its decisions simply constitute evidence of what the law is, which another court is free to reject in
favor of better evidence to be found elsewhere.”).
235 Casto, supra note 230, at 908.
236 Id. at 911.
237 Jay Tidmarsh, Foreword: Erie’s Gift, 44 AKRON L. REV. 897, 900 (2011); see also Susan
Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829, 854–55 (2011) (book
review) (observing that “the received legal wisdom about Swift and Erie has it that Swift was based on a
misunderstanding about the nature of law,” but arguing that the true story is “far more complicated”).
238 Casto, supra note 230, at 907–08.
239 Craig Green suggests that the positivist problem in Swift and Erie simply evaporates because
“judicial lawmaking does not violate legal positivism. On the contrary, many positivists have acknowledged that, when judges decide cases, that is positive law.” Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 605
(citing H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 608–09
(1958); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132 (1961)). That is true so far as it goes, but it conflates
an external perspective with the internal perspective of the judge deciding cases. From the external
perspective, one can readily construct a positivist account of judge-made law: judicial decisions are
social facts, and they derive their legal force from the community’s acceptance of them as law. But the
question is more difficult from the internal perspective of the judge, who typically must ground her own
decision in some other source—either a delegation of authority to make law or some other positive law
that she interprets and applies. The interesting question about Swift is how the judges thought about
what they were doing in diversity cases.
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quires no more adherence to trendy legal theory than to Spencer’s sociology.”240
It is certainly true that Swift could not be unconstitutional solely because it was jurisprudentially mistaken. Positivism holds, however, that
legal principles must be grounded in authority—not their logical truth or
some transcendent source such as natural law. Hence, “what counts as law
in any society is fundamentally a matter of social fact.”241 Discussing the
general maritime law, for example, Justice Holmes insisted that
however ancient may be the traditions of maritime law, however diverse the sources from
which it has been drawn, it derives its whole and only power in this country from its having
been accepted and adopted by the United States. There is no mystic over-law to which even
the United States must bow.242

This positivist perspective thus forced courts applying the general
common law to search for some sort of legal authorization to do so. In other words, “[t]his [positivist] strand of Erie requires federal courts to identify
the sovereign source for every rule of decision.”243 Failure to do so could
amount to a constitutional problem.244
It is not clear, however, that Joseph Story would have denied any of
this. As Susan Bandes points out, “neither Justice Story nor subsequent
Justices who expanded the reach of Swift experienced themselves as communing with a brooding omnipresence.”245 Two critical aspects of Story’s
analysis in Swift rendered that decision completely consistent with the positivist theory that law must be grounded in social facts. First, the general
commercial law was customary in its origin.246 Its rules were derived from
240

Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 604 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
241 Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis, in
HART’S POSTSCRIPT 355, 356 (2001); see also Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 14, at 677–78 (“Natural
law and related theories, in their simple forms, hold that law depends on conformity to moral principle.
Positivism, by contrast, holds that law depends on social practices of one sort or another.”). This is the
“social thesis,” which forms the core of legal positivism alongside the “separation thesis” distinguishing
between law and moral norms. See id.
242 The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922).
243 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 852 (1997) (quoting Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 79 (1938)).
244 See Lessig, supra note 78, at 1793 (explaining that positivism requires that law be grounded in
social authority, and that this forced courts to confront the constitutional basis for the general common
law).
245 Bandes, supra note 237, at 855.
246 Or at least it was viewed that way. See supra note 78. My friend Emily Kadens has argued
that, in the Middle Ages, the law merchant was not, in fact, customary—rather, it arose from contract
and statute. See Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153
(2012). But even if that finding were to call into question the actual nature of the law merchant in
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the actual practices of merchants—a social fact—not from some notion of
natural law. Second, Story emphasized that the New York courts applied
the general common law to commercial disputes.247 If positivism required a
governmental imprimatur rather than simply a social one, state law supplied
it in commercial cases.
It is probably fair to say that current conventional wisdom has come to
reject interpretations of Swift as inherently antipositivist.248 I think that
conventional wisdom is basically right, but that Erie nonetheless adopted a
considerably different view of what judges do in diversity cases than Swift
had articulated, primarily because the judicial role under Swift itself had
changed over the intervening years. This change, I argue, was critical to
setting up Justice Brandeis’s arguments about federalism. In this sense, it
remains true that “[t]he positivist belief that judges make law is a sine qua
non to [Erie’s] constitutional argument.”249
Under Swift, federal and state courts decided a relatively narrow range
of commercial cases under a shared body of “general” principles. For a
variety of reasons, American courts were able to maintain a remarkable
degree of uniformity in this area notwithstanding the lack of a single sovereign or court with authority to unify the law in cases of divergence.250 In
particular, commercial law was an area that affected primarily sophisticated
merchants, for whom it was often more important that the rules be settled
than that they be settled right.251 Moreover, any state choosing to depart
from general law principles in the commercial field would have placed itnineteenth century America, the important point for present purposes is how courts and commentators
perceived that law in thinking about the sources of law in diversity cases.
247 See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842); supra notes 107–108 and accompanying
text.
248 See, e.g., Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 14 (concluding that jurisprudential legal positivism
was in fact logically irrelevant to the holding of Erie); Michael Stephen Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1127–35 (2011) [hereinafter Green, Suppressed Premise] (same); Lessig,
supra note 78, at 1790–92 (characterizing the original application of general commercial law under
Swift as unproblematic from a positivist perspective).
249 Casto, supra note 230, at 928. George Rutherglen makes a curious claim that Justice Brandeis’s positivism left him without a basis for overruling Swift. Professor Rutherglen asserts that Brandeis
“appeal[ed] to principles of federalism whose source and weight could not be identified simply by
tracing them back to the Constitution,” and that “[h]aving made this appeal outside of recognized legal
sources, Brandeis could not criticize the federal general common law of Swift v. Tyson for lacking such
a source.” Rutherglen, supra note 127, at 291. I doubt this jurisprudential “gotcha” works, however.
“Positivist” is not a synonym for “textualist,” and principles of federalism and separation of powers are
surely “recognized legal sources,” regardless of how much people may differ about their meaning.
250 See Fletcher, supra note 90, at 1549.
251 Id. at 1562–63; see also H. Parker Sharp & Joseph B. Brennan, The Application of the Doctrine
of Swift v. Tyson Since 1900, 4 IND. L.J. 367, 371 (1929) (arguing that “[u]niformity is especially desirable in the case of negotiable instruments” that “circulate freely from state to state,” and that “[i]t would
greatly impede their marketability if prospective purchasers were bound to ascertain whether the instruments had become subject to any peculiar local rules”).
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self at a potentially disastrous disadvantage in an increasingly competitive
national market.252
As Tony Freyer has documented, however, “[b]etween 1842 and the
end of the nineteenth century the Swift doctrine underwent a gradual but
fundamental transformation.”253 The Court slowly but steadily expanded
the scope of general law into new areas previously governed by local principles; as then-Solicitor General Robert Jackson put it, Swift’s rule “grew
by what it fed on.”254 “By the 1880s,” Professor Freyer notes, “the general
law included 26 distinct doctrines. The two main categories of cases in
which this enlargement took place involved tort liability in accidents and
recovery on defaulted municipal bonds.”255 These were not areas where
interested parties valued certainty over content.256 Moreover, these expansions brought the general law increasingly into conflict not only with state
court decisions but also with state statutes. In Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque,
for example, the Court famously refused to follow a state court’s construction of the state constitution that would have invalidated the state bonds at
issue.257 “We shall never immolate truth, justice, and the law,” the Court
bellowed, “because a State tribunal has erected the altar and decreed the
sacrifice.”258
This expansion of the general law seems to have been driven—or at
least accompanied—by a shift in Swift’s underlying rationale.259 Although
Swift and other early decisions had emphasized the customary nature of the
general commercial law and the importance of the parties’ expectations in
interstate commercial transactions, later decisions relied on a more expan-

252

See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 91.
FREYER, supra note 30, at 45.
254 Jackson, supra note 198, at 611; see also Lessig, supra note 78, at 1792. At the same time, the
general common law as interpreted by the federal courts was becoming considerably more friendly to
business interests than was state law. See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 66-67.
255 FREYER, supra note 30, at 58; see also Comment, supra note 200, at 91–92 (“Confining themselves at first to a sort of law merchant of usages common to the commercial world the federal courts
have applied their own rules in an increasing field, without regard to the non-statutory law of a state,
feeling dictated . . . by the importance of national certainty of the law in the broader field of general
jurisprudence”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Sharp & Brennan, supra note 251, at 376 (noting, in
1929, that “[f]or the most part, in negligence cases federal courts are not bound by state decisions”).
256 See generally JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987) (describing the controversy over the state bond cases).
257 68 U.S. 175, 206–07 (1863).
258 Id. Professor Freyer notes that “[d]uring the 30 years after the Dubuque decision, approximately 300 bond cases came to the Supreme Court (more than on any other single issue), while many others
were settled in the lower federal courts without appeal.” FREYER, supra note 30, at 60.
259 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 78, at 1792 (“As the practice of the common law became less
reflective and more directive, theories of the common law as custom yielded to theories of the common
law as science. The theories that fit the emerging practice saw the common law as normative, and these
in turn displaced theories that insisted that the common law was simply reflective.”).
253
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sive need for national uniformity.260 This shift did not render the later decisions antipositivist; Swift’s late-century defenders relied on indubitably
positivist sources—typically the Diversity Clause of Article III.261 But the
shift away from customary law to normative lawmaking put the question of
legislative authority front and center.
I submit that what happened to Swift was not that it could no longer be
justified once legal positivism became well established, but rather that the
twin positivist sources of Swift’s authority eroded as the general law expanded beyond its commercial law origins. Justice Story could ground the
general commercial law in the customary practices of merchants as well as
the states’ decision, acknowledged by the state courts, to follow the general
commercial law rather than localize the rules governing such transactions.
But the common law principles articulated in the new bond and tort cases,
for example, did not arise from the customary practices of parties to consensual transactions, and in many instances the states had made a deliberate
decision to localize the relevant legal principles. The federal courts thus
needed a new basis of positive authority for applying general law in this
broader universe of cases. “As the federal judiciary continued to enlarge
the body of general law,” Professor Freyer relates, “a fundamental question
arose as to the proper balance of power between the state and federal governments.”262 Erie thus raised a question of federalism that Swift had not.263
Although there is fairly widespread agreement today that Erie’s positivism requires courts “to identify the sovereign source for every rule of
decision,”264 disagreement persists about the available options. Professors
Bradley and Goldsmith maintain that “[b]ecause the appropriate ‘sovereigns’ under the U.S. Constitution are the federal government and the
states, all law applied by federal courts must be either federal law or state
law.”265 Similarly, Louise Weinberg has written that “[a]t the heart of
[Erie] was the positivistic insight that American law must be either federal
or state law. There could be no overarching or hybrid third option.”266 I
have criticized this view at greater length elsewhere,267 and a number of
260

See Casto, supra note 230, at 915–18; Comment, supra note 200, at 92.
See, e.g., Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 14, at 682–83; BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63,
at 95, 147 n.17.
262 FREYER, supra note 30, at 71.
263 See, e.g., FREYER, supra note 30, at 36–37 (explaining why pro-states’ rights justices on the
Court did not object to Story’s holding in Swift); see generally Lessig, supra note 78, at 1793–94 (explaining that as the general common law became normative rather than reflective of customary practices, it became more difficult for federal judges to justify their role in shaping that law).
264 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 243, at 852.
265 Id.
266 Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 820 (1989).
267 See Young, CIL, supra note 84, at 492–96 (arguing that there is nothing antipositivist about
general law so long as that law is adopted and empowered by positivist means—that is, social acceptance or governmental authorization).
261
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recent commentators have noted the role that “general” law continues to
play in our legal system.268 Nothing in Erie or in legal positivism generally
would preclude state or federal courts from continuing to follow the general
law in diversity cases, so long as state law mandated that choice as it did
under Swift.269 The reason that federal courts generally may not apply the
general law presently is simply that states generally do not make that
choice.
B.

Erie and Federalism

Positivism, as I have said, required courts to locate some ground of legal authority to construe and apply the common law. By the time of Erie,
application of the general law could, for the most part, no longer rest on the
states’ acquiescence or on the notion that courts were simply enforcing the
customary understandings of parties to interstate transactions. The federal
courts thus needed some sort of federal authority to displace state law in
diversity cases. Positivism did not, strictly speaking, require rejection of
Swift—but it did mean that Erie had to be a case about federalism.
Erie’s federalism rationale, however, is frequently misunderstood.
1.

Legislative Power and Dual Federalism

Misinterpretation of Erie’s constitutional rationale stems from two
statements: one at the beginning and one at the end of Justice Brandeis’s
constitutional discussion. Brandeis opened with the canonical statement of
Erie’s holding: “Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State. . . . There is no federal general common law.”270 He then made a
somewhat confusing reference to Congress’s power, despite the fact that no
federal statute purported to govern the merits of the case: “Congress has no
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State,
whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law
or a part of the law of torts.”271 Brandeis compounded the confusion when
he added, at the end of the section, “that in applying the doctrine [of Swift]

268

See Nelson, General Law, supra note 74; Bellia & Clark, supra note 49; see also Young, CIL,
supra note 84, at 467–74 (arguing that American courts should treat customary international law as
“general” law unless it is incorporated into federal law by Congress).
269 See, e.g., Rutherglen, supra note 127, at 295 (concluding that “the federal courts could appeal to
the general common law if state law allowed them to do so”).
270 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
271 Id.
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this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion
are reserved by the Constitution to the several States.”272
This language has suggested to some that Erie rested on a pure question of federalism. Craig Green, for example, purports to find two supposedly distinct federalism rationales in Justice Brandeis’s opinion: a highlyimplausible “states’ rights” interpretation and a slightly more tenable
“enumerated powers” reading.273 The gravamen of each argument, however, is to characterize Erie as a case about limits on the power of the federal
government as a whole, rather than about limits specific to the powers of
the federal courts.274 Likewise, Suzanna Sherry appears to read Brandeis as
relying entirely on a lack of congressional power to reach the conduct at
issue in the case.275
This reading, if correct, would have important implications for current
debates about federal judicial power to recognize and enforce norms, such
as principles of customary international law, that are not embodied in federal positive law. Harold Koh has argued, for example, that “given both
Congress’s enumerated authority to define and punish offenses against the
law of nations and its affirmative exercise of that power in a range of statutes, no one could similarly claim that federal courts lacked power to make
federal common law rules with respect to international law.”276 More
broadly, the enumerated powers reading would support an extremely capacious view of federal common law generally. Current enumerated powers
doctrine, after all, gives Congress extremely broad legislative powers.277 If
Erie were about federal legislative jurisdiction, then that entire field would
now be open to federal judicial lawmaking.
If this were the rationale, then Erie’s critics would be right to criticize
it. As Professor Sherry notes, “[i]t is doubtful that Erie’s federalism limitation on congressional power was correct when it was decided, and doctrinal
developments have made it even less valid.”278 As the critics read it, Erie is
a relic of “dual federalism”—the regime of federalism doctrine that dominated the Court’s jurisprudence for the first century and a half of our history.279 Dual federalism contemplated “two mutually exclusive, reciprocally
272 Id. at 80; see also, e.g., Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 142 (plucking these two statements out
as the key expression of the Court’s rationale).
273 Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 607–14.
274 See also PURCELL, supra note 9, at 172–73.
275 See Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 142–44; see also Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of Theory, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1571–73 (2008) (reading Erie similarly).
276 Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law? 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1831
(1998).
277 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
278 Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 143.
279 See Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 607–09. Even Professor Purcell’s reading takes Erie
into this territory. See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 168 (“The federal common law was illegitimate,
Brandeis believed, because it was base on the fallacy that the scope of congressional power had no
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limiting fields of power—that of the national government and of the States.
The two authorities confront each other as equals across a precise constitutional line, defining their respective jurisdictions.”280 Consistent with this
model, the critics interpret Erie to hold that matters like the tort duty at issue in that case fell within an exclusive zone of state authority.281
The problem, of course, is that this view of federalism has become untenable.282 The Court rejected dual federalism as part of its New Deal revolution, which largely abandoned the notion of judicially enforced limits on
the Commerce Clause.283 Erie was decided in 1938, a year after the Court’s
1937 “switch in time.” But even before the Court switched, it had made
clear that Congress had extensive power to regulate even intrastate matters
pertaining to the railroads as instrumentalities of interstate commerce.284 It
is thus difficult to say that Congress would have lacked constitutional power to specify by statute a duty of care for railroads towards persons walking
along their rights-of-way. Indeed, Michael Greve seems right to contend
“that Congress could reenact, and could have reenacted even in 1938, the
entire corpus juris of general common law that was declared unconstitutional in Erie.”285 This, for Erie’s critics, is enough to dispose of Erie’s
federalism rationale.286

relevance to the reach of the federal judicial power.”); id. at 173 (“[Congress’s lack] of power . . . turned
on the absence of congressional authority as determined by reference to the constitutional grant of
powers to the national government.”).
280 Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Role of the Court, in FEDERALISM: INFINITE VARIETY IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 8, 24–25 (Valerie A. Earle, ed., 1968); see also ANTHONY J. BELLIA, JR., FEDERALISM
183 (2011) (“The dual federalism paradigm understands federal and state governments to operate in
different spheres of authority.”).
281 See Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 144–45.
282 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 1, at 701 (concluding that “the enclave theory does not accurately
reflect the Constitution’s plan for allocating power between the federal and state governments”).
283 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37–38 (1937); see also Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942); see generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950) (recounting dual federalism’s collapse); Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling
Persistence of Dual Federalism, NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY (forthcoming 2013)
[hereinafter Young, Puzzling Persistance] (complaining that many contemporary commentators confuse
any federalism-protective doctrine with the old dual federalism model).
284 See Houston E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342, 354–
55 (1914) (holding that the federal government could regulate intrastate railroad rates where necessary
to regulating interstate rates); Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1684 n.10 (1974) (“[E]ven by then contemporary standards, Congress would have
been seen as having power to prescribe a substantive rule of liability for the specific accident in Erie.”).
285 GREVE, supra note 4, at 227. Interestingly, then-Solicitor General Robert Jackson did cite this
sort of federalism problem as a reason for getting rid of Swift. Writing in 1938, Jackson argued that
Swift created an anomaly because questions like insurance contracts or torts were “held to be within
Federal judicial power, but not within Federal congressional power.” Jackson, supra note 198, at 614.
If contemporary observers thought that all or most of the realm covered by general common law had
come within Congress’s legislative power as a result of the Court’s expansive reading of the Commerce

File: Young Proofs

2013]

Created on: 1/16/2014 10:21:00 AM

Last Printed: 1/16/2014 10:22:00 AM

A GENERAL DEFENSE OF ERIE RAILROAD CO. V. TOMPKINS

67

It is highly unlikely, however, that this was the Court’s actual rationale. As Professor Green acknowledges, Justice Brandeis was hardly a
proponent of dual federalism.287 It would have been exceptionally odd to
find him aggressively seeking to roll back the Shreveport Rate Case’s more
expansive view of national power. Unsurprisingly, Brandeis said no such
thing.288 His opinion is completely consistent with notions of judicial federalism—that is, limits on the lawmaking power of courts that impose no
parallel limits on the power of Congress. I discuss the judicial federalism
rationale in the next section.
2.

Judicial Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Legal Process
Vision

Contemporary federalism doctrine—and most contemporary federalism theory as well—largely accepts that Congress shares broad, largely
concurrent regulatory powers with the States.289 The principal limits on
national authority thus arise from the difficulty of enacting federal legislation and the states’ political representation in that process.290 From this
standpoint, it is critical that “the states, and their interests as such, are represented in the Congress but not in the federal courts,”291 and no less significant that the federal courts may formulate rules of decision far more readily

Clause in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), one would have expected Jackson,
of all people, to note that fact.
286 See, e.g., Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 143 (“Erie’s reliance on federalism is utterly inconsistent with both contemporaneous and subsequent cases on congressional power.”).
287 Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 607; see also PURCELL, supra note 9, at 134–35 (noting that
although Justice Brandeis valued decentralization, he shared the post-1937 majority’s “sense of excitement and vindication” at “jettison[ing] doctrine identified with the ‘old Court’”).
288 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 1, at 702 (“The opinion Justice Brandeis wrote for the Erie Court in
1938 was a creature of its time [(a year after NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. . . . and three years
before United States v. Darby)] and it understood all this [that there were no exclusive enclaves of state
authority] perfectly well.”). As Professor Ely points out, some later courts did appear to make this
mistake. See id. at 705; see also, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 202
(1956) (suggesting that if the Federal Arbitration Act were to apply in diversity actions, it would unconstitutionally invade the “local law field”). It might be best to understand Bernhardt’s reference to the
field of local law as an application of the “presumption against preemption” in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947), which applies most strongly when Congress legislates “in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied.” Id. at 230.
289 See Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption
in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 279–80 (2012) [hereinafter Young, Ordinary Diet].
290 See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (emphasizing the political representation of the states in Congress); Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 15, at
1339–42 (emphasizing the procedural difficulty of enacting federal law).
291 Mishkin, supra note 284, at 1685.
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than Congress can enact laws.292 Hence the principle of judicial federalism.
As Paul Mishkin put it,
That Congress may have constitutional power to make federal law displacing state substantive policy does not imply an equal range of power for federal judges. Principles related to
the separation of powers impose an additional limit on the authority of federal courts to engage in lawmaking on their own (unauthorized by Congress). 293

As in other areas of federalism doctrine,294 then, separation of powers
reinforces the limits on national power by constraining courts from displacing state law even where similar action by Congress would be permissible.295
This judicial federalism theory of Erie fits well into a broader vision of
federalism commonly associated with the Legal Process school of jurisprudence.296 That vision, articulated in the first edition of the famous Hart &
Wechsler casebook, portrayed federal law as broad in its potential scope but
interstitial in its actual manifestation:
Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature. It rarely occupies a legal field completely,
totally excluding all participation by the legal systems of the states. This was plainly true in

292

See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1362
(2001) [hereinafter Young, Two Cheers]; see also Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 185, at 313–16
(identifying other institutional factors pressing federal courts to make law); Gasaway & Parrish, supra
note 4, at 967 (arguing that because the common law is “comprehensive” and “integrated” it must provide answers to all conceivable questions arising between two parties).
293 Mishkin, supra note 284, at 1683; see also Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 15, at 1414;
Hill, supra note 102, at 441 (raising the “rather obvious point” that “even if a particular area is one in
which the federal government has power to make independent law, it does not follow that a federal court
also has power to do so, for the power of the federal courts does not correspond in all respects with the
power of the federal government as a whole”).
294 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (limiting Congress’s power to act
against the states pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment by restricting Congress’s
ability to second-guess the Court’s interpretation of constitutional rights); Solid Waste Auth. of N. Cook
Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (refusing to defer to agency rule that pressed
the outer limits of Congress’s commerce power).
295 See Henry P. Monaghan, Hart and Wechsler’s the Federal Courts and the Federal System, 87
HARV. L. REV. 889, 892 (1974) (book review) (“Erie is, fundamentally, a limitation on the federal
court’s power to displace state law absent some relevant constitutional or statutory mandate which
neither the general language of article III nor the jurisdictional statute provides.”). In this essay, I will
generally use the labels “judicial federalism,” “separation of powers,” and “Legal Process” interchangeably to describe what I view to be the best account of Erie’s constitutional rationale.
296 On the Legal Process school, see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and
Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 964–67 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li–
cxxxvi (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205–99 (1995).
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the beginning when the federal legislative product (including the Constitution) was extremely small. It is significantly true today, despite the volume of Congressional enactments, and
even within areas where Congress has been very active. Federal legislation, on the whole,
has been conceived and drafted on an ad hoc basis to accomplish limited objectives. It builds
upon legal relationships established by the states, altering or supplanting them only so far as
necessary for the special purpose. Congress acts, in short, against the background of the total
corpus juris of the states in much the way that a state legislature acts against the background
of the common law, assumed to govern unless changed by legislation.297

As the current editors of Hart & Wechsler note, “the expansion of federal legislation and administrative regulation . . . has accelerated,” so that
“at present federal law appears to be more primary than interstitial in numerous areas.”298 Nonetheless, they suggest—I think correctly—that “the
First Edition’s thesis [remains] accurate over an extremely broad range of
applications.”299
Erie’s constitutional holding—that federal judicial lawmaking authority is not coextensive with Congress’s, and that in fact federal courts generally lack common lawmaking powers—fits comfortably within this framework. Indeed, I argue in Part IV that Erie is the paradigm case of contemporary federalism doctrine. What is “reserved” to the States, on the Legal
Process view, is regulatory authority over matters upon which Congress has
been unwilling or unable to legislate.300 In that sense, the late nineteenth
century expansion of the Swift doctrine had indeed “invaded rights . . . reserved by the Constitution to the several States”301—in particular, the right
to govern matters not preempted by federal legislation. Similarly, Justice
Brandeis’s statement that “Congress has no power to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a State” is best read as a somewhat inartful way of saying that Congress may not confer a general common lawmaking power on the federal courts.302 Congress can declare only statute
law, made through the Article I lawmaking process. As Professor Clark has
explained,

297

HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 459 (quoting the first edition, published in 1953); see
also Wallis v. Pan Am. Petrol. Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (citing and endorsing this view); Hart,
supra note 10, at 525-35 (developing the casebook’s view); MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 80-86 (1966) (adopting the interstitial
view); Hill, supra note 102, at 442 (“[T]here are vast reaches within the scope of the commerce power
which have always been deemed to be subject to the sovereign power of the states until pre-emted for
the federal prerogative by action of Congress . . . . Until such pre-emption takes place the federal courts
have always understood that the law of the states furnishes the rule of decision.”).
298 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 459–60.
299 Id.
300 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 10, at 526.
301 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938).
302 This view finds considerable support in the Framers’ considered decision not to include a general reception of the common law in the federal constitution. See Jay, Part Two, supra note 91, at 1312;
compare id., with infra note 513 (discussing state provisions receiving the common law).
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Erie's constitutional holding is best understood as an attempt to enforce federal lawmaking
procedures and the political safeguards of federalism they incorporate. In other words, Erie
reflects the idea that the Constitution not only limits the powers granted to the federal government, but also constrains the manner in which the federal government may exercise those
powers to displace state law. 303

The Legal Process vision of federal law as interstitial has several important implications for federalism doctrine. The primary limits on federal
authority, on this view, arise from the political representation of the states
in Congress and the procedural difficulty of making federal law. Herbert
Wechsler, a key expositor of the Legal Process approach, emphasized the
former in his work on the “political safeguards of federalism,”304 and the
Supreme Court adopted that notion—for some purposes, at least—in the
Garcia case.305 Brad Clark’s more recent work has emphasized the latter,
more procedural checks.306 Both political and procedural limits on federal
authority militate in favor of judicial doctrines that channel federal lawmaking to Congress, rather than administrative agencies and federal courts.
Agencies and courts, after all, lack built-in state representation and can
make federal law considerably more easily than Congress can.307 The polit303 Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 15, at 1414; see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Common
Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 15–19 (1985) [hereinafter Merrill, Common Law].
Ed Purcell has argued that the judicial federalism aspect of Erie was merely prudential—not constitutional—in nature. See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 173. I have argued against that reading in Young,
CIL, supra note 84, at 410–13.
304 Wechsler, supra note 290; see also JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW
STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING (2009) (exploring the operation of
political safeguards in practice).
305 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, (1985). The Garcia/Wechsler
“political safeguards” argument has been controversial. Compare, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF
THE SUPREME COURT (1982) (arguing that the Supreme Court should abandon judicial review of federalism issues and rely entirely on political safeguards); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into
the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) (criticizing Wechsler’s original
account but arguing that alternative mechanisms, especially political parties, provide important protection for states), with Saikrishna B. Prakash & John Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Federalism Theories, 79 TEXAS L. REV. 1459 (2001) (criticizing old and new versions of the political
safeguards theory); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 106–33 (2001) (same). My own view is that while the states’ representation
in Congress does not provide sufficient protection for states to substitute for judicial review, it is a
significant check on national power and judicial review should be geared to maximize the effect of
political and procedural checks. See, e.g., Young, Two Cheers, supra note 292, at 1365–66; Ernest A.
Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 65–91, 123–29 (2004) [hereinafter
Young, Two Federalisms]. As I discuss in Part IV, the Erie doctrine fits well with that approach.
306 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1681 (2008) [hereinafter Clark, Procedural Safeguards]; Young, Two Cheers, supra note 292, at
1361–64.
307 See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 15, at 1433; Young, Executive Preemption, supra
note 7, at 878.
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ical/procedural perspective likewise favors doctrines that raise the salience
and political costs of measures that encroach on state authority, such as the
presumption against preemption and the various clear statement rules.308
To be sure, the notion that Congress must always make federal law is
often honored in the breach. In particular, Congress has delegated—and the
courts have allowed it to delegate309—broad lawmaking authority to administrative agencies.310 One might contend that Congress has likewise delegated broad lawmaking powers to the federal courts, either in the statutory
grant of diversity jurisdiction or (if one buys the Sherry/Ritz reading discussed earlier311) in the Rules of Decision Act itself. Against such a reading, Aaron Nielson has argued Erie should be read to rest on the nondelegation doctrine.312 “In light of the broad, unchanneled power exercised by
federal courts under Swift v. Tyson’s interpretation of the Rules of Decision
Act,” he insists, “Erie . . . can and should be understood as a nondelegation
case.”313
The nondelegation reading of Erie is best read to make two distinct
claims: Congress can’t delegate a general lawmaking power to the federal
courts, and in any event Congress hasn’t delegated such a power. One obvious rejoinder to the first claim is that the nondelegation doctrine is dead;
the Supreme Court has not struck down a federal statute on nondelegation
grounds since 1935.314 But although the Court has proven extremely reluc308 See generally Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note 289, at 265; Matthew Stephenson, The Price of
Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs,
118 Yale L.J. 2 (2008).
309 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn’s, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (rejecting a
nondelegation challenge to a provision of the Clean Air Act and observing that “we have ‘almost never
felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be
left to those executing or applying the law’”) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 416
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
310 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985–86 (White, J., dissenting) (“For some time, the
sheer amount of law . . . made by the [administrative] agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking
engaged in by Congress through the traditional process.”). Delegation is not an entirely new phenomenon. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 411 (2008) (“From the early days of the Republic, Congress
voluntarily has . . . ‘delegated’ . . . substantial lawmaking powers to members of both the executive and
judicial branches.”). It is undeniable, however, that the volume and scope of delegations has vastly
increased since the advent of the modern regulatory state in the mid-twentieth century.
311 See supra Part II.A.3.
312 Aaron Nielson, Erie as Nondelegation, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (2011).
313 Id. at 241–42.
314 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down a
provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) on nondelegation grounds); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking down a different NIRA provision on similar grounds). As
Cass Sunstein puts it, “the conventional [nondelegation] doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad
ones (and counting).” Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000);
see also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1241
(1994) (lamenting the “virtually complete abandonment of the nondelegation principle”).
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tant to draw firm lines fixing the outer limits of permissible delegations, it
has always treated the underlying constitutional principle as sound.315 As
my colleague Margaret Lemos has observed, “the basic notion that the Constitution imposes some restrictions on Congress’s ability to delegate lawmaking authority is deeply entrenched in constitutional law and widely accepted in constitutional commentary.”316
Moreover, “the constitutional principles underlying the [nondelegation] doctrine apply with full force to delegations to courts.”317 In fact, they
ought to apply with greater force. Federal courts lack even the minimal
democratic accountability of executive agencies, and the usual legislative
checks on agency action—such as oversight hearings, funding control, and
judicial review for compliance with statutory mandates—are attenuated or
absent when Congress delegates to courts.318 Moreover, as Professor
Neilson points out, one of the Court’s earliest nondelegation cases concerned a judicial delegation.319 In Wayman v. Southard,320 the Court upheld
the Process Act, which required federal courts to apply state procedural
rules in common law actions but authorized them to make “such alterations
and additions as the said courts . . . shall in their discretion seem expedient.”321 But Chief Justice Marshall firmly observed that “[i]t will not be
contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.”322
A general delegation of federal common lawmaking power—even if
confined to diversity cases—would fail any conceivable notion of nondele-

315 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn’s, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (reaffirming that
“when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must ‘lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform’”)
(quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)); Loving v. United
States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) (rejecting—but taking seriously—a nondelegation challenge to aspects of
the military capital punishment scheme); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the
Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1408 (2000)
(suggesting that the Court’s decision in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), actually
relied on a nondelegation rationale).
316 Lemos, supra note 310, at 413; see also Nielson, supra note 312, at 263; Cass R. Sunstein, Is
the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 311 (1999) (contending that “the doctrine is
properly held in reserve for extreme cases—that it serves as a genuine, but judicially underenforced,
constitutional norm—and that it operates as a legitimate tool of statutory construction”).
317 Lemos, supra note 310, at 405.
318 See Nielson, supra note 312, at 266–98; Lemos, supra note 310, at 409; Young, Federal Common Law, supra note 8, at 1667; Merrill, Common Law, supra note 303, at 21–22.
319 See Nielson, supra note 312, at 270.
320 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
321 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792). The act also authorized the Supreme
Court to make “such regulations as [it] shall think proper from time to time by rule to prescribe to any
circuit or district court.” Id.
322 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 42–43.
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gation.323 Unlike Professor Nielson, I do not think a delegation of authority
to apply the general commercial law construed in Swift v. Tyson would necessarily have been unconstitutional. That law, after all, was relatively narrow in scope and, more importantly, its principles were dictated by the customary practices of merchants;324 directing the courts to follow those practices in order to vindicate party expectations would provide an intelligible
principle to guide and cabin judicial discretion. But as I have already discussed, the general common law had overflowed the banks of Swift by the
end of the nineteenth century, becoming both far broader in scope and far
more normative in character.325 No intelligible principle specified by Congress limited judicial discretion in general law cases by the time the Court
sat to decide Erie.
Even if Congress could delegate such broad authority, moreover, it
plainly has not done so.326 I have already explained why the Rules of Decision Act cannot be read as such a delegation, and that forecloses any such
reading of the diversity statute as well; after all, why would the Rules of
Decision Act prescribe state law in diversity cases if Congress intended to
delegate federal common lawmaking power in those cases?327 Contemporary nondelegation jurisprudence adds considerable force to this conclusion.
Although the Court has not struck down a delegation as unconstitutional in
nearly eighty years, it not infrequently invokes delegation concerns in the
context of statutory construction.328 Given this strong presumption against
inferring broad statutory delegations from ambiguous text—not to mention
the breadth of the delegation that would have to be inferred—neither the
Rules of Decision Act nor the diversity statute should be construed as authorizing federal courts to make federal common law.329
323

See Nielson, supra note 312, at 275–76.
See supra notes 73–89 and accompanying text.
325 See supra notes 253–60 and accompanying text.
326 See Ely, supra note 1, at 707 n.77 (“Congress has made clear its disinclination to delegate
anything remotely resembling the entirety of its constitutional power to federal courts.”).
327 Professor Ritz argued that the Rules of Decision Act simply had nothing to do with diversity
jurisdiction. See RITZ, supra note 124, at 163. The more common argument is that the Act applies only
to diversity. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 275, at 1573. But that’s not what the Act says either.
328 See, e.g., Indus. Union Dept. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645–46 (1980) (plurality
opinion); Nat’l Cable Television Assn. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341–43 (1974); Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 314, at 322. It is probably fair to say that the modern nondelegation
doctrine is enforced entirely through statutory construction—particularly through clear statement rules
that disfavor broad delegations and delegations of authority to tread upon constitutional rights. See
Bressman, supra note 315, at 1409 (“The Court has used clear-statement rules and the canon of avoidance as surrogates for the nondelegation doctrine.”); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1603–06 (2000) (arguing that clear statement rules supply the best method of enforcing certain constitutional values and that
nondelegation is an example).
329 In Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640–41 (1981), the Court read
Erie as making clear that “[t]he vesting of jurisdiction in the federal courts does not in and of itself give
324
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I want to stress that both of these judicial federalism arguments—that
Congress couldn’t delegate sufficiently broad common lawmaking authority to support judicial practice in the latter days of the Swift era, and that it
hasn’t delegated such authority—are constitutional arguments. As Paul
Mishkin explained,
It makes no difference . . . whether the core of Erie be perceived as ‘Constitutional’ in the
sense that Congress could not validly enact a statute entirely contrary to the Rules of Decision Act, or merely ‘constitutional’ in the sense that it rests upon premises related to the
basic nature of our federal system which are presupposed to govern in the absence of clear
congressional determination to change and reallocate power within that system. 330

Our Constitution leaves much to be worked out by statute, practice,
and convention, and the result is that much of our government structure is
“constituted” by law that is not constitutionally entrenched.331 Both sorts of
rise to authority to formulate federal common law.” Two frequently cited exceptions to this principle
involve interstate disputes and admiralty cases. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 653–54
(noting these exceptions, but suggesting that “lawmaking authority in these areas rests on factors other
than a jurisdictional grant”). Commentators have said that the federal courts’ federal common lawmaking authority in interstate disputes “springs of necessity from the structure of the Constitution.” Henry
P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 11-12 (1975) [hereinafter Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law]; see also Clark, Federal
Common Law, supra note 147, 1322–31 (grounding federal courts’ authority in the structural principle
that states enter the Union on an “equal footing”). And I have argued elsewhere that the admiralty
statute similarly cannot be read as a broad delegation of federal common lawmaking authority. See
Ernest A. Young, It’s Just Water: Toward the Normalization of Admiralty, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 469,
485–507 (2004) [hereinafter Young, Just Water]. The only other prominent example of judicial lawmaking authority implied from a jurisdictional grant is the Lincoln Mills case, which inferred such
authority from a bare grant of jurisdiction to resolve collective bargaining disputes under the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA). See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957). The majority opinion in that case, however, relied heavily on evidence that Congress intended
the grant in the LMRA to be more than a bare jurisdictional grant and instead to embody a specific
policy of enforcing arbitration agreements. Id. at 450–56; see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66,
at 664 (suggesting that “federal common lawmaking in Lincoln Mills [is] best viewed as rooted in the
need to carry out the substantive policies of the federal labor laws rather than as an implication from the
jurisdictional grant”); Young, Just Water, supra, at 496–98 (identifying other problems with Lincoln
Mills as a template for congressional delegations of lawmaking authority).
330 Mishkin, supra note 284, at 1686; see also id. (“It is true in fact that Congress generally does
not ignore such principles; in any event, it is sound policy not to take constitutional principles as likely
undercut by Congress (even if it should have ultimate power to do so) when Congress has not squarely
and unmistakably taken the decision to do so.”); Field, Sources of Law, supra note 55, at 920 (“stating
that even if Erie did not rest on strictly constitutional grounds, the scheme we have inherited from Erie
and developed since has become such a fundamental part of our way of thinking about the boundary
between state and federal power that many of our suppositions, constitutional and otherwise, are built
upon it, so that Erie, together with Murdock v. Memphis, has “created our current view of what ‘state
law’ is”).
331 See generally Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408
(2007); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934).
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law, moreover, serve fundamental constitutional values of federalism and
separation of powers.332 This is particularly true of the nondelegation principle. In modern administrative law, the relatively strict judicial enforcement of statutory boundaries to delegated authority has largely come to
stand in for judicial enforcement of limits on excessive delegation grounded
in Article I.333 Given that evolution, Congress’s decision not to delegate
broad federal common lawmaking authority to the federal courts has constitutional significance; it means, after all, that it would be unconstitutional
for the courts to assert such unbounded authority on their own.334
Our experience under Erie confirms that the manner of federal lawmaking makes a practical difference. Professor Mishkin noted, for example, that “central judicially appointed committees . . . proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence broadly abrogating state laws on privilege, and . . . these
passed through the Supreme Court, to be intercepted only in the Congress.”335 He concluded that “this weighting of state interests in the Congress, more significantly than in the Court (or judicial appointees), was a
fulfillment of the institutional structure established in the Constitution.”336
The most important implication of this judicial federalism reading of
Erie is that federal common law is always constitutionally problematic.337
“Problematic” is not the same thing as “unconstitutional”; as Judge Friendly
famously pointed out, Erie cleared the way for legitimate forms of federal
common law.338 But federal judge-made law always requires special justifi-

332

See Ernest A. Young, The Continuity of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: An Essay
for Phil Frickey, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1384–85 (2010).
333 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 143 (1990) (“Broad delegations of power to regulatory agencies, questionable in
light of the grant of legislative power to Congress in Article I of the Constitution, have been allowed
largely on the assumption that courts would be available to ensure agency fidelity to whatever statutory
directives have been issued.”); Farina, supra note 217, at 597–98.
334 Cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding the Bush Administration’s use of
military commissions to try suspected terrorists unconstitutional because it was not authorized by Congress).
335 Mishkin, supra note 284, at 1685.
336 Id.
337 Craig Green asserts that “Brandeis’s conclusion, ‘[t]here is no federal general common law’ . . .
had nothing to do with separation of powers or new-myth aversion to federal common law.” Green,
Repressing, supra note 5, at 616. But this, like much of Professor Green’s argument, is badly overstated. It is true that “‘[f]ederal general common law’ is different from ‘federal common law,’” id., in the
sense that the former would be a subset of the latter. But Erie’s statement—that except for cases governed by statutes and constitutional provisions state law applies—pertains to both. It means that judicial
lawmaking must be tied to constitutional meaning or Congress’s intent, as Judge Friendly—upon whom
Green relies—acknowledged. See Friendly, supra note 57, at 407. Calling the separation of powers
argument against federal common law “wordplay” and a “mistake,” as Green does, Green, Repressing,
supra note 5, at 617, is not an argument.
338 Friendly, supra note 57, at 405.
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cation under Erie.339 It must be tied to the specific forms of federal law that
Erie mentioned—federal statutes or constitutional provisions, and we might
reasonably add treaties in respect of the Supremacy Clause’s clear command. If a federal common law rule cannot be connected to some source in
federal positive law, then it is unconstitutional.340 And it is no answer to say
that Congress can override federal common law rules if it likes. Our federalism protects state authority in large part through placing burdens of overcoming inertia on federal actors, which ordinarily may act with the force of
supreme federal law only when those burdens have been overcome.341
Like everything else about Erie, however, this Legal Process understanding of the case has come under widespread attack. I consider various
objections in the next section.
C.

Objections

This section considers four distinct objections to the judicial federalism understanding of Erie. First, a number of commentators—most importantly, Ed Purcell in his wonderful book on Erie—have argued that the
Legal Process writers reinterpreted Erie in a way that was unfaithful to Justice Brandeis’s “original understanding” of the case. Second, Susan Bandes
and other critics of the Legal Process school have argued that its assumptions are outdated and overly formalistic. Third, Suzanna Sherry and
Louise Weinberg have both made a narrower argument that any reading of
Erie based on separation of powers must fail because the founding generation assumed that legislative and judicial powers are coextensive. And finally, Michael Greve has argued that the judicial federalism argument
proves too much, because it would require us to reject other forms of nonlegislative federal lawmaking that are pervasive in the modern administrative state. None of these objections, in my view, makes much of a dent in
Erie’s constitutional argument.
1.

Erie’s Original Meaning

Erie’s critics have generally acknowledged that the most plausible
constitutional rationale incorporates not only federalism but also separation
339

See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (“Federal courts, unlike state
courts, are not general common-law courts and do not possess a general power to develop and apply
their own rules of decision.”); Merrill, Common Law, supra note 303, at 3 (arguing that federal common
law is legitimate only where it arises from textual interpretation of federal enactments, congressional
delegation, or preemptive federal interests).
340 See, e.g., Young, Federal Common Law, supra note 8, at 1663–65.
341 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); see also Mishkin, supra note 284, at 1687–88
(warning against reliance on congressional inaction).

File: Young Proofs

2013]

Created on: 1/16/2014 10:21:00 AM

Last Printed: 1/16/2014 10:22:00 AM

A GENERAL DEFENSE OF ERIE RAILROAD CO. V. TOMPKINS

77

of powers.342 They often insist, however, that this rationale “finds no support in the decision itself.”343 It’s not clear what turns on this insistence; if
Erie’s principle can be shown to rest on firm constitutional ground, the critical enterprise would amount to little more than correcting Brandeis’s opinion.344 In any event, these “originalist” critiques of Erie’s separation of
powers rationale misconstrue both the opinion and its author.
The “originalist” case against a separation of powers reading for Erie
has both a textualist and an intentionalist strain. For the textualists, Craig
Green insists that “Erie’s new myth [the separation of powers reading]
lacks support in Brandeis’s opinion. Indeed, the Court’s words fail to identify any separation-of-powers issue at all.”345 But this assertion is wrong.
Justice Brandeis’s initial statement—“Except in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
case is the law of the State”346—echoes the Supremacy Clause’s command
that only “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof” are “the supreme law of the land.”347 More
than any other provision, the Supremacy Clause ties separation of powers
and federalism together: only laws made according to the rigorous lawmaking procedures specified in the Constitution have the authority to oust the
342

See, e.g., GREVE, supra note 4, at 375 (“The most promising defense of Erie is some combination of separation of powers and federalism arguments.”); Rutherglen, supra note 127, at 288 (observing
that the judicial federalism argument “is the best current account of Erie as a fundamental principle of
federalism”). This is the dominant interpretation among Erie’s supporters. See, e.g., Clark, Erie’s
Source, supra note 90; Merrill, Common Law, supra note 303, at 15–19; Mishkin, supra note 284, at
1683; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1689 (2004).
343 Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 145; see also GREVE, supra note 4, at 228 (asserting that the
judicial federalism reading “is hard to square with Brandeis’s opinion”); Green, Twin Aims, supra note
18, at 1878 (calling the judicial federalism reading a “new Erie”).
344 Cf. Bandes, supra note 237, at 844 (questioning the “occasional tendency to portray Erie as
belonging to Brandeis, and thus to portray those who deviated from Brandeis’s vision—whether on the
Court or on future Courts interpreting it—as betraying the true Erie”).
345 Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 617.
346 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
347 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Of course, the Supremacy Clause also includes in this list “all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States.” Id. International law
scholars have long suggested that the Court never meant to apply Erie to foreign relations matters. See,
e.g., Phillip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM.
J. INT’L L. 740, 743 (1939) (“Mr. Justice Brandeis was surely not thinking of international law when he
wrote his dictum.”); see also Koh, supra note 276, at 1832–38 (endorsing Professor Jessup’s view). I
have argued against this suggestion at length elsewhere. See Young, CIL, supra note 84, at 404–34.
The contemporary Court has made clear that Erie remains relevant in foreign relations cases even while
disagreeing as to its precise import. See Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726-27 (2004) (holding that, in light of Erie, federal courts should recognize an implied right of action to enforce customary
international law only in relatively narrow circumstances); id. at 740–43 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and in the judgment) (arguing that Erie forbids recognition of any implied right to enforce customary
international law); see generally Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 16 (discussing Erie’s continuing importance to foreign relations cases).

File: Young Proofs

78

Created on: 1/16/2014 10:21:00 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLICY

Last Printed: 1/16/2014 10:22:00 AM

[VOL. 10:1

presumptive authority of the states. Brandeis built his opinion around that
principle.348
Although Justice Brandeis’s opinion did not anticipate the analytic
terms of contemporary process federalism, his constitutional analysis put
the focus squarely where that theory suggests it belongs: on the way that
supreme federal law is made. “[N]o clause in the Constitution,” he wrote,
“purports to confer such a power [“to declare substantive rules of common
law applicable in a State”] upon the federal courts.”349 I have already argued, moreover, that Justice Brandeis’s Legal Positivist argument—which
makes up the bulk of the Court’s constitutional analysis—is also directed to
the issue of lawmaking authority. Brandeis needed to deflate the notion
that Swift entailed the mere application by federal courts of a “transcenden-

348 See, e.g., Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, supra note 329, 11–12 (“[Erie] recognizes
that federal judicial power to displace state law is not coextensive with the scope of dormant congressional power. Rather, the Court must point to some source, such as a statute, treaty, or constitutional
provision, as authority for the creation of substantive federal law.”). Professor Green acknowledges that
this key language—“Erie’s statement that, ‘[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the States’”—is about separation of
powers. Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 617 (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 78). “By [its] terms,” Green
admits, “this language does support new-myth limits on federal courts’ lawmaking authority.” Id. He
does not agree with Justice Brandeis’s conclusion on this point, arguing that “if the sentence were
accurate, it would bar federal common law altogether—and therein lies its error.” Id. But that is quite
different from asserting that the opinion fails to deal with separation of powers altogether.
In any event, Professor Green is wrong to characterize the quoted language from Erie as wholly
foreclosing federal common law. If Green were right, then Judge Friendly would have badly misread
Justice Brandeis’s opinion when he said it opened the way for a “new federal common law.” Friendly,
supra note 57, at 405. Brandeis said that state law applies “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by acts of Congress,” Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, and a great deal of federal common law arises
because a matter is “governed . . . by acts of Congress” but Congress has not filled in the details. See,
e.g., Merrill, Common Law, supra note 303, at 40–46 (discussing “delegated” federal common lawmaking). Even Professor Merrill’s somewhat more tenuous category of “preemptive” federal common
lawmaking, see id. at 36–40, is probably best justified on the theory that it arises in areas “governed by
the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress.” See Young, Federal Common Law, supra note 8, at
1660–65; see also Rutherglen, supra note 127, at 294 (“The defining characteristic of federal common
law as it exists today is that it is based upon federal statutes or the Constitution without being plainly
determined by them.”). As Professor Purcell explains, Brandeis took precisely this approach in justifying a federal common law of interstate disputes in Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), which he decided on the same day as Erie. See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 188.
Hence, much of the federal common law that does exist can be squared with a judicial federalism reading of Erie, although different commentators may disagree about particular areas. See, e.g., Young,
Preemption at Sea, supra note 185, at 336–37 (arguing that much federal maritime law is unconstitutional because it cannot be tied to statutes). Green is simply adopting a categorical reading of Brandeis
in order to dismiss what Brandeis says. Significantly, Green barely engages the extensive literature on
federal common law.
349 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; see also LOW, JEFFRIES, & BRADLEY, supra note 129, at 13 (“This language suggests that Erie is based, at least in part, on separation of powers.”).
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tal body of law outside of any particular State,”350 rather than lawmaking.
This was because if Swift required federal lawmaking and depended on a
federal sovereign source, it could stand only if it were somehow reconcilable with the institutional mechanisms for supplanting state law specified in
the Constitution.351
There is also an “intentionalist” strand to the argument that a judicial
federalism reading misconstrues Erie. For Edward Purcell, “Erie was a
constitutional statement of the political ideals of early twentieth-century
Progressivism.”352 He explains that
Brandeis’s constitutional theory was not based on any particular limitation on congressional
power, nor was it based on a commitment to decentralization as such. Rather, it was grounded on two related principles. The first, which Brandeis regarded as inherent in the constitutional structure, was that legislative and judicial powers were coextensive. The second,
which he regarded as a prudential but nevertheless essential corollary, was that federal judicial power was also limited to those areas—not involving constitutional rights—where Congress had chosen to act. Absent compelling reason, the federal courts should not make law
even in areas within the national legislative power unless and until Congress made the initial
decision to assert national authority in that area.353

This view hardly denies that Erie was about separation of powers—in
fact, Purcell argues that Erie “rested not on the distinction between local
and national authority but, rather, on the relationship between federal judicial and legislative power.”354 And Purcell’s second principle precisely
duplicates the judicial federalism interpretation of Erie. The only difference is that Purcell interprets this “essential corollary” as “prudential” rather than constitutional in nature.
It is unclear how much this distinction between prudential and constitutional separation of powers matters.355 The ordinary import of the distinction in other doctrinal areas is that Congress may override prudential rules
but not constitutional ones.356 But where the rule in question is itself one
that judicial authority to displace state law depends on action by Congress,
it matters considerably less whether we call that rule constitutional or not.
In any event, one searches the Erie opinion in vain for language indicating
350

Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518,
533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
351 See, e.g., BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 11 (“[I]n a federal system in which both
national and local judges believe that their legitimate function is to ‘make’ law in a legislative sense,
sources of sovereign authority become critical.”).
352 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 172.
353 Id.
354 Id. at 165.
355 See supra notes 330–34 and accompanying text (suggesting that it matters little whether the rule
of Erie is constitutionally entrenched).
356 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 128 (discussing the difference between constitutional and prudential standing doctrines).
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that its restriction on judicial power is prudential. Even Professor Purcell
describes the separation of powers aspect of Brandeis’s as “essential” and
“critical,”357 and the reasons he gives for that conclusion strongly suggest
that the principle is in fact constitutional.358 In particular, Purcell notes that
Brandeis believed in a fundamental principle of “legislative primacy,” such
that “congressional abstention in any area within its authority represented a
political judgment by the representative branch that states should exercise
control in that area, and courts should defer to that judgment.”359 This principle fits comfortably with accounts of Erie grounded in constitutional
principles of judicial federalism—that is, that Erie “enforce[d] federal lawmaking procedures and the political safeguards of federalism they incorporate.”360
Professor Purcell also voices a broader criticism of the judicial federalism rationale when he says that Erie “was not designed primarily to protect
‘federalism’ or special enclaves of state law. Rather, its more vital concern
lay in broader ideas about judicial lawmaking and separation of powers.”361
This is a problem, however, only if we assume—as many of Erie’s critics
do362—that federalism and separation of powers have little to do with one
another. Not only does Purcell equate “federalism” generally with the specific dual federalist model of “special enclaves of state law,” but he also
seems to think that “broader ideas about judicial lawmaking and separation
of powers” is a wholly separate rationale from concerns about federalism.363
These concerns have been linked from the beginning. The Constitution
protects federalism primarily by limiting federal lawmaking. 364 And Madison tied federalism and separation of powers together in Federalist 51 as

357

PURCELL, supra note 9, at 172–73.
I have canvassed them in detail in Young, CIL, supra note 84, at 412–14.
359 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 173–74.
360 Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 15, at 1414.
361 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 3.
362 See, e.g., Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 615 (contrasting “Erie’s old myth as a ‘cornerstone[] of our federalism’” with a “new myth” that “focus[es] on separation of powers”) (quoting Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
363 In related areas, commentators have well understood the close relationship between federalism
and separation of powers. The Court’s much more recent decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997), for example, struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as beyond the scope of
Congress’s power to enforce the Reconstruction amendments. As many have pointed out, the federalism issue in that case—the scope of Congress’s enumerated power to supplant state law—was intimately
bound up with separation of powers concerns about the respective role of Congress and the Court in
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997). Just as it makes no sense to
claim that Boerne was a federalism decision rather than one about separation of powers, so too with
Erie.
364 See generally Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 15; Young, Two Cheers, supra note 292,
at 1352.
358
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part of the Constitution’s “double security” for the rights of its citizens.365
Brandeis broke no new ground by intertwining these concerns in Erie.366
Professors Bridwell and Whitten suggest that the separation of powers
concern was not unknown prior to Erie.367 Rather, two factors allowed federal courts to apply the general law under Swift without intruding on legislative prerogatives. First, in cases under the general law merchant or the maritime law, “the preexistence of a system of relatively certain customary or
common law . . . . provid[ed] a background against which to judge party
behavior, and which the federal courts might utilize to avoid the conclusion
that they were ‘making’ law in a legislative sense.”368 Second, the “purposes of the jurisdictional grant” also, in some situations, required federal
courts to exercise judgment independent of the state courts about the meaning of this preexisting law. In diversity cases, most importantly, “protection
of the noncitizen required the federal court to exercise a relative degree of
independence.”369 Even in the nineteenth century, then, American lawyers
recognized that the potential for congressional lawmaking on a particular
subject did not necessarily imply a similar capacity in the courts.
It is no doubt true, as Professor Purcell contends, that subsequent interpreters—including subsequent courts as well as Legal Process thinkers
like Henry Hart and Paul Mishkin—altered the meaning of Erie in ways
that departed from Justice Brandeis’s specific early-twentieth-century Progressive vision.370 But, as Purcell recognizes, that is inevitable in a judicial
system that proceeds by common law elaboration of relatively open-ended
constitutional and statutory texts.371 If our understanding of Erie—and in
365 See FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cook ed., Wesleyan University
Press 1961); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 611 (noting Madison’s combined use of
federalism and separation of powers arguments in opposing the Alien and Sedition Acts).
366 See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77–78 (1873) (eschewing broad judicial recognition of unenumerated rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, based in part on concerns
that such construction would expand the legislative powers of Congress vis-à-vis the states). Martha
Field’s suggestion that “federal common law poses a more serious threat to federalism than it does to
separation of powers” rests on a similar assumption, although it points in the opposite direction by
suggesting that separation of powers principles should not limit judicial lawmaking. See Martha A.
Field, The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law, 12 PACE L. REV. 303, 305 (1992).
367 See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 29–31.
368 Id. at 30.
369 Id. These factors help to explain one of the great puzzles in the history of federal common
law—that is, why the federal courts refused from an early date to entertain common law criminal prosecutions, while exercising a robust general law decision-making power in civil commercial cases. Compare, e.g., United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (rejecting federal common law crimes), with Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (applying general law to civil commercial dispute). Neither of these factors applied so readily in the criminal context, and although there
was some preexisting law on common law crimes, criminal law involved an inevitably sovereign exercise of power. See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 47.
370 See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 247–49.
371 See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 303.
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particular, its notion of judicial federalism—has evolved over time, that is
part of the genius of our system of precedent. But what is remarkable, given the chorus of criticism, is how much support the judicial federalism
reading finds in Erie’s text, the extent to which the separation of powers
concerns undergirding that reading predated Erie itself, and the ability of
Erie’s principles to cohere with the contemporary structure of constitutional
doctrine.
2.

Erie and the Legal Process School

Rather than attacking the Legal Process scholars’ reading of Erie as a
distortion of Justice Brandeis’s intentions, a different line of criticsm attacks the Legal Process school head on. In an important review of Professor Purcell’s book on Erie, Susan Bandes portrayed the Legal Process
worldview as hopelessly out of touch with contemporary, pluralistic American legal culture. Professor Bandes is hardly the only contemporary critic
of Legal Process thinking; her critique is representative of a broader uneasiness in the Federal Courts field about whether that field’s founding jurisprudential paradigm remains viable in our current legal and intellectual
environment.372 Given the close relation between Erie and Legal Process
thinking about federalism, it is worth pausing to consider her arguments.
“In attempting to impart a systemic coherence to the field, and to federalism as its central organizing principle,” Professor Bandes writes, “the
legal process approach advocated an insularity that sought to exclude a
whole host of influences and contingencies—political, cultural, historical,
and practical.”373 One pictures a faded black and white photograph of a
staid law school faculty lounge taken sometime in the 1950s, featuring a
bunch of rumpled old white men in out-of-date suits. Similarly, she asserts
that the Legal Process school “mask[ed] the assumptions and value judgments that inevitably shape decisionmaking,” and that its emphasis on “abstract norms insulat[ed] those judgments from public debate.”374
Part of the problem with this line of argument is its heavy reliance on
critical characterizations of the Legal Process scholars’ views rather than
letting those scholars speak for themselves. Professor Bandes does not actually quote Legal Process scholars “advocat[ing] an insularity that sought
to exclude a whole host of influences and contingencies.”375 It is rare for
372

See, e.g, Michael Wells, Busting the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY
557 (1995) (arguing that the Legal Process approach to Federal Courts law should be rejected in favor of
“pragmatism”); Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions in the Hart and Wechsler Hotel, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 993 (1994) (lots of angst).
373 Bandes, supra note 237, at 830.
374 Id. at 869.
375 Instead, Professor Bandes cites articles by two other critics of the Legal Process school. See id.
at 830 n.4. That in itself might suggest a bit of insularity among that school’s critics.
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scholars to actually argue for insularity, and it is unsurprising that she is
unable to catch Henry Hart or Herbert Wechsler doing so—in word or even
in practical effect. It is equally hard to find Legal Process scholars actually
arguing for “an abstract and timeless logic of federalism.” 376 Bandes would
do better to focus on the positions that the Legal Process school actually
took.377
Professor Bandes’s rather tendentious characterization of the Legal
Process jurisprudence is at odds with the role those scholars played in the
development of American jurisprudence. Any defense—as well as any
critique—of the Legal Process school must begin by recognizing that that
the label encompasses a variety of strands, emphases, and tendencies. As
Neil Duxbury has shown, “[p]rocess jurisprudence was never packaged as a
discrete theory”; it lacked a single “grand, initiating text”; and it constituted
less a theory than “a particular attitude towards law.”378 Although process
jurisprudence originated more or less at the same time as Legal Realism, 379
it remains fair to say that it embodied a response to the Realist critique of
law as political and indeterminate. One aspect of that response, which
Bandes seems to emphasize, was a reaffirmation of the primary role of reason in the law.380 But at least the strands of Legal Process thinking that I—
and many contemporary Federal Courts scholars—take to be most important was neither as formalist nor as rationalistic as Bandes suggests.381
376 Id. at 832. Professor Bandes offers no citations on this point. And Professor Wechsler’s seminal reorienting of federalism theory toward the operation of the national political process, although
grounded in arguments reaching back to the Federalist papers, was quite different from federalism
theory in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Young, Puzzling Persistance, supra note 283 (contrasting
dual federalism and process federalism). Wechsler certainly did not think that federalism had an “abstract and timeless logic.”
377 Professor Bandes’s attack on the Legal Process school appears to be motivated primarily by
disdain for the Rehnquist Court’s “new federalism” decisions—such as United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)—which she sees as replicating the
Legal Process school’s sins. See Bandes, supra note 237, at 869–78. This is not the place for an analysis or defense of those decisions. See, e.g., Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 305. But it is hard to
see how Bandes can derive any “formalist” notion of “an immutable obvious boundary between the
truly national and the truly local,” Bandes, supra note 237, at 873, from what the opinions actually say
and do. Tellingly, she relies primarily on characterizations of those opinions by the dissenters. See id.
at 873 n.238–40.
378 DUXBURY, supra note 296, at 206–07. Although Henry Hart’s and Albert Sacks’s textbook,
The Legal Process, is often cited as the “classic work” of this school, Professor Duxbury points out that
“process-oriented legal thought was already fairly well established in the United States” when that work
appeared in the mid-1950s. Id. at 207.
379 See id. at 205.
380 See Bandes, supra note 237, at 863 (arguing that “Legal process theory attempted to maintain
the rule of law despite the unavoidable fact of judicial discretion” by emphasizing “reasoned elaboration” as the key constraint on judicial imposition of values); see also DUXBURY, supra note 296, at 205,
225–28.
381 Far from slavish devotion to formalism and abstract theory, process jurisprudence injected a
strong emphasis on prudence. See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 296, at 278–86 (describing Alexander
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Critically, process reasoning was directed to a functional analysis of the
most promising allocation of institutional authority.382
Process jurisprudence thus did not presuppose a consensus on values
in society; rather, it aspired to bridge social cleavages on substantive values
by securing widespread agreement on legitimate processes for the resolution of disputes. As Richard Fallon puts it,
In a post-Realist world, legal norms are frequently indeterminate. Moreover, in a demonstrably pluralistic society, we cannot expect consensus about appropriate answers to many urgent
questions of substantive justice. But most of us, Hart and Wechsler assume, are prepared to
accept the claim to legitimacy of thoughtful, deliberative, unbiased decisions by government
officials who are reasonably empowered to make such decisions. On this assumption rest our
hopes for the rule of law.383

Hence the principle of “institutional settlement,” which lies at the heart
of the Legal Process vision.384 Modern, pluralistic society gives rise both to
disputes and to differing ideas about how those disputes should come out.
Under these conditions, “[t]he alternative to disintegrating resort to violence
is the establishment of regularized and peaceable methods of decision.”385
The principle of institutional settlement reflects the respect that members of
the society owe to the outcome of these agreed-upon procedures; as Henry
Hart and Albert Sacks put it, institutional settlement “expresses the judgment that decisions which are the duly arrived-at result of duly established
procedures of this kind ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole
society unless and until they are duly changed.”386
Legal Process thinkers urged that institutional settlement of authority
to make decisions should be undertaken based on judgments about comparative institutional competence.387 These judgements were highly functional
Bickel’s contributions to process jurisprudence); Anthony Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of
Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985) (same). Nor was process jurisprudence indifferent to substantive
justice. As Professor Duxbury explains, “it [was] Hart and Sacks’s belief that, so long as judges respect
the principle of institutional competence, they ought to engage in the reasoned elaboration of principles
as actively as possible in order to achieve substantive justice for the parties to any particular dispute.”
DUXBURY, supra note 296, at 264.
382 See infra notes 387–90 and accompanying text.
383 Fallon, supra note 296, at 964.
384 DUXBURY, supra note 296, at 255–56.
385 HART. & SACKS, supra note 296, at 4.
386 Id.; see also Fallon, supra note 296, at 970 (“The Legal Process school, with its principle of
institutional settlement and its theories of comparative institutional competences, furnished a theory of
law and provided a structure for distinctively legal analysis; it substantially addressed the threat of
judicial subjectivity introduced by Legal Realism, but without relying on the metaphysical pretenses that
had brought moral and political philosophy into bad repute.”).
387 See HART & SACKS, supra note 385, at 158 (taking as central questions, “What is each of these
institutions good for? How can it be made to do its job best? How does, and how should, its working
dovetail with the working of the others?”).
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in character and often grounded in social science,388 which makes it hard to
understand how Professor Bandes can charge process jurisprudence with
formalism or insularity. To be sure, the constitutional scheme of federalism
and separation of powers was part of this institutional allocation; hence,
institutional settlement had to rest in part on the “reasoned elaboration” of
constitutional text and principle.389 But consider the notion at the heart of
the Legal Process view of Erie—that is, that if Congress must legislate in
order to make federal law, then forces of inertia and political conflict will
maintain a large realm of autonomy for the states. This view is far more
functional than formal, and it draws considerably on social science insights
about how government actually works.390
When politically progressive scholars like Professor Bandes insist that
“federalism” involves a value choice, they generally seem to mean that federalism is going entrench antiprogressive notions against nationally driven
reform.391 “Federalism,” Bandes writes, “is a term that serves as an indelible reminder of the dangers of jurisdictional principle deployed as a socially
acceptable cover for the insulation of unacceptable substantive ends.”392
But a Legal Process-style emphasis on allocation of legitimate decisionmaking can also advance progressive causes. Just last term, for example, in United States v. Windsor,393 principles of federalism played a critical
role in protecting individual states’ recognition of same-sex marriage from
the national government’s effort to impose a more socially conservative
solution.394 As Windsor and other cases have shown, we have little reason
to assume that federalism will undermine substantive justice, even from a
progressive perspective.395 Federalism protects minorities’ rights both to
388

See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 296, at 208–09, 235, 255.
See DUXBURY, supra note 296, at 259–60 (discussing reasoned elaboration); Fallon, supra note
296, at 966 (same).
390 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1441 (2008) (playing out the implications of an interstitial view of federal law with functionalist, social
science tools).
391 Bandes, supra note 237, at 871 (suggesting that the Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions
“have tended to create barriers to federal governmental protection of the rights of individuals”). That is
a particularly strange claim to make in the Erie context, given the broad consensus that the pre-Erie
general common law was inimical to progressive causes and individual remedies against national corporations.
392 Bandes, supra note 237, at 868–69.
393 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down the federal Defense of Marriage Act).
394 See generally Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in United
States v. Windsor, 2012–2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 117 (2013).
395 See also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (upholding individual tort claim against a
pharmaceutical company against a federal preemption defense); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243
(2006) (rejecting federal preemption of Oregon’s law legalizing physician-assisted suicide); Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (rejecting federalism-based argument that would have invalidated federal
prohibition on individuals’ use of medicinal marijuana). If one were inclined to be snarky, one might
even cite United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1996), which vindicated the claim of an individual
389
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exit from oppressive regimes and to implement their own norms in smaller
communities where they may constitute a majority; in this way, it may systematically promote reform.396
Even if the Legal Process scholars did rely on unacknowledged assumptions about the importance of federalism and separation of powers as
constitutional values, it hardly follows that those values should be abandoned. They should be defended explicitly. The present article is long
enough without also essaying a general defense of federalism and separation of powers values, but the topic is not neglected in the literature.397 Indeed, Professor Bandes is more than content to rely on her own presuppositions; she never undertakes any sort of argument why federalism intrinsically tends toward “unacceptable substantive ends.” Nor does she articulate
how a legal culture that was more oriented toward “substantive justice”
would actually operate in a world of pervasive disagreement on what justice
entails.
A more on-point criticism of the Legal Process vision of federalism
might be that the world of intergovernmental relations has changed to the
point that this vision no longer can provide effective protection for state
autonomy. For example, to the extent that federal law is no longer interstitial and federal bureaucracies now dominate the regulatory landscape, the
judicial federalism model of Erie might be largely beside the point.398 We
might do better to focus on approaches like Heather Gerken’s and Jessica
Bulman-Pozen’s model of “uncooperative federalism,” in which the implementing role (and resulting “agency slack”) of state officials operating
within federal bureaucratic structures provides a primary safeguard of state
autonomy.399 But this model, too, fits comfortably within the Legal Process
tradition: it brackets substantive policy disagreements and focuses on the
institutional settlement of authority to decide in particular officials and processes, and it does presuppose that limiting national authority is a legitimate

criminal defendant. See generally Baker & Young, supra note 305, at 152–153 (contesting the view that
federalism is inherently anti-progressive).
396 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, 24 DEMOCRACY J. 37, 37–38
(2012), available at http://www.democracyjournal.org/24/a-new-progressive-federalism.php?page=1;
Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, and Political Freedom, NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND
SUBSIDIARITY (forthcoming 2013); Ernest A. Young, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty as Federalism Strategies:
Lessons from the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2014).
397 See, e.g., MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, HOW IT COULD HAPPEN
1–9 (1999); DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1997); McConnell, supra note 167; Ernest A. Young, The Conservative
Case for Federalism, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 874 (2006).
398 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 460 (suggesting, in the 2009 edition, that “federal
law appears to be more primary than interstitial in numerous areas”).
399 Jessica Bulman–Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256
(2009); see also Ernest A. Young, A Research Agenda for Uncooperative Federalists, 48 TULSA L. REV.
427 (2013).
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constitutional value. In any event, the imperative to develop alternative
models that fit certain aspects of the current regulatory environment hardly
denies the importance of judicial federalism in those areas where state law
still has a central role to play.
3.

Are Judicial and Legislative Powers Coextensive?

Arguing against the Legal Process school’s judicial federalism reading
of Erie, Professor Sherry relies heavily on “the views of the founding generation,” which “assumed that the powers of the various departments of the
federal government were co-extensive with regard to the states.”400 This
original understanding, she says, refutes any notion “that federal courts
have more limited power than the federal legislature.”401 Professor Purcell
attributes this notion to Justice Brandeis himself.402 In either case, the support for this principle is thin, and to the extent it exists at all it does not undermine Erie’s judicial federalism argument.
At the outset, it is worth noting that the Constitution itself says nothing
about coextensive powers. Its basic structure belies the notion, carefully
denoting the powers of each branch largely without reference to the others.
They are coextensive in a sense, in that action by each branch may provide
the occasion for action by the others. Whenever Congress passes a law on
any subject, for example, the Executive acquires the responsibility to execute that law,403 and the Judiciary may hear cases arising under it.404 But
even in this sense, the coextensivity is imperfect and not automatic. The
federal courts cannot even hear cases—much less make law—without statutory jurisdiction, and for much of our history both the lower federal courts
and the Supreme Court have lacked jurisdiction over important classes of
federal question cases.405 The rules of standing, political questions, and
limits on judicial review abroad406 all create situations in which judicial
power is not coextensive with the powers of the legislative and political
branches.
400

Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 145.
Id.
402 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 172.
403 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing that the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed”).
404 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing that “[t]he judicial power shall extend to all cases . . . arising under . . . the laws of the United States”).
405 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 275–76; Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and
Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1585–86 (1990).
406 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (standing); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S.
224 (1993) (political questions); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 78 (1950) (holding that the
federal courts lacked jurisdiction over an enemy alien detained abroad); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244, 285–86 (1901) (rejecting the notion that the Constitution always follows the flag).
401
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To be sure, the Founding Generation did from time to time suggest
that the federal branches’ powers were coextensive.407 The Founders’ doctrine of coextensive powers, however, cannot do the work that Professor
Sherry needs it to do. First, it was deployed by James Madison and others
to reject the notion that the federal courts had broad federal common law
powers. Writing against the Alien and Sedition Acts, Madison warned that
accepting the Federalist argument that the Constitution had endowed the
federal courts with broad power to declare common law crimes would legitimize federal legislative intrusion into any area that the common law could
reach, thereby destroying the whole notion of a government of limited and
enumerated powers.408 The election of 1800 arguably ratified the Jeffersonian position on this issue,409 and in any event, the Supreme Court adopted
it in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin,410 which rejected the very notion
of federal common law crimes.411
As Madison’s position makes clear, the coextensivity argument was
often used to say that Congress could legislate wherever the courts could
adjudicate. So, for instance, many maritime statutes were justified on the
ground that Congress’s legislative jurisdiction piggybacked on the federal
courts’ ability to decide cases under general maritime law.412 As the admiralty example makes clear, however, we need to be careful about the inferences we draw from that notion of coextensivity. At the Founding and
throughout the nineteenth century, prior to Jensen, the federal courts did not
treat judge-made maritime law as federal law within the meaning of the
Supremacy Clause,413 and even thereafter the Court held that admiralty cases did not fall within the federal question jurisdiction.414 Most important, it
does not follow, as Louise Weinberg has suggested, that “[t]he judiciary
407

THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cook ed., Wesleyan University Press 1961); Jay, Part Two, supra note 91, at 1242.
408 See Report on Resolutions, House of Delegates, Session of 1799–1800, Concerning Alien and
Sedition Laws, in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 381 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1906) (“[T]he consequences
of admitting the common law as the law of the United States, on the authority of the individual States, is
as obvious as it would be fatal. As this law relates to every subject of legislation, and would be paramount to the Constitutions and laws of the States, the admission of it would overwhelm the residuary
sovereignty of the States, and by one constructive operation new model the whole political fabric of the
country.”).
409 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 611 (“Many historians believe that a backlash
against federal-common law crimes helped to elect Jefferson in 1800.”).
410 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
411 See generally Gary Rowe, Note, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin,
the Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919
(1992); Jay, Part One, supra note 91, at 1111–13.
412 See Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360–61 (1959); GRANT GILMORE &
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 1-16, at 47 (2d ed. 1975). I think it’s generally fair
to say that these statutes would be better grounded in the Commerce Clause today.
413 See Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 185, at 319–22.
414 See Romero, 358 U.S. at 363–68.
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must have presumptive power to adjudicate whatever the legislature and the
executive can act upon.”415 The originalist assumption that courts can act
wherever the political branches can act could sensibly be taken to mean
simply that the federal courts always have the presumptive authority to review, interpret, and apply any federal legislation or order promulgated by
those branches.416 But nothing in that assumption implies the further proposition that federal courts have the authority to go first and act in an area
where the national political branches potentially could act, but have not.417
Edward Purcell imputes an assumption of coextensive powers not to
the Founders but rather to Justice Brandeis himself. As I have already discussed, coextensivity of legislative and judicial powers was one of the “two
related principles” upon which, in Purcell’s view, Brandeis rested Erie.418
Purcell’s account is ambiguous, however, as to what Brandeis meant by
coextensivity or what constitutional authority he rested that assumption
upon. Purcell suggests that Brandeis developed his views on coextensive
powers from his pre-Erie experience with state legislative jurisdiction.419
But that issue, which involved constitutional issues on state choice of law,
establishes only that Brandeis believed state legislative and judicial powers
must be considered coextensive. That view would reflect the widespread
assumption that state courts share lawmaking authority with legislatures420
but it hardly translates without controversy to federal courts.421 Similarly,
Brandeis’s correspondence with Justice Reed during the deliberations in
Erie relied on the coextensive powers of state legislatures and courts:
“Since [the Swift doctrine] admits that the state rule must be followed if

415

Weinberg, Federal Common Law, supra note 266, at 813.
See Jay, Part Two, supra note 91, at 1242 (noting that, according to James Wilson, the principle
that “the judicial [powers] were commensurate with the legislative powers [and] went no further” both
limited judicial authority and provided “the means of making the provisions” of congressional laws
“effectual over all that country included within the Union”) (quoting 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 515 (J. Elliot ed. 1836)).
Even so, the coextensivity proposition would be subject to the important qualification that the federal
courts may act only where Congress confers jurisdiction upon them by statute. See supra note 405 and
accompanying text.
417 See, e.g., Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 61 (1981) (“[N]or does the
existence of congressional authority under Art. I mean that federal courts are free to develop a common
law to govern those areas until Congress acts.”).
418 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 172; see supra text accompanying notes 352–61 (discussing Purcell’s
argument).
419 See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 185 (observing that Brandeis’s concept of state legislative jurisdiction “also implied that the scope of that allowable lawmaking should be no broader for one branch of
a government than for its other branches”).
420 See supra text accompanying notes 211–214.
421 See, e.g., Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (“Federal courts, unlike state courts,
are not general common-law courts and do not possess a general power to develop and apply their own
rules of decision.”).
416
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declared in a [state] statute,” Brandeis wrote, “it admits that [the state rule]
is not a matter within the authority of Congress.”422
If this is the key point, then it is a very odd one. We cannot, for the
reasons already discussed, impute to Justice Brandeis the view that Congress could not have legislated a rule to deal with mishaps along railroad
rights-of-way.423 Professor Purcell seems to think the problem “was not that
Congress lacked certain powers but that the federal courts ignored the relevance of whatever those powers were.”424 In other words, Swift would support displacing state law even in situations that fell outside Congress’s
commerce power.425 But if that is the point, then Erie (in which Congress
plainly did have power to act) was an odd case in which to overrule Swift.426
And Purcell’s reading seems flatly inconsistent with Brandeis’s statement
that “Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be
they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.”427 If Brandeis were concerned about the scope of Congress’s legislative jurisdiction, he would
hardly choose topics fitting plainly within that jurisdiction—such as commercial law—as examples of unconstitutional federal action.
As I have already suggested, the language just quoted is best read as
insisting that Congress actually pass substantive statutes in order to displace
state law; it cannot simply order federal courts to apply the common law in
disregard of state jurisprudence.428 And the more natural implication from
the coextensivity of state legislative and judicial powers would be that state
decisional law can be displaced only by the same sorts of federal action that
displace state statutes—that is, federal statutes and constitutional provisions. Brandeis himself wrote that “[m]y own opinion had been that it was
wise (1) to treat the constitutional power of interstate commerce as very
broad and (2) to treat acts of Congress as not invading State power unless it
clearly appeared that the federal power was intended to be exercised exclu422

Quoted in PURCELL, supra note 9, at 173.
See supra text accompanying notes 273–288.
424 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 173.
425 See Rutherglen, supra note 127, at 288 (construing Brandeis to mean that “federal general
common law as a whole was illegitimate because it exceeded the power of Congress, not necessarily on
the special facts of the case before the Court, but in a broad range of other cases”).
426 See Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 613. If the question in Erie were really whether Congress had the requisite power, then under modern practice Swift would have been constitutional “as
applied” to the facts of Erie, and there would surely have been sufficient constitutional applications for
the doctrine to survive a “facial” challenge as well. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
745 (1987) (facial challenges can succeed only when there is “no set of circumstances” under which the
challenged action would be valid). Professor Green thinks this point shows why Erie was wrong. My
own view is that it demonstrates that both Green and Purcell have misinterpreted what Brandeis was
driving at.
427 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
428 See supra text accompanying note 337.
423
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sively.”429 On this reading, Purcell’s two principles—the coextensivity
principle and its “prudential” corollary—are really the same idea. In any
event, as I have already pointed out,430 the supposedly prudential reasons for
that corollary limiting judicial displacement of state law to situations in
which Congress has already acted are sufficiently strong to warrant treating
it as a constitutional principle in its own right—and that is how it has been
treated by subsequent courts and commentators.431
The Sherry/Weinberg position requires a still further and even more
radical step—that is, it asserts that the federal courts’ supposed authority to
adjudicate any issue that the national political branches could act upon also
presupposes the power to make law on such issues. Beginning with the
proposition that when “the national interest so requires, Congress has power
to federalize a matter previously governed by state law,” Professor Weinberg concluded that it “would seem that that basic power must also inhere
in its courts.”432 Even if one assumes that all diversity cases involve interstate commerce and therefore involve matters upon which Congress could
potentially legislate,433 that coextensivity would not itself answer the question of what law the federal courts must apply in such cases, or whether
those courts have the power to fashion common law rules of decision with
the force of federal law.434 Coextensivity, at most, establishes the federal
courts’ power to adjudicate in situations where Congress might legislate,
but it begs the most important question: Does power to adjudicate necessarily include the power to make law?435
429

Quoted in PURCELL, supra note 9, at 174.
See supra text accompanying notes 356–369.
431 See, e.g., Merrill, Common Law, supra note 303; Clark, Erie’s Source, supra note 90. In Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213 (1997), for example, the Court said that “when courts decide to fashion rules
of federal common law, ‘the guiding principle is that a significant conflict between some federal policy
or interest and the use of state law . . . must first be specifically shown.’” Id. at 218 (quoting Wallis v.
Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)). This language, to my mind, suggests a stronger
limitation than a merely prudential test.
432 WEINBERG, supra note 229, at 20. As Professor Purcell notes, “Weinberg’s views did not seem
to persuade most legal scholars.” PURCELL, supra note 9, at 402 n.47. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish,
Federal Common Law and American Political Theory: A Response to Professor Weinberg, 83 NW. U. L.
REV. 853, 858–59 (1989) (concluding that Weinberg’s approach is flatly inconsistent with the Rules of
Decision Act).
433 This assumption is likely incorrect. For example, a citizen of one state might bring a diversity
suit against an out-of-stater for intentional infliction of emotional distress if the out-of-stater brought a
gun to school and frightened him, but it would not follow that schoolyard gun possession is within
Congress’s regulatory authority. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
434 See generally BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63 (arguing that the point of the diversity
jurisdiction was to provide a neutral forum that would apply general principles of commercial law
arising out of customary dealings among merchants).
435 For example, Professor Purcell cites the 1969 American Law Institute’s Study of the Division of
Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts as relying “most fundamental[ly]” on the principle that
“the judicial and legislative powers should be coextensive.” PURCELL, supra note 9, at 273. But the
430
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A recent case may help to illustrate this cluster of arguments. In Zivotofsky v. Clinton,436 parents of a child born in Jerusalem sued the Secretary
of State requesting that their child’s passport list “Israel” as his place of
birth. They invoked a federal statute, § 214(d) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, providing that “[f]or purposes of the
registration of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of
a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall,
upon the request of the citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, record the
place of birth as Israel.”437 The Secretary refused, pursuant to Department
policy recognizing that whether Jerusalem is legitimately part of Israel is a
hotly disputed issue and asserting that Congress’s attempt to resolve that
question interfered with the Executive’s constitutional authority to conduct
foreign affairs.438 The lower courts concluded that Zivotofsky’s claim presented a nonjusticiable political question.439 The Supreme Court reversed,
and its reasoning may help illustrate what it may and may not mean for
legislative, executive, and judicial power to be “coextensive.”
Even if the Founders and Justice Brandeis thought that the three
branches possess “coextensive” powers, Zivotofsky demonstrates that that
cannot be true in any simple, straightforward sense. The Executive branch,
to start with, took the position (1) that only it could determine the U.S. position on the status of Jerusalem, (2) that Congress’s attempt to do so was
flatly unconstitutional, and (3) that the judicial branch lacked even the power to determine who was right about (1) and (2).440 On this view, power
would be coextensive only in the sense that Congress would have authority
to legislate and appropriate money in support of the Executive’s position on
the matter, and the judiciary might have occasion to interpret and apply
those directives. No one thought that some broad notion of coextensive
powers required categorical rejection of the Executive’s claims.
The Court’s rejection of the political question argument, moreover, illustrated two important distinctions: (1) between courts “going first” and
following action by another branch in a particular area, and (2) between the
power to make law and the power to resolve disputes. If Congress had not
acted on the question of Jerusalem’s status, then it seems likely that the
ALI relied on that principle to condemn diversity jurisdiction for rendering “the state’s judicial power . .
. less extensive than its legislative power,” and to suggest that “federal courts should be ‘concentrated
upon the adjudication of rights created by federal substantive law.’” Id. (quoting American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, at 99 (1969)). Neither of
these points comes close to establishing that federal courts may make substantive rules of decision on
any issue upon which Congress could legislate.
436 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).
437 116 Stat. 1350, 1366.
438 Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1425–26.
439 See Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97, 103 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d, 571 F.3d 1227,
1232–33 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
440 See 132 S. Ct. at 1428.

File: Young Proofs

2013]

Created on: 1/16/2014 10:21:00 AM

Last Printed: 1/16/2014 10:22:00 AM

A GENERAL DEFENSE OF ERIE RAILROAD CO. V. TOMPKINS

93

Court would have found that status to pose a nonjusticiable political question—after all, the Court seemed to acknowledge that the Constitution may
commit the recognition of foreign sovereigns to the political branches and
that, in any event, courts lack “judicially discoverable and manageable
standards” for resolving recognition questions.441 But, Chief Justice Roberts noted, “there is, of course, no exclusive commitment to the Executive
of the power to determine the constitutionality of a statute,” and concerns
about a lack of standards “dissipate . . . when the issue is recognized to be
the more focused one of the constitutionality of 214(d).”442 This is thus a
case where the judiciary’s power to act may well have depended on the fact
that Congress had acted first.
Even more obviously, the judiciary’s power to resolve a dispute about
who had the power to establish the U.S. position on Jerusalem hardly
equated with a judicial power to make law itself on that question. The
Chief Justice distinguished between two questions: “whether Jerusalem is
the capital of Israel,” and “whether Zivitofsky may vindicate his statutory
right, under § 214(d), to choose to have Israel recorded on his passport as
his place of birth.”443 The D.C. Circuit erred, he said, when it “treated the
two questions as one and the same.”444 Answering the first would have required the federal courts “to supplant a foreign policy decision of the political branches with the courts’ own unmoored determination of what United
States policy toward Jerusalem should be”—in other words, it would have
invited the courts to make law on their own.445 But in order to answer the
second question, “the Judiciary must decide if Zivotofsky's interpretation of
the statute is correct, and whether the statute is constitutional. This is a
familiar judicial exercise.”446 Adjudication of disputes under preexisting
law, whether statutory or constitutional, is distinct from lawmaking, and the
judiciary’s power to do one is not necessarily coextensive even with its own
power to do the other.447
Professors Sherry and Weinberg assert not simply that legislative and
judicial powers are coextensive in scope, but also that they are the same

441

Id. at 1428.
Id.
443 Id. at 1427.
444 Id.
445 Id.
446 Id.
447 See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (stating that
“instances [of federal common lawmaking authority] are ‘few and restricted’”) (quoting Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)). As discussed earlier, none of this is to deny that every adjudication
may involve a sort of Heisenbergian element of lawmaking. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying
text. I do deny that this element is the same as deliberate formulation of rules of federal common law.
442
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thing.448 There is no evidence that either the founding generation or Justice
Brandeis ever thought that, and abundant evidence that they did not. If they
had, then to what end did the Founders make specific and distinct provision
for the jurisdiction and operating procedures of each branch? And why did
Brandeis insist that, in practice, judicial power was much narrower than
legislative power? In any event, we certainly do not equate judicial and
legislative powers under contemporary law, and it would be strange to reject Erie based on anachronistic assumptions if it coheres with current doctrine.
4.

Proving Too Much and Too Little: Judicial Lawmaking and the
Administrative State

Michael Greve offers a different argument against the judicial federalism interpretation of Erie. Although conceding that this account “provides
a plausible constitutional rationale,” he complains that “in substance, the
argument proves both too little and too much.”449 Too little, because Justice
Story could both read the Supremacy Clause and appreciate the importance
of federal lawmaking procedures. And too much, because “a Supremacy
Clause understanding that is sufficiently rigorous to provide firm ground for
Erie also casts doubt on practices and institutions wholly outside its ambit—for starters, the administrative state, whose raison d’etre is to make
law outside the constitutional strictures of bicameral approval and presentment.”450 Both objections are plausible, and considering them will help
flesh out the implications of the judicial federalism position.
Arguments beginning from a premise along the lines of “Justice Story
made an obvious mistake” generally are—and should be—met with considerable skepticism.451 But that is not my claim. My own view has always
been that, under the circumstances that each court faced at the time, both
Swift and Erie were rightly decided.452 The explanation has to do with
changes in the content of both state law and general law over the course of
the nineteenth century. The latter began as a narrow category of principles
derived from the customary practices of merchants engaged in primarily
cross-border transactions.453 But as the nineteenth century wore on, the
448 See Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 145 (asserting that because the Founders “assumed that the
powers of the various departments of the federal government were co-extensive,” it followed that “none
denied the power of federal courts to declare the common law”); Weinberg, supra note 266, at 813.
449 Greve, supra note 4, at 375.
450 Id.
451 One might also, however, say the same of Justice Brandeis.
452 See also Bellia & Clark, supra note 49, at 687–88, 701 (taking a similar view).
453 As I have noted, scholars debate whether the law merchant was ever as customary or as uniform
as it is sometimes made out to be. See, e.g., Kadens, supra note 246, at 1168–81 (arguing that it was
not). That dispute is beyond my scope here, although it does have implications for related issues today.
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Court extended it to the construction of ordinary contracts or other written
instruments,454 tort cases,455 and even cases involving deeds of land.456 This
radical expansion of Swift’s scope coincided with erosion of the strong
norm of deference to state courts on construction of state statutes and constitutions.457
The result was that the general common law came to apply in areas
that not only had a more local flavor, but also that were more strongly normative in character. Justice Story’s general commercial law had sought
simply to capture the actual practices of merchants and involved issues upon which it was often more important that rules be settled than that they be
settled right; areas like tort law, by contrast, implicated much sharper conflicts over justice and fairness, upon which local political communities were
more likely to insist on their own way.458 Federal courts could not, as a
result, continue to take for granted the state choice of law rule that I have
argued was crucial to Swift’s reasoning—that is, that the state itself had
determined that general law should govern the relevant class of cases.459
Nor could general law be regarded as customary or “bottom–up” law, based
on the actual practices of merchants—instead, it embodied top–down normative commands like any other form of law. Both developments made it
imperative to identify the sovereign source of the general law and the federal courts’ power to apply it.
Professor Greve is thus right to focus on why Swift “got out of hand
and eventually prompted [federal] judges to substitute their own views of
sound public policy on the states.”460 The answer is that a doctrine that
originally reflected state policy—New York’s own decision to apply the
See, e.g., Kadens & Young, supra note 77 (arguing that customary international law cannot rest on
analogy to the customary law merchant).
454 Lane v. Vick, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 464, 476 (1845).
455 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 378 (1893); Chicago v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2
Black.) 418, 428 (1862).
456 Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 360–62 (1910).
457 See, e.g., Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 184 (1863) (refusing to follow a
state court’s construction of the state constitutional provisions governing defaulted municipal bonds,
declaring that “[w]e shall never immolate truth, justice, and the law, because a State tribunal has erected
the altar and decreed the sacrifice”); Watson v. Tarpley, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 517, 521 (1855) (“[A]ny
state law or regulation, the effect of which would be to impair the rights [under and defined by the
general commercial law] . . . or to devest the federal courts of cognizance thereof . . . must be nugatory
and unavailing.”). Michael Collins has argued that the federal diversity courts even developed a “general” body of constitutional law that they applied in cases construing state constitutions during the latter
end of this period. Michael Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of
General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263 (2000); see also Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Rehearsal for
Substantive Due Process: the Municipal Bond Cases, 53 TEXAS L. REV. 738, 745–47 (1975).
458 See FREYER, supra note 30, at 23–25; Fletcher, supra note 90, at 1513.
459 See Baugh, 149 U.S. at 377–78; Robbins, 67 U.S. at 428–29; supra text accompanying notes
116–120.
460 GREVE, supra note 4, at 375.
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general law merchant to cases like Swift—had become a tool by which federal judges limited state policy in order to benefit interstate businesses.461
Professor Greve may or may not be right that such limits are salutary and
necessary—what cannot be denied, however, is that they require a different
constitutional justification than a decision, like Justice Story’s in Swift, to
follow state preferences. In Erie, Justice Brandeis found that this more
difficult constitutional case simply could not be made.
Does the judicial federalism rationale prove too much? It is morally
satisfying to pound on the table and insist that “Only Congress can make
federal law!”—but that principle is often honored in the breach. As Gary
Lawson has depressingly explained, “the demise of the non-delegation doctrine . . . allows the national government's now-general legislative powers
to be exercised by administrative agencies.”462 This development, moreover, “has encountered no serious real-world legal or political challenges,
and none are on the horizon.”463 Justice White thus famously observed that
“[f]or some time, the sheer amount of law . . . made by the agencies has far
outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by Congress through the traditional
process.”464 If we accept that development, then why not accept judicial
lawmaking, contra-Erie?
It does seem to me that it is one thing to admit that we have a massive
administrative state and that it is too late in the day to return to a simpler
model where Congress makes all the laws, but quite another to say that the
administrative state should become our template for reasoning in cases
where the burdens of historical inertia do not exist or point in a different
direction.465 Moreover, there are significant differences between administrative agencies and federal courts as lawmaking agents. Agencies are subject to extensive congressional oversight and budgetary controls that, if
applied to the federal courts, we would consider a serious threat to judicial
independence.466 Most importantly, one can still argue that although federal
agencies plainly “make law” in an important sense, considerably more
stringent limits exist on their capacity to displace state law. Current doctrine continues to stress that such displacement must be traceable to Congress’s intent in an authorizing statute,467 and the Court has proven willing
to limit the preemptive force of agency decisions in a number of important
461
462

See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 78, at 1792; Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 212–14.
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1241

(1994).
463

Id.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985–86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
465 See, e.g., Stuart M. Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative
Federalism without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111, 2113 (2008) (rejecting the “‘in for a penny, in for a
pound’ approach to the modern administrative state”). If Professor Greve is actually arguing otherwise,
then perhaps he should worry about having his American Enterprise Institute membership card revoked.
466 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955 n.19; see also supra note 318 and accompanying text.
467 See Benjamin & Young, supra note 465, at 2147.
464
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ways.468 Although no viable doctrinal proposal can avoid taking the administrative state into account, the way remains open to make process federalism arguments against broad administrative preemption analogous to the
judicial federalism argument in Erie.469
The more serious version of Professor Greve’s “too much” argument
focuses instead on the extensive use of federal common law after Erie.470
As Judge Friendly famously observed, Erie hardly put an end to federal
common law:
By banishing the spurious uniformity of Swift v. Tyson . . . and by leaving to the states what
ought to be left to them, Erie led to the emergence of a federal decisional law in areas of national concern that is truly uniform because, under the supremacy clause, it is binding in every forum, and therefore is predictable and useful as its predecessor, more general in subject
matter but limited to the federal courts, was not. The clarion yet careful pronouncement of
Erie, ‘There is no federal general common law,’ opened the way to what, for want of a better
term, we may call specialized federal common law.471

Federal common law rules thus fill in the interstices of federal statutes,
and they dominate certain legal enclaves even in the absence of statutory
guidance or authorization.472 Judge-made federal law plays a critical role,
for example, in admiralty,473 disputes between states,474 foreign relations
law,475 labor–management relations,476 and matters involving the proprietary
relations of the United States government.477 Professor Greve argues that

468 See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2575 n.3 (2011) (“Although we defer to the
agency’s interpretation of its regulations, we do not defer to an agency’s ultimate conclusion about
whether state law should be pre-empted.”); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576–80 (2009) (refusing to
defer to agency preamble asserting broad preemptive effect to federal drug approvals); Solid Waste
Auth. of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-74 (2001) (refusing to defer to
agency rule operating at the outer limit of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority); see generally
Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note 289, at 280–81 (discussing doctrinal limits on agency preemption).
469 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Process-Based Preemption, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE
THEORY, LAW, AND REALTY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 192 (William Buzbee ed., 2009); Nina
A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 699 (2008);
Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 769–79 (2008);
David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy? 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1188–90 (2012); Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 7.
470 GREVE, supra note 4, at 375.
471 Friendly, supra note 57, at 405.
472 See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 616–26 (discussing the development of the
“new federal common law” after Erie).
473 See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
474 See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
475 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
476 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1947).
477 See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
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“the structural Supremacy Clause argument runs up hard against wellrecognized enclaves of federal common law.”478
I think it is fair to say, however, that Judge Friendly’s “new federal
common law” is—as the judge insisted—very much a creature of Erie’s
world, not Swift’s. Notwithstanding revisionist academic theories arguing
for a general federal common law power in the federal courts,479 each enclave of federal common lawmaking has been developed and justified as an
exception to Erie’s rule, with special attention to why a departure from the
presumptive rule of congressional primacy is warranted.480 Reasonable
people disagree about whether all the existing instances of federal common
lawmaking can be justified in this way. My own view is that filling in the
gaps of federal statutes is so close to—and difficult to distinguish from—
statutory interpretation as to be relatively unproblematic;481 that most of the
foreign affairs rules can be justified as self-imposed prudential limitations
on judicial review;482 that the Clearfield line of cases is not obviously necessary but may be largely assimilated to notions of conflict preemption;483
that state versus state cases may be a legitimate uses of “general” law where
states are not competent to legislate;484 and that freestanding federal common law in admiralty is unconstitutional.485 But, the important point is that
the new federal common law must be grounded in a plausible interpretation
478

GREVE, supra note 4, at 375.
See, e.g., Field, Sources of Law, supra note 55; Weinberg, Federal Common Law, supra note
266. But see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 618 (observing that “[f]ew decisions or commentators support the broad view” of federal common law). For rejections of the broad view, see, e.g.,
O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (“[J]udicial creation of a special federal
rule . . . is limited to situations where there is a ‘significant conflict between some federal policy or
interest and the use of state law.’”) (quoting Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68
(1966)); Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 213 (1997) (same).
480 See, e.g., Merrill, Common Law, supra note 303 (exploring the different domains and justifications of federal common lawmaking from this perspective).
481 See, e.g., Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity,
78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 331–36 (1980) (arguing that statutory interpretation and federal common lawmaking are indistinguishable).
482 See Ernest A. Young, The Story of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino: Federal Judicial
Power in Foreign Relations Cases, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 436–37 (Vicki Jackson & Judith
Resnik eds., 2010).
483 See Young, Federal Common Law, supra note 8, at 1655–67. Importantly, the Court has
backed away considerably from Clearfield since the New Deal. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 739-40 (1979); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 628 (noting that contemporary case law under Kimbell Foods incorporates “a preference for incorporation of state law
absent a demonstrated need for a uniform federal rule of decision”).
484 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in Constitutional
Interpretation, 96 CAL. L. REV. 699, 711 (2008) (suggesting that “many of the ‘federal common law’
rules that fall within these enclaves do not actually constitute ‘federal judge-made law’ because they
consist of background principles derived from the law of nations that are necessary to implement basic
aspects of the constitutional scheme”).
485 See Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 185, at 306; Young, Just Water, supra note 329.
479
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of the Supremacy Clause; no courts, and few scholars, are willing to generalize from these enclaves to a rejection of judicial federalism.
Importantly, these enclaves do not rest on a judgment that they somehow implicate the most important or fundamental aspects of our constitutional scheme. Rather, they generally rest on arguments about congressional authorization486 or claims that applying state law would thwart particular
federal interests that cannot otherwise be easily protected.487 Professor
Greve’s argument that the law governing interstate business must necessarily be governed by federal common law because it is a “basic aspect of the
constitutional scheme,”488 thus, misses the mark. That argument also represents a strange inversion of our scheme of government, which was concerned to empower Congress—not courts—to deal with the most critical
matters for national unity and prosperity. As such, Professor Greve’s desire
for federal courts to rescue interstate business from the grasping clutches of
state law489 echoes Erie’s liberal critics, like Professors Sherry and Green,
who seek to empower courts to protect human rights through expansive
constitutional interpretation and importation of international law.490 As I
suggest in Part IV, all of these arguments reflect a basic loss of faith in the
political branches to solve national problems. Whether or not that loss of
faith is warranted by the current performance of our national political
branches, it finds little support in the Constitution.

486 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457–58 (1947). (finding a
delegation of common lawmaking authority in § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947); Jonathan M. Gutoff, Federal Common Law and Congressional Delegation: A Reconceptualization of Admiralty, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 367 (2000) (reading the 1948 Judiciary Act and the Admiralty
Extension Act as delegating authority to federal courts to make federal common law in admiralty cases).
487 See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 510–12 (1988) (developing a federal
common law defense for government military contractors sued in tort, based on the likelihood that
damages awards would be passed through to the government and an analogy to the Federal Tort Claims
Act). Professor Sherry argues that “it is at least plausible to read the grant of diversity jurisdiction as an
authorization to develop federal common law.” Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 146. Why? Sherry
offers no explanation, and the text of the diversity grant says no such thing. And even under Swift, the
Rules of Decision Act was not interpreted to authorize federal common law. See Fletcher, supra note
90, at 1514 (distinguishing federal common law from general common law). In any event, I submit that
such an unbounded delegation of lawmaking to the federal courts—without any intelligible principle to
guide their decisions—would violate even the vestigial nondelegation doctrine that persists today. See
Young, Just Water, supra note 329, at 485–90.
488 GREVE, supra note 4, at 376.
489 Id.; see also Gasaway & Parrish, supra note 4, at 969.
490 See Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 623–35; Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 152–53; see
also Koh, supra note 276, at 1831–33 (reading Erie narrowly to permit recognition of customary international law norms as federal common law); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 433–38 (1997) (same).
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D.

Erie’s Premises: The State Courts’ Power and Inclination to Make
Law

This section deals with a quite different critique of Erie’s constitutional argument developed by Caleb Nelson and Michael Green.491 Professor
Nelson’s critique proceeds from the notion that, in at least some cases under
Swift, federal courts did not purport to apply general law as an alternative to
state law, but rather, saw themselves as applying state law but exercising
independent judgment as to the content of that law.492 On this view, the
important holding of Erie is that “federal courts [must] follow state-court
precedents on all questions that lay within the states’ legislative competence, even if those questions would previously have been classified as matters of ‘general’ law.”493 That makes sense, Nelson allows, if we conceive
of state courts as having been delegated power to make state law under state
constitutions.494 The trouble, in his view, is that it remains unclear that state
constitutions do any such thing.495
Professor Green’s worry, by contrast, is less about power than inclination. Assuming that state courts have the authority to bind federal courts to
follow their decisions on common law matters, Green asks, what if state
courts don’t want to bind the federal courts?496 What if, in other words, a
particular state remains committed to Swift’s notion of general law and believes that all courts should reach an independent determination of the
meaning of that law? Green reads at least one state—Georgia—as persisting in the Swiftian view; if correct, his concern would amount to considerably more than a theoretical quibble.497 In any event, the basic point is that
Erie’s holding did not appear to allow for the continued possibility that
state courts would cling to the general law.
These are both thoughtful objections, and it is worth considering them
in some detail. At the end of the day, however, I conclude that there are
good reasons for federal courts to follow the decisions of state supreme

491

See Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 929; Green, Suppressed Premise, supra note 248, at 1113.
See supra notes 199–202 and accompanying text.
493 Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 950. Louise Weinberg seems to read Erie this way when she says
that
Erie held, precisely, that the nation lacks power to make state law. State law is reserved to
the states. The power of the nation is to make federal law only. There was, of course, no
conflict between federal and state law in Erie. The Court struck down no federal law or rule.
It struck down only an independent view of what state law ought to be.
Weinberg, Federal Common Law, supra note 266, at 812.
494 See Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 981.
495 Id. at 984.
496 See Green, Suppressed Premise, supra note 248, at 1112–13.
497 See id. at 1123–27, n.89. I remain quite skeptical about Professor Green’s reading of Georgia
law. See infra notes 533–547 and accompanying text.
492
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courts irrespective of the content of state law concerning the role of a particular state’s courts.
1.

Lawmaking Power and Deference to State Courts

Professor Nelson reads Erie as requiring federal courts to defer to state
court interpretations of state law.498 The trouble with Erie, on this reading,
is that it is not obvious where this obligation of deference comes from. As
Professors Nelson and Green both point out,499 Justice Holmes attempted an
answer in the Taxicab case:
If a state constitution should declare that on all matters of general law the decisions of the
highest Court should establish the law until modified by statute or by a later decision of the
same Court, I do not perceive how it would be possible for a Court of the United States to refuse to follow what the State Court decided in that domain. But when the constitution of a
State establishes a Supreme Court it by implication does make that declaration as clearly as if
it had said it in express words, so far as it is not interfered with by the superior power of the
United States. The Supreme Court of a State does something more than make a scientific inquiry into a fact outside of and independent of it. It says, with an authority that no one denies . . . that thus the law is and shall be. Whether it be said to make or to declare the law, it
deals with the law of the State with equal authority however its function may be described.500

These critics agree that “if one starts from the premise that state constitutions do indeed allocate authority to prescribe state law in the way that
Justice Holmes believed, then one might well arrive at the bottom line that
Justice Brandeis reached in Erie.”501 As Brandeis pointed out, “whether the
law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its
highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern.”502 On this
view, there could be no federal authority to disregard a state’s allocation of
lawmaking authority to its courts.503 Deference to the state court’s interpretations of state law would be mandatory on grounds analogous to the strong
theory of Chevron deference in administrative law, which reads congressional ambiguity in statutory drafting as an outright delegation of lawmak-

498

See Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 950.
See Green, Suppressed Premise, supra note 248, at 1126; Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 950.
500 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S.
518, 534–35 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
501 Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 981.
502 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also id. at 79 (quoting Holmes’s Taxicab
dissent); Hart, supra note 10, at 512 (stating that “the need of recognizing the state courts as organs of
coordinate authority with other branches of the state government in the discharge of the constitutional
functions of the states” was “the essential rationale of the Erie opinion”).
503 See Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 981 (suggesting that an effort to “interfere with state governance” on this point might well be unconstitutional).
499
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ing authority to the agency to fill in the gaps.504 Deference occurs, in other
words, because the primary interpreter—there, the agency; here, the state
court—is actually vested with authority to “say what the law is.”
The worry is that “no state constitution actually includes such an explicit allocation of the state’s lawmaking authority to the state’s highest
court.”505 And although “Holmes believed that this allocation was implicit
in each and every state constitution,”506 Professor Nelson argues that that
premise “is at least contestable and may be false”:507
The typical state constitution certainly does not give the state supreme court the same sort of
direct authority to prescribe state law that it gives the legislature. Subject only to constitutional limits, legislatures can announce whatever legal rules they like, and those automatically are the law of the state. What courts do is different. In many cases, the rules that they can
legitimately articulate are constrained either by pre-existing written laws or by pre-existing
sources of unwritten law (such as real-world customs). Even after the state supreme court
has issued an opinion, moreover, people might say that the opinion is wrong about the true
content of state law. One could not make the same statement about a state statute. 508

If this is right, then “Erie’s claim that practice under Swift violated the
Federal Constitution may well have rested on a debatable interpretation of
each and every state constitution.”509
I do not want to concede the premise—that is, while I do think Erie
requires federal courts to defer to state courts on the meaning of state law,
there were also cases under Swift—including Swift itself—in which the federal courts plainly applied general law rather than state law, and Erie held
that practice to be unconstitutional. I will have more to say about this at the
end of this section, but for now I want to examine Professor Nelson’s argument on its own terms. Nelson is surely right that state courts do not
enjoy the same lawmaking powers that state legislatures do. But is that the
relevant question?
It may help to be more specific about the different faces of judicial
lawmaking. Writing about the lawmaking function of the U.S. Supreme
Court, Fred Schauer has distinguished between a “backward looking” and a
“forward looking” aspect of judicial decisions.510 The former concerns “the
sources of the norms for making decisions in cases”; “[t]o the extent that its
decision is based on norms not already embodied in authoritative legal ma-

504 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984); see also Nina
A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 743–44 n.25 (2004).
505 Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 980.
506 Id.
507 Id. at 984.
508 Id. at 982.
509 Id. at 984.
510 Frederick Schauer, Refining the Lawmaking Function of the Supreme Court, 17 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 1, 1–2 (1983).
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terials, the Court is accused of, or praised for, making law.”511 State courts
are sometimes thought to have lawmaking authority in this sense—for instance, they are often thought to have greater latitude to translate policy or
moral views into binding legal norms than do federal courts, which are typically seen as limited to the interpretation of authoritative statutory or constitutional materials. If this view is correct, then state courts would be entitled to the strong form of Chevron-style deference described earlier: Having
been delegated authority to make law, it would not be possible for the state
supreme court to be “wrong” about the content of state law, and federal
courts should defer accordingly.
We do often think about state courts in this way, particularly when
they are operating within the scope of the common law tradition.512 Although there are no express delegations of lawmaking authority in the state
constitutions, most states do have positive enactments—either in their state
constitutions or in statutes—“receiving” the common law of England,513 and
it seems fair to interpret those enactments not only as receiving the substantive law but also endorsing the judge-driven method by which it was
made.514 Indeed, a significant subset of those reception statutes explicitly
endorse the state courts’ role in applying and developing the common
511

Id. at 1.
See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS
L.J. 881, 896–97 (1989) (“Unlike their federal counterparts, state courts continue to play an avowedly
generative role in the growth of American law. As the energy of state courts in forging new common
law rules in areas as diverse as products liability and corporate take-overs attests, state courts are imbued with the power and creative ethos of the common law tradition.”); WILLIAM E. NELSON,
AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS
SOCIETY, 1760–1830, 171 (1975) (“By the early nineteenth century judicially administered change had
become an abiding and unavoidable feature of the legal system, and for judges to have said that they
were merely applying precedent in bringing about such change would have been to ignore reality.”).
513 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.2 (“The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to
or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, is the
rule of decision in all the courts of this State.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-1 (“All such parts of the
common law as were heretofore in force and use within this State, or so much of the common law as is
not destructive of, or repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the freedom and independence of this State and
the form of government therein established, and which has not been otherwise provided for in whole or
in part, not abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete, are hereby declared to be in full force within this
State.”); see generally Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the United
States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791 (1951) (describing the process of reception throughout the country). Those
states lacking a positive reception provision have generally adopted the common law by judicial decision. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Walker, 21 Conn. 168, 181 (1851) (“We have, in our judicial practice, adopted so much of the common law as was operative as law, in the father-land, when our ancestors left it,
and which was adapted to the new state of things here, under our colonial condition. This was our
inheritance.”).
514 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 513, at 800 (observing that, regardless of the wording of particular
reception statutes, state courts enjoyed wide latitude in determining the content of the common law in
force); see also id. at 823–24 (pointing out that judges possessed an arguably legislative discretion to
determine which common law rules were “inapplicable” to the circumstances of the new states).
512
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law.515 Even those states that have chosen to codify their common law,
such as California, continue to accept a leading role for the state courts in
the evolutionary development of that law.516 And in the key area of commercial law, the Uniform Commercial Code—adopted with relatively little
formal variation in most states—seems plainly to envision that state court
judges will continue to develop the relevant law.517
So there is more positive support for backward-looking state court
lawmaking authority than Professor Nelson has acknowledged. And I have
already discussed the practical arguments for deference to state courts as to
the content of state law.518 Nonetheless, I think he is right to question
whether Erie’s constitutional holding can be rested entirely on this ground.
It remains intelligible, as Nelson points out, to insist that a state court is
“wrong” about the content of state law, even state common law.519 If that is

515 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 1-1 (“The common law of England, as ascertained by English and
American decisions, is declared to be the common law of the State of Hawaii in all cases, except as
otherwise expressly provided by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or by the laws of the
State, or fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage . . . .”); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 77-109 (“The common law as modified by constitutional and statutory law, judicial decisions,
and the conditions and wants of the people, shall remain in force in aid of the General Statutes of this
state . . . .”); MD. CONST. art. 5 (“[T]he Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of
England . . . and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and
other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity . . . .”); OKL. ST. ANN. tit. 12, § 2 (“The common law, as modified by constitutional and statutory law,
judicial decisions and the condition and wants of the people, shall remain in force in aid of the general
statutes of Oklahoma . . . .”); WYO. STAT. § 8-1-101 (receiving “[t]he common law of England as modified by judicial decisions”). The most explicit endorsement of judicial lawmaking comes from the great
state of North Dakota, which provides that “[t]he will of the sovereign power is expressed” not only by
the constitution and statutes of the state, but also by “[t]he decisions of the tribunals enforcing those
rules, which, though not enacted, form what is known as customary or common law.” N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 1-01-03.
516 The codification of much of California’s common law did not, after all, prevent its most famous
Chief Justice from insisting that judges retain “the major responsibility for lawmaking in the basic
common-law subjects.” Roger J. Traynor, No Magic Word Could Do It Justice, 49 CAL. L. REV. 615,
618 (1961).
517 U.C.C. § 1-103 (providing that the UCC “must be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies, which are . . . to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions; . . . to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties; and . . . to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions”). Comment 1 to this section then makes clear that the U.C.C. “is intended to be a semi-permanent
and infrequently-amended piece of legislation” and to “provide its own machinery for expansion of
commercial practices. It is intended to make it possible for the law embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code to be applied by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices.”
See also Bank of New York v. Amoco Oil Co., 35 F.3d 643, 660 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying this section
pursuant to New York state law).
518 See supra text accompanying note 215–222.
519 Nelson, Erie, supra note 6, at 979.
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true, then we may need a different argument to support a categorical rule of
deference.
On the other hand, it also seems relatively clear that backward-looking
lawmaking authority is not, in fact, the critical variable in Swift or Erie.
After all, state courts hardly enjoy such authority vis-à-vis state statutes or
constitutional provisions, and yet even under Swift the federal courts had
generally considered themselves bound to follow state courts’ interpretations of those positive enactments.520 In other words, the critical point was
not whether the state courts were making law as opposed to interpreting
some source of law with an objective existence outside their chambers.
What the federal courts seem to have deferred to is the state courts’ forward
looking authority—that is, their authority to “set[] forth a standard, or principle, or rule that is to be followed and applied by those to whom it is addressed.”521 This aspect of state lawmaking authority thus focuses on the
ability of state courts to settle the meaning of state law going forward.
I submit that once we agree that federal courts sitting in diversity are
applying state law to any question not governed by federal positive law,
then Erie’s rule of deference is fully supported by the necessity that some
court must have final authority to settle the meaning of state law. Ultimate
authority to determine that meaning, of course, resides in the state legislature or the people of the state (who may generally intervene through referenda and constitutional amendment more easily than the people of the United States may do so at the federal level).522 But that is true at the federal
level, too, where Congress may ultimately determine the meaning of federal
statutes through amendment. That fact has never, however, kept courts and
commentators from emphasizing the importance of having one Supreme
Court to resolve disputes about the meaning of federal law.523 A single judicial forum to settle the meaning of state law is no less important to the
persons who must take that law as a guide to their own conduct. Absent
such a forum, persons subject to state law would experience “the debilitating uncertainty in the planning of everyday affairs” that Erie was designed
to prevent.524
That forum has to be the state supreme court. As the Court said long
ago in Murdock v. City of Memphis, “[t]he State courts are the appropriate
tribunals . . . for the decision of questions arising under their local law,
520

See supra text accompanying notes 102–104.
Schauer, supra note 510, at 2.
522 See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF
GOVERNANCE 332-33 (2012) (discussing the high amendment rate of state constitutions).
523 See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (stressing the importance of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s function in ensuring the uniformity of federal law); Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 201–
02 (1960) (asserting that “maintaining the uniformity and supremacy of federal law” is the “essential
constitutional function[]” of the Supreme Court).
524 Ely, supra note 1, at 710–11.
521
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whether statutory or otherwise.”525 Murdock held that the U.S. Supremes
lack jurisdiction to review state supreme court decisions on questions of
state law, and the Court suggested that that statutory bar may have constitutional underpinnings.526 That holding is significant for at least two reasons:
First, it means that the federal courts cannot unify the meaning of state law,
because no federal tribunal has the authority to correct erroneous state interpretations.527 Second, and more fundamentally, as Martha Field has ex525

87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626 (1874).
See id. at 631 (interpreting Section 25 of the Judiciary Act to limit Supreme Court review of
state supreme court decisions to federal questions); see also id. at 633 (reserving judgment as “whether,
if Congress had conferred such authority [to review state law questions], the act would have been constitutional”); see also Harrison, Federal Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 197, at 355 (“Murdock rests in
part on constitutional qualms.”). John Harrison has argued that “Justice Miller’s misgivings, however,
almost certainly derived in large part from substantive premises about the federal structure that were
dominant at the time but that do not derive straightforwardly from the text and that I think are unfounded.” Id. In particular, Professor Harrison argues that Murdock rested on notions of “dual federalism,”
but not the principle of separate and exclusive fields of regulatory authority that I discussed earlier,
supra notes 279–280 and accompanying text, but rather a notion that “interactions between the two
governments, and especially regulation of one level of government by the other, [are] strongly disfavored.” See Harrison, Federal Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 197, at 355. I am not even sure that
this notion is properly viewed as part of “dual federalism,” as opposed to simply a postulate of American sovereignty common to most models of federalism doctrine. See generally Young, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 283 (describing the dual federalist model as I understand it). But without regard to
taxonomy, it is clear that this non-regulation or non-interference principle has a lot more life in it today
than does the model of separate and exclusive spheres of authority to regulate private actors. See, e.g.,
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (striking down the Affordable Care Act’s
expansion of Medicaid on the ground that it coerced state governments); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S.
491 (2008) (striking down an attempt by the President to issue commands to the state courts); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress may not “commandeer” state executive
officials); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may not
subject states to damages liability in suits by individuals pursuant to federal law); U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (holding that neither the state nor the federal government presumptively may regulate the relationship between the people and their elected representatives in the other
government, except as the Constitution expressly permits); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992) (holding that Congress may not require state legislates to enact laws implementing a federal
statutory program); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (“‘It is obviously essential to the
independence of the States, and to their peace and tranquility, that their power to prescribe the qualifications of their own officers . . . should be exclusive, and free from external interference, except so far as
plainly provided by the Constitution of the United States.’”) (quoting Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548,
570–71 (1900)); cf. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J.
947 (2001) (identifying serious constitutional objections to federal regulation of the state courts). In any
event, it may not matter whether Murdock is constitutionally-grounded. Professor Field points out that,
despite Murdock’s avowed reliance on statutory construction, its rule has become “such a fundamental
part of our way of thinking about the boundary between state and federal power that many of our suppositions, constitutional and otherwise, are built upon it.” Field, supra note 55, at 920. The critical point
is that much of our judicial system now rests on a presupposition that the state courts are the last word
on state law.
527 Even if there were no such bar, I have already suggested that it is doubtful that the Court would
be willing to hear the volume of state law cases that that it would take to unify conflicting interpretations
526
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plained, if the federal Supreme Court were allowed to substitute its own
view of state law for that of the highest state court, “it would not be possible to identify any body of law as ‘state law.’ It is thus because of Murdock
that the whole concept of state law as distinct from federal law is a meaningful one.”528
What I hope to have established is that Erie’s rule of deference to state
courts on the construction of state law need not rest solely on the supposition that state courts do something fundamentally different from federal
courts in deciding cases. That rule may also arise from recognizing that the
functions of the two judicial systems are fundamentally similar. That is,
both the U.S. Supreme Court and the state supreme courts share similar
responsibilities for settling the meaning of the bodies of law within their
respective charges. As I tell my students each year, that is why they call
them the state “supreme” courts. It would be hard to identify any good
reason to impute this function to the U.S. Supreme Court on the federal side
without also allowing it to the state supreme courts on the state side. And
to the extent that a state’s constitutional regime vests this responsibility in
the state courts, a federal court’s decision to set aside the state courts’ interpretation of state law must be construed as an attempted act of federal supremacy and measured by the lawmaking criteria of the Supremacy
Clause.529

of state law. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. Of course, it is also true that we lack an appellate mechanism for state supreme courts to review federal applications of state law under Erie. The U.S.
Supremes will occasionally vacate federal circuit court decisions and remand them for reconsideration
in light of state precedents, see, e.g., Thomas v. Am. Home Prods., Inc., 519 U.S. 913 (1996), and the
Court has also encouraged certification of questions on the meaning of state law to the state courts. See
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 80 (1997). But this situation seems less chaotic
than that which would exist were federal courts disobliged of their obligation to follow state decisions.
528 Field, supra note 55, at 922; see also Dogan & Young, supra note 213, at 119–23 (discussing
the significance of the Murdock rule). A limited exception to Murdock allows the U.S. Supreme Court
to review a state court’s decision of a state law question for the purpose of ensuring that the state court is
not manipulating state law in order to undermine or thwart a federal right. See, e.g., Fairfax’s Devisee v.
Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812) (reviewing the Virginia Court of Appeal’s construction
of state property law in order to ensure that the state courts had not construed that law so as to defeat
rights under the federal Treaty of Peace ending the Revolutionary War); HART & WECHSLER, supra note
66, at 457–58 (discussing the concept of “antecedent” state law grounds). Most of these cases are explainable by the presence of federal constitutional guarantees that, while not precluding the state from
changing its law (even through judicial decision) do prevent retroactive changes or require that those
changes be compensated. See, e.g., State of Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938)
(reviewing state court’s decision as to the existence of a contract under state law as a predicate to the
plaintiff’s federal claim for impairment under the Contracts Clause); Dogan & Young, supra note 213,
at 120–30 (discussing this exception in the context of claims that a state court’s change in state law has
effected a judicial taking). In any event, even this exception incorporates a significant degree of deference to the state courts’ construction of state law. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 485–86.
529 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 314 n.199 (1984)
(explaining that “there is no general federal judicial power to displace state law”).

File: Young Proofs

108

Created on: 1/16/2014 10:21:00 AM

Last Printed: 1/16/2014 10:22:00 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLICY

[VOL. 10:1

The Supreme Court adopted this view in Green v. Neal’s Lessee.530 As
already mentioned, Green held that federal courts must defer to state courts’
construction of state statutes. The case involved a Tennessee statute of
limitations that the U.S. Supreme Court had construed in a prior case; subsequent decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court, however, had adopted a
contrary construction. The Green Court explained that it would follow the
Tennessee decisions in order to avoid a conflict “arising from two rules of
property within the same state” that would be “deeply injurious” to the
state’s citizens.531 This rationale is consistent with what Professors Bridwell and Whitten describe as the basic purpose of the diversity jurisdiction
itself—that is, to protect the settled expectations of private parties.532
On this reading, Erie does rest on a premise about state constitutional
law. That premise, however, is simply that state constitutions, by vesting
the judicial power of the state in the state supreme courts, entrust those
courts with the authority to settle the prospective meaning of state law until
that meaning is altered by the legislature or other democratic processes of
the state. This assumption strikes me as a somewhat safer, or at least less
controversial, assumption than the one that Justice Holmes made and that
Professor Nelson criticizes.
2.

What if State Courts Don’t Want Federal Deference?

The role of state courts in settling the meaning of state law also responds to Professor Green’s objection, which is that we cannot take for
granted that state courts want to bind the federal courts. Green’s argument
is not so much a critique of Erie as an effort to play out its implications: If
Erie requires federal courts to follow state courts on matters not governed
by positive federal law, he argues, then whether or not to defer to state court
interpretations of the common law would seem to depend on whether state
courts want deference.533 It is at least logically possible that they do not. If
a state should choose to stick with Swift and view the common law as “general” law shared by all American jurisdictions, then Erie provides no obvious reason why federal courts should defer to the state courts’ construction
of that law.534 I think Green’s argument, while ingenious, ultimately underrates the reasons compelling federal court deference to state court decisions.
530

31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291 (1832); see also BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 111 (discussing
this case).
531 Green, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 300.
532 See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 67–68.
533 See Green, Suppressed Premise, supra note 248, at 1135–36.
534 Professor Green ultimately concludes that Erie is right, because if a state’s supreme court’s
decisions are binding on the inferior courts of a state (which they are) then a principle of “nondiscrimination” requires that they also be binding on federal courts. See id. at 1147. I agree that the role of the
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As an initial matter, I am not at all convinced that any American jurisdiction continues to view the common law as “general” in nature or to accept the holding of Swift that federal diversity courts should not defer to
state courts on the meaning of that law. Professor Green points to the Great
State of Georgia, and he begins by citing the Georgia Supreme Court’s
statement reaffirming Swift in Slaton v. Hall:
The common law is presumed to be the same in all the American states where it prevails.
Though courts in the different states may place a different construction upon a principle of
common law, that does not change the law. There is still only one right construction. If all
the American states were to construe the same principle of common law incorrectly, the
common law would be unchanged.535

Green acknowledges, of course, that Slaton came down nine years before Erie. He points out that such a late reaffirmation of Swift sets Georgia
apart from the numerous states that had condemned Swift by that late date.
And it is true that if Erie was right about the federal courts’ lack of constitutional power to dictate to the states on matters of common law, then Justice Brandeis could hardly impose his views on legal positivism on an unwilling state. But the notion that the general common law retains some sort
of Platonic existence irrespective of the decisions of the courts in all fifty
states is so far from contemporary understandings of jurisprudence that one
would want to see a pretty clear statement from the modern Georgia courts
indicating that this remains their view.
Professor Green does not have one.536 And, aside from the few odd
conflicts cases Green cites, Georgia seems to behave pretty much like any
state supreme court vis-à-vis other state courts is a critical factor, but I think the reasons for federal court
deference are more fundamental than a principle of nondiscrimination.
535 148 S.E. 741, 743 (Ga. 1929) (quoted in Green, Suppressed Premise, supra note 248, at 1123).
536 Green infers the notion that Georgia adheres to Swift entirely from some state conflict of laws
decisions in which Georgia courts have reached an independent judgment as to the content of a sister
state’s law. Green, Suppressed Premise, supra note 248, at 1126–27, n.89 (citing Trs. of Jesse Parker
Williams Hosp. v. Nisbet, 189 Ga. 807, 811 (1940); Calhoun v. Cullum’s Lumber Mill, Inc., 545 S.E.2d
41, 45 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Leavell v. Bank of Commerce, 314 S.E.2d 678, 678 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
Slaton itself was a case of this type. See id. at 1123 (“[S]trictly speaking [Slaton] held only that Alabama decisions could be ignored when interpreting the common law of Alabama.”). Green reads these
cases to say that “if the matter is governed by the common law (including apparently local common
law), [Georgia courts] come to their own judgment about what this common law is. This suggests that
they do not think that their own common-law decisions bind sister-state—or federal—courts.” Id. at
1126–27. Green acknowledges a far more likely possibility, however: “One might read these cases as
simply applying Georgia common law to events in sister states.” Id. at 1126 n.89. He acknowledges
that “[a] few cases do put the matter this way,” id. (citing White v. Borders, 123 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1961)), but he characterizes that possibility as “an inaccurate description of Georgia’s approach,” id. at 1126 n.89. Green’s point is simply that ignoring a sister state’s tort rules would be inconsistent with Georgia’s conflict of laws principles. Id. That may be so, but this sort of inconsistency
seems far more likely than a covert adherence to Swift. After all, the only authority on Georgia conflicts
rules that Professor Green cites states the Georgia rule in exactly the way that Green characterizes as
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other state with regard to its common law. Georgia has, in fact, adopted the
U.C.C. (which would be unnecessary if Swift’s general commercial law
were still operative), and the state legislature—like other legislatures—
continues to tweak its provisions.537 Scholars have written about the extent
to which Georgia has or has not adopted this or that aspect of the U.C.C.,538
but if Swift v. Tyson were still good law in Georgia one would expect to see
some mention of that fact in these legislative debates or scholarly discussions. One does not. Likewise, Georgia conflicts of laws cases talk about
the state’s rejection of the Second Restatement and the applicability of
Georgia common law,539 both of which would be odd things to do if those
courts thought a Swiftian general law governed conflicts or other common
law subjects. It would be a surprising thing indeed if any American state
persisted in the view that common law is general, so that other jurisdictions’ courts need not defer to that state’s courts in interpreting the law of
that jurisdiction. What is unsurprising is the lack of any evidence for that
phenomenon.
In any event, I do not think that Erie leaves the federal courts obligation of deference up to the state courts. I have argued that federal courts
should defer to state courts on the meaning of state law for reasons analogous to the grounds of deference in administrative law: state courts have
greater expertise with respect to state law;540 they are more democratically
accountable to the state electorate;541 and state law typically delegates lawmaking authority to state courts.542 Professor Green’s argument questions
only the third of these grounds, but the first two are sufficient to provide
strong pragmatic justifications for deference.
One might object that, if a state really does view the common law as
unitary and general, then the relevant law is not state law at all. On this
“inaccurate.” See John B. Rees, Jr., Choice of Law in Georgia: Time to Consider a Change?, 34
MERCER L. REV. 787, 789–90 (1983) (“When no statute is involved, the common law of Georgia controls; the other jurisdiction's decisions construing its own common law will be ignored.”). Tellingly,
Green cites no language whatsoever from a contemporary Georgia court explicitly endorsing a view that
is anything like Slaton’s pre-positivist manifesto.
537 See, e.g., Bryan Cave Alert, Recent Legislative Action Regarding Changes to Article 9 of Georgia’s Uniform Commercial Code (“The Georgia UCC”), April 23, 2013, available at
http://www.bryancave.com/files/Publication/15bf7345-bfc0-4dd7-8508680fa4c906a2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/cf104535-9375-4389-b8f276a4f09335e2/Financial%20Services%20Alert_%204.23.13.pdf.
538 See, e.g., Albert H. Conrad, Jr. & Richard P. Kessler, Jr., Proposed Revisions to the Georgia
Uniform Commercial Code: A Status Report, 43 MERCER L. REV. 887 (1992) (not mentioning it).
539 See, e.g., Convergys Corp. v. Keener, 582 S.E.2d 84 (Ga. 2003) (refusing to follow a contractual law-selection clause “[b]ecause the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws has never been adopted in
Georgia, and because we continue to refuse to enforce contractual rights which contravene the policy of
Georgia”).
540 See supra notes 216, 219–220 and accompanying text.
541 See supra notes 217, 221 and accompanying text.
542 See supra notes 501–504 and accompanying text.
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view, as the Georgia Supreme Court put it in Slaton, “[t]he common law is
presumed to be the same in all the American states where it prevails.”543 If
that is true, then any given state’s courts could claim no special expertise or
democratic connection to that general law. But it is not true. In the nineteenth century, courts applying the general commercial law could ground
that law in a shared body of commercial custom that virtually all jurisdictions had agreed to respect. But outside of commercial law, principles of
general law lacked any comparable positive grounding. To the extent that
general law exists today, it is a collection of general principles and “best
practices”—such as the American Law Institute’s “Restatements”—that all
agree require positive acts by particular jurisdictions in order to confer on
them the force of law.544 And when individual jurisdictions do adopt those
principles, they inevitably do so with particular variations reflecting the fact
they have been adopted as state law.545
There is, however, an even more fundamental reason that the Constitution mandates federal court deference to state court decisions. I have argued that whether or not state courts have a “backward-looking” lawmaking
function, they surely have a “forward-looking” one.546 That is, they have
the authority and the obligation to settle the meaning of state law—at least
unless and until the legislature intervenes—whether or not they have the
authority to “make” that law in the first instance. The federal courts cannot
perform that function; for reasons already discussed, it is exclusively delegated to the state courts. And because there is no “mystic over-law”547 to
apply as an alternative, federal courts can only apply the state law administered by the state courts.
* * *
Erie affirms the definitive power and obligation of state courts to settle
the meaning of state law, and that is sufficient to answer both Professor
Nelson’s and Professor Green’s objections. But I doubt that this proposition about state law is all that Erie stands for. If Erie simply means that
“the nation lacks power to make state law,” as Professor Weinberg puts it,
then “[n]othing in that holding qualifies national power to make federal
law.”548 And yet Erie said that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the
543

148 S.E. 741, 743 (Ga. 1929).
See Nelson, General Law, supra note 74, at 505 (“In modern times, rules of [general law] are
rarely thought to govern legal questions of their own force; they apply only to the extent that custom or
positive adoption has incorporated them into the law of a particular sovereign.”).
545 See, e.g., Conrad & Kessler, supra note 538 (describing the variations in Georgia’s adoption of
the U.C.C.).
546 See supra notes 510–532 and accompanying text.
547 The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
548 Weinberg, Federal Common Law, supra note 266, at 812.
544
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law of the state . . . There is no federal general common law.”549 Erie thus
spoke not only to how federal courts ascertain the meaning of state law, but
also to where state law and federal law respectively apply. It is the latter
point that is critical for most of our contemporary debates about Erie, because those debates focus on federal courts’ power to fashion federal common law or to apply common-law-like norms such as customary international law.550 The remainder of my discussion focuses on this aspect of
Erie.
IV. ERIE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, AND THE NEW DEAL SETTLEMENT
This last part briefly addresses Erie’s place in the architecture of contemporary federalism doctrine. That doctrine is largely a child of the New
Deal, which put an end to the old dual federalism model and ushered in an
era of largely concurrent federal and state regulatory authority.551 This shift
from separate and exclusive spheres of regulatory jurisdiction to largely
overlapping ones preceded a parallel shift in the way that federalism is enforced. Under dual federalism, courts had drawn lines between the two
regulatory worlds and invalidated measures, state or federal, that overstepped into the other government’s territory. Contemporary federalism
doctrine, by contrast, emphasizes the political and institutional safeguards
of federalism—especially the representation of the states in Congress and
the procedural difficulty of making federal law.552 Although the leading
case associated with this latter shift—Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority553—is also associated with judicial abdication,554 it has
become clear since that Garcia’s notion of “process federalism” can be
enforced with significant bite.555 Although the Court continues to enforce
some sort of outer bound to Congress’s authority,556 the most important
cases have to do with what goes on within the realm of Congress’s enumer549

Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
See, e.g., Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 623 (identifying customary international law as
the true issue).
551 See Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note 289, at 257–61; Gardbaum, supra note 105, at 486.
552 See Wechsler, supra note 290 (stressing political safeguards); Clark, Procedural Safeguards,
supra note 306.
553 469 U.S 528 (1985).
554 See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709
(1985).
555 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–22 (1997) (relying in part on process
arguments to hold that Congress may not commandeer state executive officials); see generally Young,
Two Cheers, supra note 292; see also Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341 (anticipating this development).
556 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School
Zones Act as outside Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause).
550
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ated powers—powers which, after all, now largely overlap with those of the
States.557
Where does Erie fit in all this? A significant school of thought holds
that it doesn’t fit at all. Kurt Lash asserts that Erie “had nothing to do with
nationalism, redistribution, or any other part of the New Deal political
agenda.”558 As Edward Purcell puts it, Erie “bore an oblique and problematic relationship to the jurisprudence of the ‘Roosevelt Court.’”559 And Suzanna Sherry, invoking the Court’s expansion of federal authority in cases
like Wickard v. Filburn560 and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin,561 as well as its
undermining of state sovereignty and “exclusive territoriality” in cases like
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,562 asserts that “[t]he Erie Court’s
solicitude for state sovereignty, and its reliance on ‘pre-New Deal federalism,’ is inexplicable in the midst of this march toward federal dominance.”563
I have already rejected the notion that Erie relied on “pre-New Deal
federalism,”564 but I now want to press the further claim that Erie actually
fits rather well with post-New Deal federalism jurisprudence. In fact, it is
fair to say that Erie is the archetypal case of that jurisprudence. I do not
claim that Erie is a product of the New Deal jurisprudence or quarrel with
Professor Purcell’s account of Erie as a specimen of Brandisian progressivism.565 As Susan Bandes has noted, “[t]he age that gave rise to the Erie
decision was ending as the decision was issued, dramatically altering many
of the social concerns and political assumptions on which the decision had
been based.”566 I do claim that Erie, despite being a product of an earlier
era, fit beautifully with the federalism doctrine that would emerge after the
New Deal.
The statements from Professor Sherry and others quoted above take an
unfortunately simplistic view of what the New Deal and the New Deal
Court accomplished. The point, as Stephen Gardbaum has well demonstrated, was not simply to achieve “federal dominance” but to liberate government at both the state and national levels from the constraints imposed

557

See Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note 289, at 261–65.
Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of the New Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 461 (2001).
559 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 3.
560 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
561 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
562 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
563 Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 148 (quoting Green, supra note 5, at 607); see also Bandes,
supra note 237, at 850 (arguing that Erie’s federalism—at least as understood by its Legal Process
school defenders—was completely cut off from its historical roots).
564 See supra Part III.A.1.
565 See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 114.
566 BANDES, supra note 237, at 849.
558
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on it by the Old Court.567 Those constraints included not only a more limited affirmative commerce power, but also notions of economic substantive
due process and a rigorously enforced dormant Commerce Clause that kept
the states from regulating pursuant to their view of the public interest.568
After the New Deal, both the national and the state governments enjoy
broad regulatory scope, and attention necessarily shifts to the modes of resolving conflicts that may arise between their efforts.569
Erie’s place in this post-New Deal vision stands out in the preface to
the first edition of the famous Hart & Wechsler casebook on federal jurisdiction, published in 1953. That preface compares the “[p]roblems of federal and state legislative competence” that generally arise in “elementary
courses in constitutional law” with the problems to be addressed in the new
book.570 The former sort of problems, which “arise in clear-cut instances of
conflict” and call for “adjudication of competing claims of power,” “touch
only the beginnings of the problems.”571 Rather,
[f]or every case in which a court is asked to invalidate a square assertion of state or federal
legislative authority, there are many more in which the allocation of control does not involve
questions of ultimate power; Congress has been silent with respect to the displacement of the
normal state-created norms, leaving courts to face the problem as an issue of choice of
law.572

The latter sort of case is, of course, Erie. No federal statute had sought
to set a railroad’s duty of care to a passerby, and thus the case presented no
question of “ultimate power”; instead, the federal diversity court faced a
difficult “choice of law” problem in judging between the general common
law and the law of the state. In a world of largely concurrent jurisdiction,
Professors Hart and Wechsler insisted, these would be the most important
problems.573
The judicial federalism rationale of Erie also fits comfortably with the
process federalism that dominates contemporary federalism doctrine. Justice Blackmun explained in Garcia that “the principal means chosen by the
567 Gardbaum, supra note 105, at 486 (“[W]hat occurred in many areas was not a shift from exclusive state authority to concurrent federal and state authority, but a shift from a regulatory vacuum to
concurrent powers: both federal and state governments were constitutionally enabled to regulate a large
number of areas of social and economic life that previously they had both been prohibited from regulating.”).
568 See id. at 564–65.
569 See Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note 289, at 261–62.
570 Quoted in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at vi.
571 Id.
572 Id.
573 See Mishkin, supra note 284, at 1686 (arguing that Erie is of profound constitutional significance whether or not Congress could override it, because “it rests on premises related to the basic nature
of our federal system which are presupposed to govern in the absence of clear congressional determination to change and reallocate power within that system”).
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Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the
structure of the Federal Government itself.”574 Separation of powers at the
national level, in other words, is the key to federalism. Hence, as Brad
Clark has recognized, “the Constitution prescribes precise procedures to
govern the adoption of each source of law recognized by the Supremacy
Clause as ‘the supreme Law of the Land,’” and “all of these procedures
assign responsibility for adopting such supreme law solely to actors subject
to the political safeguards of federalism.”575 And whatever doubts one
might have about the efficacy of political safeguards standing alone,576
“federal lawmaking procedures continue to constrain federal lawmaking
simply by establishing multiple ‘veto gates,’ and thus effectively creating a
supermajority requirement.”577 In the later stages of the Swift regime, federal courts had begun to displace state law by formulating effectively federal rules of decision without regard to this system of structural safeguards.578
By insisting that federal courts may not make federal law outside the constitutionally ordained legislative process, Erie became the central decision of
modern process federalism.579
Professor Purcell offers a different view near the conclusion of his
book on Erie. He contends that “[a]lthough Erie constrained the federal
courts in some ways, it also channeled them in new directions where they
could enjoy freedom and, eventually, even greater power.”580 He worries
that Justice Brandeis’s judicial federalism “corollary” has become “of uncertain import” in contemporary jurisprudence, “because the social and
institutional trajectory of the twentieth century challenged the corollary’s
wisdom and utility, and hence its power to command judicial allegiance.”581
“[I]n an age of accelerating interstate and international integration,” he
writes, judges “could not deny the compelling need for effective national
ordering in those areas they valued most highly and thought most essential
to the nation’s well-being.”582 Purcell supports this concern by noting a
scholarly literature asserting that “[t]he Rehnquist Court . . . actively made
574

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985).
Clark, Erie’s Source, supra note 90, at 1304.
576 See, e.g., Prakash & Yoo, supra note 305, at 1459 ; Baker & Young, supra note 305, at 106–33.
577 Clark, Erie’s Source, supra note 90, at 1304–05.
578 See, e.g., BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 63, at 115–27; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66,
at 556–58; Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of General
Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1319 (2000).
579 This is not lost on all of Erie’s critics. GREVE, supra note 4, at 242 (“[T]he true protection for
the ‘states as states’ is not their representation in Congress. Rather, it is the certainty that Congress will
consistently fail to enact, and federal courts will under Erie refuse to supply, federal rules of decision in
a specified domain—the state exploitation of interstate commerce. So viewed, Erie’s legacy dovetails
with the New Deal’s ambivalent preemption doctrine.”) (emphasis in original).
580 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 300.
581 Id. at 302.
582 Id.
575
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law implementing its values, sometimes ignoring or setting aside congressional actions in the process.”583
It is hard to say, however, that the Rehnquist Court’s activism—such
as it was—cut against Erie’s principle of judicial federalism. That Court
continued an earlier tendency to restrict federal common law with respect to
both primary obligations and implied federal remedies.584 The Court’s 2004
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain585 provides an important example. In
its first significant encounter with human rights suits under the Alien Tort
Statute,586 the Court wrote that “[a] series of reasons argue for judicial caution when considering the kinds of individual claims that might implement
the jurisdiction conferred by the early statute.”587 Prominent among these
reasons were the conception of law affirmed in Erie and that decision’s
“significant rethinking of the role of the federal courts in making [common
law].”588 Whether or not Sosa resolved the longstanding dispute about the
status of customary international law in domestic courts,589 it left little doubt
about the continuing importance of Erie as a restraint on judicial lawmaking.
Moreover, Professor Purcell’s assurance that the future belongs to national power may itself be out of date. In 1937, at the height of the New
Deal (and a year before Erie), a significant majority of Americans favored
concentration of power in the federal government as opposed to the
583

Id. at 406 n.85.
See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (narrowing the implied
right of action under the Alien Tort Statute to exclude wholly extraterritorial cases); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (restricting federal common law implied rights of action under federal statutes); O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 83–86 (1994) (holding that state law governed the
liability of a failed bank’s former law firm in a suit brought by a federal agency as receiver); United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (establishing a balancing test for federal common
lawmaking that presumptively tips in favor of state law); but see Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S.
500 (1988) (establishing a federal common law “military contractor defense” in products liability actions, even though the United States was not a party). For an overall assessment, see generally HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 629 (stating that “characteristic[s] of the Court’s current approach to
federal common lawmaking” include “careful analysis of the asserted need for uniformity, concern that
federal rules of decision will generate intrastate disuniformity, and a preference for incorporation of
state law absent a demonstrated need for a uniform federal rule of decision”).
585 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
586 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts in a “civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations”). On the ATS, see generally HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 679–85.
587 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
588 Id. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, would have gone
further and eliminated altogether judicial discretion to recognize customary international law claims
under the ATS, based on “Erie’s fundamental holding that a general common law does not exist.” Id. at
744 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (emphasis in original).
589 See, e.g., Bradley, Goldsmith, & Moore, supra note 16 (addressing this question); Ernest A.
Young, Sosa and the Retail Incorporation of International Law, 120 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 28–35
(2007), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/young.pdf (same).
584
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states;590 however, a recent overview of opinion research observed that
“trust in the federal government has declined since the 1960s,” while “attitudes toward subnational governments have held steady or even improved.”591 A survey in April of 2013 found that 57% of Americans viewed
state governments favorably while only 28% viewed the federal government favorably.592 Because our system rests, as Alexander Hamilton pointed out, on intergovernmental competition for “the confidence and good will
of the people,” these opinion trends matter.593
These trends in public opinion correspond to changes in institutional
reality. As Alice Rivlin has observed, “[t]he dissatisfaction with state government that reached a crescendo in the 1960s not only prompted an explosion of federal activity, it also brought a wave of reform to the states themselves. . . . [S]tates took steps to turn themselves into more modern, responsive, competent governments.”594 The result is an increasingly stark
contrast between political gridlock at the national level and policy innovation in the states. States have led the way on gay rights, with the federal
government acting primarily as a brake on reform. 595 Individual states have
590 See Megan Mullin, Federalism, in, PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 209,
217 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan, eds. 2008). In the 1937 poll, Americans favored
the federal government by 46 to 34 percent; in polls with the same wording taken in 1981 and 1995,
those numbers had reversed to 28 to 56 percent and 26 to 64 percent, respectively. Id.
591 Id. at 214 (collecting opinion studies from 1976 to 2006).
592 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 17. By October, in the midst of the latest round of government shutdown and debt ceiling follies, the federal government’s favorable had declined further to 19
percent. See PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, Trust in Government Nears Record
Low, But Most Federal Agencies Are Viewed Favorably (October 18, 2013), available at
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/10-18-13%20Trust%20in%20Govt%20Update.pdf. The
October poll does not appear to have addressed confidence in state governments. See also Chris Cilizza
& Aaron Blake, Are We in the End Times of Trust in Government, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/02/07/are-we-in-the-end-times-of-trust-ingovernment/ (lamenting a steep and lasting decline in trust in the federal government, but ignoring data
on robust public trust in the states).
593 The Federalist No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton), at 109 (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961); see also Robert A.
Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 1669 (2007) (arguing that trust levels
affect the federal balance of power).
594 ALICE M. RIVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE ECONOMY, THE STATES & THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 102 (1992); see also PHILIP W. ROEDER, PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY
LEADERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN STATES 24-27 (1994) (collecting studies indicating that state governmental capacity has improved significantly in recent decades); Van Horn, supra note 17, at 2–3 (describing a “quiet revolution” as a result of “changes in representation, government organization, and
managerial competence” at the state level, with the result that “[s]tate officials are far more willing and
able to carry out significant responsibilities”).
595 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (striking down the federal
Defense of Marriage Act, which denied federal recognition to same-sex marriages, as applied to a couple married under the laws of New York; the Court emphasized that “[t]he State’s decision to give this
class of persons the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import”); Letter
from Dayna K. Shah, Managing Assoc. Gen. Cousnel, GAO, to Senators Tom Harkin, Susan Collins &
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developed their own policies to combat global warming even while pressing
a reluctant federal government to take action.596 States have played a similar role on immigration reform, taking action on their own while also stimulating a national debate on the subject.597 Even healthcare reform, the current administration’s signature national policy innovation, seems to have
dubious prospects at the national level while individual states continue to
pursue more radical reforms.598
It is thus far from obvious that, as Professor Purcell contends, our “social and institutional trajectory” continues to undermine the “wisdom and
utility” of Erie’s view of federalism. Many lawyers and academics formed
their views about federalism in an earlier era, when state autonomy seemed
both technologically outdated and morally retrograde.599 Whether or not
that view was ever fair, a lot has happened since then, and Purcell’s view
Jeff Merkely, Re: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Employment Discrimination: Overview of
State
Statutes
and
Complaint
Data
(Oct.
1,
2009),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10135r.pdf (“Although federal law does not prohibit discrimination in
employment on the basis of sexual orientation, 21 states and the District of Columbia provide such
protection in their statutes.”).
596 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (upholding the standing of a group of
states to challenge the federal Environmental Protection Agency’s refusal to issue regulations governing
greenhouse gas emissions); Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 19258, at *13
(9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2013) (upholding California’s Low Carbon Fuels Standard against a dormant Commerce Clause challenge and noting that “California's role as a leader in developing air-quality standards
has been explicitly endorsed by Congress in the face of warnings about a fragmented national market”);
see also REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/home (last visited Nov. 3, 2013)
(agreement by nine northeastern and mid-Atlantic states to establish a regional cap and trade program
for electric generating plants).
597 See generally David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J.
CONST.
L.
&
PUB.
POL’Y
(forthcoming
2013),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264483; Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance
of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008).
598 Compare, e.g., Amy Goldstein & Juliet Eilperin, Healthcare.gov: How political fear was pitted
against
technical
needs,
WASH.
POST,
Nov.
2,
2013,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/challenges-have-dogged-obamas-health-plan-since2010/2013/11/02/453fba42-426b-11e3-a624-41d661b0bb78_story.html?hpid=z1 (documenting “the
disastrous rollout of the new federal health insurance marketplace”); Susan Page, USA Today/Pew Poll:
Health care law faces difficult future, USA TODAY (Sept. 16, 2013), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/09/16/usa-today-pew-poll-health-care-lawopposition/2817169/ (“53% disapprove of the health care law, the highest level since it was signed; 42%
approve. By an even wider margin, intensity favors the opposition; 41% of those surveyed strongly
disapprove while just 26% strongly approve.”), with Zach Howard, Vermont Single-Payer Health Care
Law Signed by the Governor, REUTERS (May 26, 2011, 2:44 PM), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/26/vermont-health-care-reform-lawsinglepayer_n_867573.html.
599 See, e.g., Seth Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACADE. POL. & SOC. SCI.
66, 67 (2001) (“In my formative years as a lawyer and legal scholar, during the late 1960s and 1970s,
[federalism] was regularly invoked as a bulwark against federal efforts to prevent racial oppression,
political persecution, and police misconduct.”).
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now seems, well, so sixties.600 In an era of resurgent and innovative states,
accompanied by national gridlock, Erie’s concern for preserving state autonomy is more relevant and more critical than ever.
It is Erie’s limitation of judicial lawmaking that may ultimately motivate some of the more violent attacks on its holding. According to Professor Sherry, “that new myth [Erie’s judicial federalism rationale] has lent
support to a distorted view of what judges do and what they are supposed to
do, in ways that are detrimental to our constitutional democracy.”601 Sherry
thus complains that “Erie has been drafted into service in the war against
judicial ‘activism.’”602 Erie’s real victim, this view suggests, was not so
much Swift v. Tyson as Roe v. Wade.603 The consequences, moreover, are
dire and far-reaching: According to Sherry,
We are now enjoying the benefits of Erie’s dichotomy [between “legitimate judicial interpretation and illegitimate judicial lawmaking”] in the form of a highly politicized judicial nomination process, and academic calls either to abandon judicial review and substitute popular
constitutionalism or to constrain judicial discretion by means of some utopian grand theory
of interpretation. The judiciary, it seems, is in danger of losing both its independence and its
ability to lead.604

This is all a bit overheated for me. In the years that Erie has been understood primarily as a limitation on judicial lawmaking, the Supreme
Court has decided not only Roe but also Lawrence v. Texas,605 Roper v.
Simmons,606 Citizens United v. FEC,607 and Bush v. Gore.608 The Court hard600

See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 396 (extolling a “new progressive federalism”).
Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 150.
602 Id. at 151.
603 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
604 Sherry, Wrong, supra note 6, at 152–53. Each of these specific claims is highly suspect. It is
not clear that the nomination process is any more “politicized” than in the past, at least for supreme
court justices. And I doubt the fights over the lower federal courts have much to do with federal common law. Academic calls to ‘take the Constitution away from the courts’ enjoyed barely fifteen minutes
of prominence before going back out of style, thanks to the appointment of some liberal justices more to
the academy’s liking and, possibly, some pretty devastating reviews. See, e.g., Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Are
“the People” Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 855 (2005) (reviewing
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
and demonstrating that the most plausible historical instance of “popular constitutionalism” was the
South’s “massive resistance” to school desegregation). And while originalism has become more mainstream as a theory of constitutional interpretation, that is owing largely to its becoming less “utopian”—
that is, originalists have loosened the constraints that it purports to impose on judges. See, e.g., Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989) (embracing a “fainthearted” brand
of originalism); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) (pushing a brand of “originalism” that is
basically the same as living constitutionalism).
605 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
606 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
607 558 U.S. 50 (2010).
608 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
601
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ly seems deterred either from addressing the great issues of the day or from
exercising considerable creativity in doing so. And I doubt that the critics
of those decisions will pack up their tents and go home if Erie can be
shown to be in error. Debates about the proper latitude of construction for
constitutional provisions and statutes did not start with Erie, and they will
persist long after Erie has been forgotten.
Putting aside the abundant evidence that the Court is doing just fine in
terms of its “independence and its ability to lead,”609 it is a monstrous leap
to lay current threats to judicial legitimacy at Erie’s door. What Erie did
help to do, however, was to divert federalism doctrine from the highly confrontational track that it had been on prior to the New Deal. Instead, we
now have a federalism doctrine that is largely deferential to the political
process, stepping in where necessary to remedy distortions or circumventions of that process.610 I have argued elsewhere at length that this sort of
role not only plays to judicial competence, but also avoids the risk of damaging institutional confrontations that characterized the era of dual federalism.611
Similarly, Craig Green’s contempt for Erie seems to be motivated by
the impediment it poses to his generation’s equivalent to Professor Sherry’s
substantive due process: customary international law (CIL).612 The Erie
doctrine is hardly the only problem with CIL613 or with current international
human rights litigation in American courts,614 but Erie does provide the
most compelling argument against the federalization of CIL norms through
federal judicial decisions.615 It is hard to think of many instances nowadays,
however, where such federalization is actually important to the agenda of
international human rights,616 and Congress retains the power to federalize
609

Manoj Mate & Matthew Wright, The 2000 Presidential Election Controversy, in PERSILY,
CITRIN & EGAN, supra note 590, at 333, 348–49 (concluding, based on extensive studies of polling data,
that the Supreme Court retained broad public support even after the controversy over Bush v. Gore).
610 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (refusing to invalidate
the “individual mandate” to purchase health insurance under the national Affordable Care Act, but
limiting Congress’s ability to coerce state participation in the Medicaid expansion and leaving states to
make the ultimate judgment about whether to expand their benefit programs).
611 See Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 305, at 65–121.
612 See Green, Repressing, supra note 5, at 623–24.
613 See, e.g., Kadens & Young, supra note 77 (arguing that CIL is not actually customary); Kelly,
supra note 76, at 463-65 (arguing that CIL is not even law).
614 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (concluding that the Alien
Tort Statute does not apply to extraterritorial claims).
615 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725–26 (2004); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 243, at 827; Young, CIL, supra note 84, at 493–96.
616 For many years, the central examples advanced by human rights advocates of CIL norms that
might trump state law involved international law limits on the death penalty. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer,
Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295,
322–26. But these arguments have become largely moot as the Supreme Court has significantly expanded Eighth Amendment limitations on capital punishment. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
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customary norms by statute.617 Significantly, the federal courts have asserted the power to make federal common law in foreign affairs cases, but they
have generally used that power to avoid making broad statements about
international law norms.618 That tendency suggests that caution would prevail concerning the federalization of CIL norms even if Erie had come out
differently. In any event, Erie’s limits on CIL are plainly in step with the
contemporary Court’s caution about international law generally.619
Far from being out of step with the jurisprudence of its era, then, Erie
has proven critical to the New Deal Settlement. As Professor Purcell ultimately acknowledges, Erie “established an essential foundation for the continued operation of legal federalism in a new age of centralization, nationalization, and globalization.”620 If the current American correlation of political forces tells us anything, it is that contemporary pressures to centralize
coexist with resurgent vitality at the state level, even as national governance
seems in crisis. Erie’s interstitial vision of federal law is thus more central
than ever. This is not because subsequent interpreters have twisted Erie to
suit their own purposes, but rather because Justice Brandeis recovered what
the Founders had known all along—that federalism and separation of powers are integrally related, and that the processes by which laws are made
may often be more important than substantive constraints on those laws. In
so doing, Erie put constitutional law on a better footing to deal with the
bewildering complexity of modern governance. That is why Erie deserves
to be understood as the central case of contemporary American federalism.
CONCLUSION
Michael Greve is no doubt right that, as a practical matter, Erie stands
“unassailable” today.621 The decision’s correctness and rationale remain
worth debating, however, if only because they provide a useful practical
551 (2005) (striking down the juvenile death penalty). It is not obvious what will replace the juvenile
death penalty as a doctrinal flashpoint for the CIL issue. Ironically—from Professor Green’s perspective—the best candidate may involve CIL limits on expropriation of private property, which property
rights advocates might invoke to ratchet up scrutiny in takings cases.
617 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (conferring power on Congress “[t]o define and punish . . . offenses
against the law of nations”).
618 See, e.g., Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (explaining the
Court’s reluctance to apply controversial CIL norms of expropriation).
619 See, e.g., Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (warning about “the danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy”); Sanchez–Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 334 (2006) (refusing to defer to the International Court of Justice on a question of treaty interpretation); Medellin v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508 (2008) (holding that an International Court of Justice judgment ordering
reconsideration of a domestic capital conviction of a foreign national was not self-executing and thus
could not be enforced absent action by Congress).
620 PURCELL, supra note 9, at 299.
621 GREVE, supra note 4, at 373.
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frame for some of the most fundamental questions of jurisprudence and
constitutional structure. These include not only what we should understand
judges to be doing when they decide cases, but also the division of lawmaking power between the branches of the national government and the appropriate model for preserving the federal balance. If Erie were otherwise, far
more would change than the law applied in diversity cases.
But as often happens, the conventional wisdom turns out to be correct:
Erie was right, basically for the reasons given in the opinion. The Rules of
Decision Act requires federal courts to apply state law in the absence of
positive federal law, not because of some dubious inference from the Act’s
drafting history but because the kind of general common law that the states
accepted during the Swift era no longer exists. Erie’s insistence on vertical
uniformity—that federal and state courts sitting in the same state should
apply the same law—is far from perfect, but the alternative of horizontal
uniformity among federal courts in different states is likely unattainable; in
any event, the obstacle to that uniformity is not Erie but rather the lack of
uniform and territorial choice of law rules. Justice Brandeis’s nonconstitutional arguments, in other words, remain sound today.
It is Erie’s constitutional reasoning, however, that should claim it a
place at the center of the structural canon. If the Civil Procedure teachers
will not teach it—an endemic problem in some law schools—then the Constitutional Law faculty should. Because “law in the sense in which courts
speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind
it,”622 the displacement of state law must be traceable to the valid exercise
of federal lawmaking authority. Under the federal separation of powers,
that authority generally belongs to Congress, which can legislate only by a
difficult process in which the states are represented. Outside the ambit of
federal legislation (or, sometimes, uniquely preemptive federal interests),
the state law background remains in force. This interstitial view of federal
law, with a broad national lawmaking jurisdiction circumscribed by political and procedural safeguards, remains the most promising model for maintaining our federal balance in the modern era.
Attacks on Erie generally arise out of dissatisfaction with this model.
Federalism is untidy. When one has figured out the optimal legal answer to
a pressing problem, it is hard to see why that solution ought not be adopted
across the board. Democracy is untidy, too, and it is always tempting for
smart people to look to smart judges to fashion new rights or new solutions
when the democratic process seems stalled or uninterested. Against these
impulses, Erie’s vision of federalism and separation of powers stands for
humility. Consensus eludes us on many important questions, and federalism’s messy patchwork helps us generate new answers or, sometimes, agree
to disagree. Likewise, history teaches us that federal judges have their own
622 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).

File: Young Proofs

2013]

Created on: 1/16/2014 10:21:00 AM

Last Printed: 1/16/2014 10:22:00 AM

A GENERAL DEFENSE OF ERIE RAILROAD CO. V. TOMPKINS

123

foibles as lawmakers; our Constitution places its bet on a uniquely American form of mixed government.
However “unassailable” Erie may be in its original context of choice
of law in diversity cases, the decision’s import sweeps far more broadly. It
is, as I began by saying, the most important federalism decision of the
twentieth century. What remains is for courts and commentators to take
Erie’s rationale more seriously in the important and related debates that
continue to arise in the twenty-first. These include matters of administrative preemption, the domestic status of customary international law, and
continuing controversies over the lawmaking authority of federal courts.
Erie’s wisdom may be conventional, but it still has much to teach us.

